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Abstract
This thesis consists of four largely independent essays on game theory and the allo-
cation of resources. It applies both theoretical and empirical methods, covering both
cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretical approaches. The thesis focuses on
three different allocation mechanisms: auctions, grandfathering and the Shapley value.
The first two mechanisms are applied directly within the fisheries context whilst the
Shapley value is discussed in a general setting. Theoretical applications often employ a
number of assumptions, which are rarely met in practice, and fail to take into account
the contextual setting. This thesis empirically analyses real life examples in order to
enhance our understanding of individual players and their interactions. The first chap-
ter on the famous solution concept — the Shapley value — introduces a cooperative
game in which some of the information may be missing from the characteristic function.
We put forward two ways of extending the Shapley value to the missing information
domain. Using our proposals, it is possible to find a ‘fair and efficient solution’ in situ-
ations where coalitions might not have formed or information is withheld. The second
chapter presents a theoretical model for fisheries which is capable of exploring the ef-
fects of utilising different combinations of allocation mechanisms — grandfathering and
auctions — for fishing quota. In the model, the government has applied an environmen-
tal tax, which can be reduced through investment, to limit the negative externalities
of the fishing activity. This in turn affects the firms’ valuations at the auctions, incor-
porating bidder valuations as an endogenous component within the model. The model
demonstrates the effects of changing specific variables within the government’s control
on revenue, total welfare, level of investment and equilibrium prices at the auction. We
conclude by stating that the model is applicable in the fisheries context, but further
work is required to improve its relevance in the policy arena. The third chapter is an
empirical essay on the ascending and uniform-price multiunit auctions of fishing rights
in the Faroe Islands from 2016 to 2018. In the essay, we identify problems with sig-
nalling, bidding rings and low-price equilibria. We believe this is the first case of all
three phenomena happening in the same bidding environment. We conclude that the
underperformance of ascending and uniform-price auctions are not just theoretical cu-
riosities, but rather a pervasive phenomenon in practical auction design. We continue
in the empirical domain in the fourth chapter, where we use several methods to analyse
price patterns in the auctions at the Faroe Fish Market in 2017. We apply the method
employed by Ashenfelter (1989) in his work on the declining price anomaly. We also
run regressions to establish how the auction round affects absolute and relative price
changes and explore the impact of the number of bids, quantity sold and the price of
the first round. Finally, we analyse the average price of cod in every round across the
whole period. We find that declining prices are a strong feature of the Faroese fish
market, but after considering contributing factors, we conclude that perhaps declining
prices should not come as such a surprise after all.
	
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Robert R.
Routledge and Professor Demougin D. Dominique for their valuable guidance,
insights and fruitful discussions. I am very grateful for the financial support
from the Economic and Social Research Council, which allowed me to pursue
this project. I would also like to thank PRG and Búagrunnurin for funding my
research stay at Tokyo University.
My deepfelt gratitude goes to my coauthors Robert, Olga, Daniel and Alex
for their excellent collaboration and friendship. It has been a privilege to work
with you. My most sincere thanks goes to Daniel for making my stay at Tokyo
University so productive and wonderful. Throughout my studies, I have greatly
appreciated the friendship and support of Harvey, Robert, Kaori, Sirui and Yun-
chou, as well as the encouragement and discussions with staff at the University
of Liverpool, in particular Yiquan, Christian, Erin, Brendan and Gary.
This research could not have been conducted were it not for the help of many
individuals. A special thanks to Heri Joensen and Hans Ellefsen from the Faroese
Minstry of Fisheries, Jóhan Simonsen and Jan Klein Olsen at the Faroese Fish-
eries Inspectorate, Høgni Hansen, Oddma Osmundsdóttir and Elnar Rasmussen
from the Faroe Fish Market and Esmar Joensen from Formula for giving me
guidance and access to invaluable data and materials.
I would also like to thank all the interviewees that so generously shared their
insights and valuable time with me. I am particularly grateful for the invaluable
knowledge of Anfinn Olsen from Framherji. The discussions have provided me
with a greatly improved understanding of the structure and economics of fisheries.
To my parents I owe everything — the unfaltering love, support and encour-
agement you provide have given me the platform to pursue my dreams. A special
thanks to my father for the many hours he has spent reading, discussing and
guiding this work, and my mother for her encouragement and creating the per-
fect environment for me. I am forever indebted to my wonderful sister for her
continuous guidance, editing and insights into fisheries. In the final stages of this
thesis, when I needed support the most, my sister kept me sane. You were my
cheerleader and I will be forever thankful.
A special thanks to Michael for proofreading the work and for allowing me
to pinch his Spotify account. Thanks for your love and support and for always
believing in me when I need it the most. Finally, I am deeply grateful for my
greatest treasures Sam and Jónas — your presence in my life is a true blessing.
There is no expression, numerical nor literal, to express the love I feel for you.
	
Contents
List of Figures 3
List of Tables 5
Introduction 7
1 Information and the Value of a Game 13
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3 Domain Restrictions and the Shapley Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 A Two-Stage Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2 A Model for Quota Allocation 43
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3 EPIC Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auc-
tions 75
1
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2 Fishing Industry in the Faroes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Auction Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 How Ascending Auctions Fail: Value Advantage, Signalling, and
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5 How Uniform-Price Auctions Fail: Crank-Handle Bidding . . . . 93
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.8 Appendix A: Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.9 Appendix B: Design of Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.10 Appendix C: Average Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.11 Appendix D: Reserve Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.12 Appendix E: Other Demersal Fish Quota Auctions in 2018 . . . . 114
3.13 Appendix F: Auctions for Demersal Fish Quota in the Russian
Part of the Barents Sea in 2016 and 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4 Declining Price Trends: Evidence from a Faroese Fish Market 123
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.2 Faroe Fish Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.3 The Declining Price Anomaly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.6 Appendix A: Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.7 Appendix B: Price Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.8 Appendix C: All Rounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
2
4.9 Appendix D: Cod and Haddock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.10 Appendix E: Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Conclusion 167
Bibliography 175
List of Figures
1.1 Shapley value payoffs and the unknown worth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1 Marginal cost and value functions for firm i. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 Value function, demand and maximum price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3 Surplus from trade in grandfathered quota and demand at auction . . 50
2.4 How to obtain the residual supply from total supply on auction and
demand functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5 Total payment of firm 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6 Utility of firm i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.7 Total welfare from firm i’s operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.8 Utility and payments of firm 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.9 Revenue from firm i’s purchases of quota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.10 Marginal values and maximum price on auction . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.11 Demand and supply on auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 Hockey-stick bidding in an electricity market (data taken from Hurlbut
et al. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2 Prices in the auctions for quota for demersal fish in Russian waters . 88
3.3 Final prices in the 2017 auctions for quota for mackerel (25 lots) . . 91
3.4 Aggregate bid schedule of the incumbents and the supply of quota in
the 2018 auction for quota for demersal fish in Svalbard . . . . . . . 93
3
3.5 Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for demersal fish quota in
Svalbard and market share of grandfathered quota (prior to the auction) 94
3.6 A hockey stick, a crank-handle, and a bidding schedule . . . . . . . . 95
3.7 Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.8 Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for one-year quota of de-
mersal fish in Russian waters and grandfathered quota share of supply
(prior to the auction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.9 Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota for
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea . . . . . . . . 98
3.10 Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota of
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and grand-
fathered quota share of supply (prior to the auction) . . . . . . . . . 99
3.11 Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for three-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.12 Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for three-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters and grandfathered quota share of sup-
ply (prior to the auction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.13 Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.14 Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters and grandfathered quota share of sup-
ply (prior to the auction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.15 Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea . . . . . . . . 118
3.16 Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and grand-
fathered quota share of supply (prior to the auction) . . . . . . . . . 119
3.17 Aggregate bid schedule in the 2016 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.18 Aggregate bid schedule in the 2017 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.1 Binned scatterplot of price on round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.2 Regression coefficients for estimating price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4
4.3 Binned scatterplot and coefficient plot for price of cod 5 . . . . . . . 141
4.4 Regression coefficients for estimating price changes relative to the pre-
vious price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.5 Average price of cod 4 in each round and regression line . . . . . . . . 144
4.6 Binned scatterplots for price of cod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.7 Binned scatterplots for price of haddock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.8 Regression coefficients for estimating price change relative to first price 164
List of Tables
2.1 Effect of changing qGi on prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2 Utility and revenue when changing qGi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1 Companies operating in pelagic fisheries and demersal fisheries in the
Barents Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.2 Total quantities (tonnes) sold on auction in 2016–2018 . . . . . . . . 105
3.3 Dates and types of auctions including quantities (tonnes) sold in 2016 108
3.4 Dates and types of auctions including quantities (tonnes) sold in 2017 110
3.5 Dates and types of auctions including quantity, maturity and area of
quota sold in 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.6 Weighted average prices in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.7 Weighted average prices in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.8 Weighted average prices in 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.9 Reserve prices in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.10 Reserve prices in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.11 Reserve prices in 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.12 All bids in the 2016 auction for one-year quota for demersal fish in
Russian waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.13 Incumbents’ bids in the 2016 auction for one-year quota for demersal
fish in Russian waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.1 Number of transactions in each round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5
4.2 Distribution of price patterns on the aggregate and species level . . . 135
4.3 Average increases and decreases in price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.4 Estimation result of price on round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.5 Mixed regression model for estimating prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.6 Estimation results of prices on rounds and the first price . . . . . . . 140
4.7 Estimation results of price change relative to previous price . . . . . . 143
4.8 Estimation results for average price of cod 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.9 Predicting relative price changes (first round) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.10 Estimating price change relative to previous price of cod . . . . . . . 148
4.11 Fish types, number of transactions, quantities and average prices in
2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.12 Summary statistics of price and quantity per fish type . . . . . . . . 154
4.13 Distribution of price patterns (first price) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.14 Average increases and decreases in price (first price) . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.15 Estimation results of price on all rounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.16 Estimation results of price changes on all rounds . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.17 Estimation results for price of cod 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.18 Estimation results for price of cod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.19 Estimation results for price of haddock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.20 Estimation results of price change relative to first price . . . . . . . . 164
4.21 Predicting relative price changes (previous round) . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6
Introduction
This thesis consists of four largely independent essays on game theory and the
allocation of resources. “Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical
models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers.”
(Myerson, 1991, p. 1). Game theory offers a set of analytical tools designed to
understand situations in which a decision maker’s behaviour affects his or her
own gains and losses, as well as those of other decision makers (Pham Do, 2009).
Since its development in the early 20th century, game theory has been applied
in many fields; e.g. economics, political science and biology. The essays in this
thesis largely focus on fisheries.
Game theory has been applied extensively to the topic of fisheries. Most of this
literature focuses on management of shared fish stocks (e.g. Munro, 1979; Levhari
and Mirman, 1980; Lindroos et al., 2007; Pham Do, 2009; Hannesson, 2011), but
many also focus on fish market auctions (Armstrong, 2000; Fluvià et al., 2012;
Gallegati et al., 2011; Salladarré et al., 2017; Pezanis-Christou, 2000) as well as
fishing rights (e.g. Marszalec, 2018a; Anderson et al., 2011; Bromley, 2009). Here
the focus is on three different allocation mechanisms: auctions, grandfathering
and the Shapley value. The first two mechanisms are applied directly to fisheries
whilst the Shapley value is discussed in a general setting.
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The thesis applies both theoretical and empirical methods and covers both
cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretical approaches. Existing literature
on the topic does not typically pay much attention to the specific contextual
setting (Hannesson, 2011) and theoretical applications often employ a number of
assumptions, which are rarely met in practice. This thesis empirically analyses
real-life examples in order to enhance our understanding of the behaviour of
individual players and their interactions.
The first two chapters are theoretical essays, the first on the Shapley value, and
the second on auctions and grandfathering. The latter two essays are empirical
essays on one of the allocation mechanisms discussed: auctions.
The Shapley value discussed in the second chapter is one of the most famous
solution concepts in cooperative game theory and rewards players based on their
marginal contributions to possible coalitions (Young, 1988). A universal assump-
tion of game theory is that the money worths of the coalitions are known. This
work introduces a cooperative game in which some of the information may be
missing from the characteristic function. On this domain, two different proposals
of how to extend the Shapley value are considered. First, intuitive generaliza-
tions of the classical axioms of Shapley (1953) are suggested. Following this, the
paper looks for domain restrictions on the set of known coalitions upon which the
Shapley axioms characterize a unique solution. Second, a two-stage solution is
proposed in which (i) an impartial observer could use the information contained in
the characteristic function to fill in the missing information (ii) the Shapley value
is then applied to the ‘filled in’ in game. The paper concludes that despite in-
formation being missing from the characteristic function, there are different ways
8
of extending the Shapley value to the missing information domain. Using our
proposal, it is therefore possible to find a ‘fair and efficient solution’ in potential
situations where coalitions might not have formed or information is withheld.
In the second chapter, we make a first attempt at developing a theoretical
model for fisheries exploring how different combinations of two allocation mech-
anisms — grandfathering which allocates quota based on historical catches and
auctions, which any firm is allowed to participe in — perform in relation to key
parameters. The allocation of fishing quota often presents a challenge in fisheries
management and it is critically important for a succesful fishery. As another im-
portant component of fisheries management is to limit the negative externalities
of the activity, this developed model allows the government to incentivize invest-
ment into greener and more environmentally friendly fishing technologies. In our
setting, the government has applied an environmental tax, which can be reduced
through investment, to achieve these environmental objectives. Therefore the
firms’ level of investment directly affects its valuation of quota sold at auction.
This reduces the firms’ externalities and decreases their marginal costs, leading to
a higher valuation of the fishing quota sold at the auction. This means that bid-
der valuations are now endogenous within the model, which better captures the
complexity related to agents’ decisions. The developed model demonstrates how
the changing of different government controlled variables (how much is auctioned
or the resource fee of grandfathered quota) affect the government revenue, total
welfare, the firms’ level of investment as well as the equilibrium price at auction.
Finally, it considers the applicability of the model to the fisheries context and
how the model could be further developed to improve its policy relevance.
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The third chapter analyses auctions of fishing rights that took place in the
Faroe Islands from 2016 to 2018. Firstly, it describes the setting in which the
auctions took place and secondly, it evaluates their performance with respect to
collusion, entrants and price equilibria. Two different types of auctions took place:
the ascending (or second-price) and uniform-price multiunit auctions. They both
have appealing theoretical properties when bidders are symmetric and bid com-
petitively. However, auction designers have long been skeptical about their use
in practice (Bulow et al., 1999; Kagel and Levin, 2002). First, asymmetries
due to value advantage in ascending (or second-price) auctions with a large
common-value component can generate asymmetric equilibria with low reven-
ues (Bikhchandani, 1988). Second, both ascending and uniform-price auctions
are susceptible to collusion (Klemperer, 2002b). Sequential ascending auctions
make it especially easy to form and coordinate bidding rings (Robinson, 1985).
Third, uniform-price auctions are susceptible to low-price equilibria in which bid-
ders can commit to coordinate on high bids for initial units and low bids for final,
price-setting units in equilibrium (Hurlbut et al., 2004; Holmberg and Newbery,
2010) — what we in the paper name crank-handle bidding. All three of these
patterns have been observed separately in certain settings among sophisticated
and experienced bidders (Hurlbut et al., 2004; Holmberg and Newbery, 2010;
Klemperer, 2004; Beckmann, 2004).
The essay highlights several problems with the auction design and demon-
strates what we believe to be the first case of all three of the above-mentioned
phenomena happening in the same bidding environment. Our findings indicate
that the underperformance of ascending and uniform-price auctions are not just
10
theoretical curiosities, but a pervasive phenomenon in practical auction design.
Finally, we suggest straightforward improvements to the auction design which
could have mitigated some of the problems identified in the Faroese auctions.
The fourth chapter analyses the auctions at the Faroese fish market in the
period from January to December 2017. It adds to the body of literature on
price trends in sequential auctions, which has grown considerably since Ashen-
felter’s (1989) discovery of the declining price anomaly (or afternoon effect) in
wine auctions. This result amongst others has imposed an intriguing puzzle in
the literature of sequential auctions because of its violation of famous theoretical
works by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Weber (1983) who predict constant
prices in the case of independent private values (IPV) and increasing prices when
buyers’ valuations are affiliated. Since the discovery of this phenomenon eco-
nomists have attempted to empirically test for this feature in different settings
and markets with contradictory findings (Chanel et al., 1996; Ashenfelter, 1989;
Raviv, 2006; Fluvià et al., 2012), although the majority find declining prices
(Kells, 2001). However, most of these do not consider homogenous goods. Many
attempts have also been made to explain this phenomenon theoretically (Black
and de Meza, 1992; McAfee and Vincent, 1993; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn,
1999; Jeitschko, 1999). Fish markets typically sell lots of homogenous goods in
sequential auctions. In this essay, we test for the declining price anomaly in the
Faroese fish market. The market is small with many suppliers relative to buyers.
Several methods will be employed to test for declining prices at the Faroe
Fish Market. We start by employing the method used by Ashenfelter (1989) in
his influential paper on the declining price anomaly. We also run regressions to
11
establish how the auction round affects absolute and relative price changes —
both with respect to the first price of the day and to the price in the previous
round. Furthermore, we explore the impact that the number of bids, quantity
sold and the price of the first round of each species have on price trends. Finally,
we apply the method used by Gallegati et al. (2011) by analysing the average
price of cod in each round across the whole period. Here we also measure the
strength of auction round as a predictor for average prices.
Our conclusions from employing all of the methods demonstrate that declining
prices are a strong feature of the Faroese fish market both overall and for major
species. We find that in 81 percent of all cases, the prices are declining from one
lot to another, with the highest percentage for haddock, where the corresponding
figure is 87 percent. We also establish that the auction round is a significant
predictor of price trends. Finally, we discuss potential contributing factors to the
declining prices and conclude that they should perhaps not come as a surprise
considering the format and context of the auctions.
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Chapter 1
Information and the Value of a
Game
1.1 Introduction
One of the triumphs of cooperative game theory has been to answer the normative
question “what money payoffs ought the players to receive in a game?” The answer
to the question is most often to reward players by giving them the value proposed
by Shapley (1953). The reason the Shapley value is such a compelling solution to
the question is because of its simple axiomatic characterization. Furthermore, the
Shapley value uses all the information in the characteristic function. However,
as the calculation of the Shapley value requires information on the worths of all
the coalitions, this is also a weakness. The Shapley value cannot be calculated in
cases where information is missing from the characteristic function. Our paper
addresses this problem by proposing two solutions for determining how the money
worth of the grand coalition should be distributed amongst the players.1
1This chapter was co-written with Robert R. Routledge.
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In their early survey on game theory, Luce and Raiffa (1958, p. 184) noted that
the characteristic function “appears to be very well suited to a simple numerical
representation of the power of coalitions in human situations.” Since then, all the
literature on cooperative game theory has taken it as given that a real number
can be assigned to each coalition. But if the characteristic function genuinely
represents a one-off interaction between the players, then there may be no basis
on which to assign worths to the coalitions. A choice problem of this nature,
when some relevant parameters are not known, and even probabilities cannot be
assigned to them, is commonly referred to, especially in philosophical literature,
as choice in the presence of ignorance.2 An impartial observer may have to accept
that some of the information is missing from the game. Even if the players do
know the worths of the coalitions they are members of, they may not be able
to prove what these worths are to the other players, let alone to an impartial
observer.
Section 1.2 below takes the first step to address these problems by introducing
a cooperative game with missing information. In these games the characteristic
function is a mapping from the set of all coalitions into the union of the real
line and the empty set. Therefore, the worth of some coalitions may be missing
from the game. The only assumptions which are imposed upon the characteristic
function are: (i) the worth of the grand coalition of all players is not empty (ii)
the worth of the empty set is zero. This space of games includes the standard
2See, for example Peterson (2017, Ch. 3). If the characteristic function summarizes many
interactions between the players, then perhaps a probabilistic assessment of the worths could
be considered. There are many papers which have studied cooperative games in which the
worths of the coalitions are uncertain. Recent papers which have studied core-type solutions
for uncertain cooperative games include Habis and Herings (2011), studying the weak sequential
core, and Routledge (2014) analyzing a variant of the sequential core. Granot (1977) and Suijs
(2000) suggested nucleolus-type solutions for stochastic cooperative games.
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cooperative game with transferable utility, when the worths of all coalitions are
known, as a special case. On this wider domain, the paper tries to answer the
question: how should the Shapley value be extended to this domain?
In this paper we suggest two different solutions to this problem, each with
their own particular merits. First, the Shapley axioms are extended to the miss-
ing information domain. At this point a problem emerges: when information is
missing from the characteristic function it may not be possible to reconcile the ax-
ioms of null player and efficiency. To remedy this problem, we search for domain
restrictions on the set of coalitions whose worths are known which guarantee that
there exists a value satisfying the axioms. It is found that there are two domains
upon which the Shapley axioms continue to characterize a unique solution. The
solution which is characterized by the axioms is an obvious extension of the Shap-
ley value: the value gives each player the average of their marginal contributions
to the players preceding them — but only in those marginal vectors with every
player’s marginal contribution to their predecessors being defined. When all the
information is contained in the characteristic function, this value coincides with
the Shapley value. These results are quite surprising. It might be thought that if
information is missing from the characteristic function then nothing further can
be said about what the Shapley value of a game ought to be. The existence of
two domains with missing information, upon which there is a unique solution,
which is an analogue of the Shapley value, shows that this is not the case.
The second solution which we propose to the problem is not axiomatic. In-
stead we draw upon the literature on social choice and economic justice to present
a two-stage solution to the value problem. The intuition behind the solution is as
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follows. Suppose an impartial observer were to inspect the characteristic function
at the first stage. The impartial observer would ideally like to apply the Shapley
value as a solution but knows this is not possible because information is missing
from the characteristic function. To solve the problem the observer chooses to
assign worths to the unknown coalitions at the first stage. At the second stage
the observer applies the Shapley value to the game and rewards each player ac-
cordingly. Such a process will inevitably involve moral considerations given that
the observer is free to assign worths to the unknown coalitions at the first stage.
To see this, consider assigning a worth to some coalition S ⊂ N in a game. The
higher the worth assigned to S, other things equal, the lower is the average mar-
ginal contribution of players i ∈ N \ S, and the higher is the average marginal
contribution of players i ∈ S. Therefore, when assigning worths to unknown
coalitions, the trade-offs between different players would have to be taken into
consideration.
The suggestion which we propose as to how the observer should assign worths
at the first stage is drawn from the literature on social choice. When choosing
what worths to assign to the unknown coalitions we suggest that the observer
should choose from those feasible vectors which yield lexicographically maximal
Shapley value payoff vectors at the second stage. In other words, the observer
tries to ensure that the worst-off player receives their highest payoff across all the
possible ways of filling in the missing information. This is a normative judge-
ment, although it is one which is frequently used in the literature on economic
justice. In outlining a general theory of economic justice, Rawls (1972, pp. 42-45)
advanced the lexical procedure in which society’s institutions could be organized
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to maximize the welfare of the worst-off citizen. The Shapley value is often inter-
preted as simple theory of economic justice, especially in the axiomatizations of
Young (1985, 1988). When all the information is contained in the characteristic
function, the Shapley value does not involve any special moral judgements, such
as the lexical procedure; it rewards players solely on the basis of their marginal
contributions. However, when information is missing from the characteristic func-
tion it opens up the possibility of additional considerations, such as maximizing
the welfare of the least well-off player in the game. In responding to Rawls’ the-
ory of justice, Nozick (1974) presented an alternative historical-based theory of
economic holdings based upon individuals’ rights. The Shapley value is probably
closer in spirit to Nozick’s conception of justice in rewarding players solely on the
basis of their marginal contributions.3 But, even Nozick (1974, p. 166) conceded
that:
Individual rights are co-possible; each person may exercise his rights
as he chooses. The exercise of these rights fixes some features of the
world. Within the constraints of these fixed features, a choice may be
made by a social choice mechanism based upon a social ordering; if
there are any choices left to make! Rights do not determine a social
ordering but instead set the constraints within which a social choice
is to be made, by excluding certain alternatives, fixing others, and so
on.
In Nozick’s language, when all information is contained in the characteristic func-
tion, and we wish to reward the players solely on the basis of their marginal con-
3An interesting and accessible discussion of different theories of justice, including the Shap-
ley value, is contained in Yaari (1981).
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tributions, in addition to satisfying symmetry and efficiency, there are no choices
left to make! The Young (1985, 1988) axiomatizations prove that the only payoff
vector which meets these conditions is the Shapley value. When information is
missing from the characteristic function, however, there may well be additional
choices to be made, although the information which is contained in the charac-
teristic function will constrain the payoffs which can be achieved by filling in the
information missing from the game. In Section 1.4 it is demonstrated that the
two-stage maximization problem has a solution, and that, once the set of vectors
from which the impartial observer can choose is fixed, the payoff vector which
results is unique.
The two-stage solution is also interesting from another point of view. The two
most famous values for cooperative games are Shapley (1953) and the nucleolus
of Schmeidler (1969). These two solutions are logically distinct. However, the
two-stage solution which we propose brings together ideas from both the Shapley
value and the nucleolus.4 The impartial observer uses a nucleolus-type procedure
at the first stage by lexicographically maximizing the ascending payoff vector,
and then applies the Shapley value at the second stage.5
1.1.1 Related Literature
The literature on axiomatic value theory has its roots in a paper by Shapley
(1953). He demonstrated that the axioms of efficiency, symmetry, additivity,
along with an axiom relating to carrier games (which is usually restated as null
4Many of the results presented in Section 1.4 use similar proof techniques as used in estab-
lishing the well-known properties of the nucleolus.
5This paper is not the first to consider two-stage solutions to cooperative game. Charnes
and Granot (1977) proposed an early two-stage solution to stochastic cooperative games.
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player), characterize a unique solution. Since Shapley’s brief but striking paper,
originally circulated by the RAND Corporation, there has been sustained interest
in axiomatic value theory.6 This review only covers the most influential and re-
cent contributions to the literature.7 Schmeidler (1969) suggested an alternative
value solution. The nucleolus, which was Schmeidler’s proposal, minimizes the
maximal excess of the coalitions according to the lexicographic order. The nuc-
leolus belongs to the epsilon-core whenever it is non-empty and is continuous on
the space of games. Aumann and Dreze (1974) studied cooperative games with
coalition structures in which a partition of the players defined which coalitions
could form. Myerson (1977) analysed cooperative games played upon graphs and
axiomatized a value for such games. In addition, the stability of different graph
structures was studied.8 In a series of papers, Young (1985, 1988) presented a
different axiomatization of the Shapley value. Young dispensed with the math-
ematically convenient axiom of additivity and replaced it with the economically
meaningful axiom of marginality.9 Young’s marginal axiomatization proved that
the Shapley value is the only solution which rewards players solely on the basis of
their own marginal contributions, while satisfying symmetry and efficiency. Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989) demonstrated that there is a function, the potential, which
assigns a unique number to each cooperative game. Each player’s marginal contri-
6Shapley himself noted that “It is remarkable that no further conditions are required to
determine the value uniquely.”
7A clear and up-to-date textbook coverage of value theory is contained in Maschler et al.
(2013). See especially chapters 18 and 20 on the Shapley value and nucleolus respectively.
Mas-Colell et al. (1995, pp. 679-684 and pp. 846-849 ) also presents a succinct summary of the
ideas behind the Shapley value.
8The works of Aumann and Dreze (1974), and Myerson (1977), have generated a large
literature in which coalitions are restricted from forming. An excellent survey of the literature
is Gilles (2010, esp. chapters 3 & 6). Our work is related to this literature, but we take a more
fundamental approach in assuming that information is missing from the characteristic function,
and we do not impose any structure upon the coalitions which can form.
9Young (1985) used the axiom of strong monotonicity. However, strong monotonicity implies
marginalism.
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bution to the potential is equal to their Shapley value payoff. They also proposed
a concept of consistency for single-valued solutions and proved that the Shapley
value is consistent. Nowak and Radzik (1994) advanced a value solution which
had a similar axiomatization to the Shapley value. They proposed a solidarity
value in which each player received the average of the marginal contributions of
the players preceding them in each permutation. By replacing null player with
an average null player axiom, and by finding a basis different from the usual un-
animity game basis, they were able to axiomatize the solidarity value. In van den
Brink (2007) the null player axiom was replaced with a nullifying player axiom,
and it was demonstrated that the axioms of efficiency, symmetry, additivity and
nullifying player characterize the equal division solution. Most closely related
to our work is Aguilera et al. (2010), which also considered ways of extending
the Shapley value to characteristic functions in which arbitrary information may
be missing and there is no graph or coalition structure imposed upon the player
set. They proposed two main methods: one based upon graph-theoretic axioms
the other an axiomatic system imposed directly upon the space of unanimity
games. Our solutions are different and draw more upon the literature from social
choice theory as we search for domain restrictions and consider explicit justice
considerations. Malawski (2013) studied general procedural values in which the
marginal contributions of a player’s predecessors can be distributed in different
ways. These procedural values include the Shapley value, the solidarity value and
the equal division solution as special cases. In Casajus (2015) ideas from value
theory were applied to a simple economy. The axioms of efficiency in redistribu-
tion, symmetry and monotonicity were shown to characterize overall proportional
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taxation rules. Routledge (2016) analysed the same model as in this paper and
proposed a generalization of the equal division solution. An axiomatic character-
ization of the value was presented using the nullifying player axiom of van den
Brink (2007).
1.1.2 Outline of the Paper
The next section of the paper sets out the model and notation used throughout
the paper. In Section 1.3 generalizations of the Shapley axioms to the miss-
ing information domain are introduced, and two interesting domain results are
presented. In Section 1.4 the two-stage approach to solving a game with missing
information is set out. The last section of the paper contains some concluding
remarks, and points to some intriguing possibilities for future research.
1.2 The Model
Let N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, be the finite set of players in the game. A cooperat-
ive game with missing information is (N, v) with v being the characteristic
function v : 2N → R ∪ {∅}. A coalition is a S ⊆ N . The grand coalition is
N . For any coalition S ⊆ N , if v(S) 6= ∅, then v(S) is the money worth which
S can obtain independently of the other players. If v(S) = ∅, then the worth of
coalition S is missing from the game.
Assumption 1.2.1 For every v : 2N → R ∪ {∅}, v(N) 6= ∅ and v(∅) = 0.
Let G denote the space of games satisfying Assumption 1.2.1. A value is a
function ϕ : G → RN . For each v ∈ G a value assigns a unique payoff vector in
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RN . For any v ∈ G let the set K(v) be
K(v) = {S ⊆ N : v(S) 6= ∅}.
The set K(v) is the set of known coalitions in the game v. Two games v, w ∈ G
will be called comparable if K(v) = K(w). The marginal contribution of
player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N \ {i} in game v is
∆i(S, v) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
In what follows ∆i(S, v) = ∅ if either v(S ∪ {i}) = ∅ or v(S) = ∅, or both.
Let pi : N → N be a bijection denoting the permutation of the players in the
grandcoalition, and let Π denote the n! permutations of the players. Then, for
any pi ∈ Π the position of player i is given by pi(i). For any pi ∈ Π, let piij be
the permutation obtained by interchanging players i and j in permutation pi. For
any pi ∈ Π the set of predecessors of player i in pi is
Pi(pi) = {j ∈ N : pi(j) < pi(i)}.
The marginal contribution of player i to his predecessors in permutation pi in
game v is
∆pii (v) = v(Pi(pi) ∪ {i})− v(Pi(pi)).
Often in the paper we shall restrict attention to games which are subsets of the
space G. For any Ω ⊆ 2N , let GΩ be the set
GΩ = {v ∈ G : K(v) = Ω}.
The set Ω ⊆ 2N will be called singleton-defined if it satisfies the following three
conditions: (i) there is a unique i∗ ∈ N such that {i∗} ∈ Ω and {∅} ∈ Ω (ii) if
S ∩ {i∗} 6= ∅ then S ∈ Ω (iii) if S ∩ {i∗} = ∅ then S /∈ Ω.
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For Ω ⊆ 2N , let Π(Ω) ⊆ Π be the set
Π(Ω) = {pi ∈ Π : for every v ∈ GΩ and every i ∈ N , ∆pii (v) 6= ∅}.
The set Π(Ω) is those permutations of the players in which every player’s marginal
contribution to his predecessors is known. If Ω = 2N , then Π(Ω) = Π. However,
if Ω 6= 2N , then Π(Ω) will be a strict subset of Π. The set Ω ⊆ 2N will be called
permutational if Π(Ω) 6= ∅.
1.3 Domain Restrictions and the Shapley Axioms
In this section generalizations of the Shapley axioms to the missing information
are advanced. To give the reader a better understanding of the problem being
addressed, two example games are presented below. Later in the section it will
be shown that the unique payoff vectors suggested as the solutions of the games
are, in a special sense, the extension of the usual Shapley value solution.
Example 1.3.1 Suppose the set of players is N = {1, 2, 3}. The worth of the
grand coalition is v(N) = 12. The worths of the smaller coalitions are
v(12) = 6, v(1) = 2, v(∅) = 0
and
v(S) = ∅ for all other coalitions.
How should the money worth of the grand coalition, 12, be distributed amongst the
players? The payoff vector which this section proposes to the distribution problem
is (x1, x2, x3) = (2, 4, 6).
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Example 1.3.2 Suppose the set of players is N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The worth of the
grand coalition is v(N) = 30. The worths of the smaller coalitions are
v(123) = v(124) = v(134) = 24,
v(12) = 12, v(13) = v(14) = 18, v(1) = 6, v(∅) = 0
and
v(S) = ∅ for all other coalitions.
Again, how should the money worth of the grand coalition, 30, be distributed
amongst the players? The payoff vector which this section proposes to the distri-
bution problem is (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (6, 6, 9, 9).
1.3.1 The Axioms
How should the axioms of Shapley (1953) be generalized to the domain G? Here
four axioms, which are analogues of the Shapley axioms, are presented. When no
information is missing from the characteristic function the axioms coincide with
the Shapley axioms.
Definition 1.3.1 A value ϕ satisfies efficiency if
∑
i∈N ϕi(N, v) = v(N) for
every v ∈ G.
Efficiency is the simplest of the axioms, and states that the value should distribute
all of the money worth of the grand coalition between the players in every game.
In a game v ∈ G two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪
{j}) for every S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. Because information may be missing from the
characteristic function it may be that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) = ∅.
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Definition 1.3.2 A value ϕ satisfies symmetry if, whenever i, j ∈ N are sym-
metric in game v ∈ G, then ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v).
The axiom of symmetry formalizes the idea that there should be “equal treatment
of equals”.10
Before defining the axiom of additivity, let us define the sum of games on the
missing information domain.
Definition 1.3.3 Suppose v, w ∈ G. If the games v and w are comparable, so
K(v) = K(w), the game u = v + w is given by
u(S) =

v(S) + w(S) if S ∈ K(v);
∅ if S /∈ K(v).
(1.1)
Addition of two games is only defined when the games have the same set of known
coalitions. The axiom of additivity links the payoffs across different games which
can be added together.
Definition 1.3.4 A value ϕ satisfies additivity if, whenever v, w ∈ G are com-
parable, ϕi(N, v + w) = ϕi(N, v) + ϕi(N,w) for every i ∈ N .
Finally, the axiom of null player is the only axiom which states what payoff
players should receive in games. A player i ∈ N is a null player in game v ∈ G
if ∆i(S, v) ∈ {0, ∅} for every S ⊆ N \ {i}. A null player in a game is a player
whose marginal contributions are always either zero or not known.
10There is a subtle point about the axiom of symmetry. In cooperative games, symmetry
is often equivalently stated in terms of the coalitional worths or in terms of the marginal
contributions of the players. On the missing information domain, symmetry has to be stated
in terms of the coalitional worths. If v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for every S ⊆ N \ {i, j} this
implies ∆i(S, v) = ∆j(S, v) for every S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. However, ∆i(S, v) = ∆j(S, v) for every
S ⊆ N \ {i, j} does not imply v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for every S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. This is because
if v(S) = ∅ then ∆i(S, v) = ∆j(S, v) = ∅ regardless of whether v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}).
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Definition 1.3.5 A value ϕ satisfies null player if, whenever i ∈ N is a null
player in game v ∈ G, then ϕi(N, v) = 0.
As noted earlier, these four axioms coincide with the Shapley axioms when no
information is missing from the characteristic function. Therefore, the model
of a game with missing information, and the proposed axioms, contain Shap-
ley’s original characterization as a special case. The remainder of the section
demonstrates that the axioms may continue to characterize a unique solution —
depending upon the information which is missing from the characteristic function.
1.3.2 An Impossibility Result and Domain Restrictions
Does there exist a value satisfying the four axioms on the domain G? The next
proposition shows that it is not possible to reconcile the axioms of efficiency and
null player.
Proposition 1.3.1 On the domain G:
(a) No value satisfies the axioms of efficiency and null player.
(b) There exists a value satisfying efficiency, symmetry and additivity.
(c) There exists a value satisfying symmetry, additivity and null player.
Proof. (a) Suppose ϕ satisfies efficiency and null player on G. Consider the
game with N = {1, 2}, and v(N) = 1, v(1) = v(2) = ∅, v(∅) = 0. Then null
player implies ϕ1(N, v) = ϕ2(N, v) = 0, and contradicts efficiency which requires∑2
i=1 ϕi(N, v) = 1.
(b) Consider the value on G given by ϕi(N, v) = v(N)/n for every i ∈ N .
This value, which divides the worth of the grand coalition equally between the
players, satisfies efficiency, symmetry and additivity.
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(c) Consider the value on G given by ϕi(N, v) = 0 for every i ∈ N . This value
satisfies symmetry, additivity and null player. 
Part (a) of the previous result demonstrates that it is not possible to satisfy
all four axioms on the domain G. However, values on the missing information
domain can be further explored. There are some interesting results if we consider
Ω ⊆ 2N and look at the restricted domain GΩ. That is, games which have set of
known coalitions Ω.
Proposition 1.3.2 Suppose Ω ⊆ 2N is permutational. There exists a value on
GΩ satisfying efficiency, symmetry, additivity and null player.
Proof. Consider the value given by
ϕ∗i (N, v) =
∑
pi∈Π(Ω)
1
|Π(Ω)|∆
pi
i (v) for every i ∈ N. (1.2)
As Ω is permutational, the set Π(Ω) is non-empty. The value satisfies all four
axioms. 
An obvious question is whether the value in equation 1.2 is the only value to
satisfy the four axioms on GΩ when Ω is permutational? The following result
demonstrates that, without further domain restrictions, this is not always the
case.
Let Ω ⊆ 2N be permutational. Define the sets ΠIn(Ω) and Πi(Ω) to be
ΠIn(Ω) = {pi ∈ Π(Ω) : there is an i and j such that piij ∈ Π(Ω)}
Πi(Ω) = {pi ∈ Π(Ω) : pi(i) ≤ pi′(i) for every pi′ ∈ Π(Ω)}
The set ΠIn(Ω) is those permutations in Π(Ω) which can be obtained by inter-
changing any two players in another permutation in Π(Ω). The set Πi(Ω) is those
permutations in Π(Ω) in which player i′s rank is minimized.
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Proposition 1.3.3 Suppose Ω ⊆ 2N is permutational. There may be more than
one value on GΩ satisfying efficiency, symmetry, additivity and null player.
Proof. The value ϕ∗ in equation 1.2 satisfies the four axioms. Consider the
value ϕ′ defined as
ϕ′i(N, v) =

ϕ∗i (N, v) if ΠIn(Ω) 6= ∅;
∑
pi∈Π1(Ω)
1
|Π1(Ω)|∆
pi
i (v) if ΠIn(Ω) = ∅.
(1.3)
The value ϕ′ also satisfies the four axioms but can yield different payoff vectors
to ϕ∗. 
The following example demonstrates how the values in equations 1.2 and 1.3
can differ from each other in games.
Example 1.3.3 Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and Ω = {∅, 1, 4, 12, 34, 123, 234, N}.
The set Π(Ω) contains two permutations: 1234 and 4321. The set ΠIn(Ω) is
empty. The characteristic function11 has v(N) = 12. The worths of the smaller
coalitions are
v(123) = 8, v(234) = 12, v(12) = v(34) = 6,
v(1) = v(4) = 4, v(∅) = 0
and
v(S) = ∅ for all other coalitions.
The value ϕ∗ gives each player their average marginal contribution over the two
permutations
ϕ∗ = (2, 4, 2, 4).
11Just to make the point made in footnote 10 clear, in this game ∆1(S, v) = ∆4(S, v) for every
S ⊆ N \ {1, 4}. However, players 1 and 4 are not symmetric because v(12) = 6 6= v(24) = ∅.
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However, the value ϕ′ gives each player their marginal contribution according to
the permutation 1234 because in this permutation player 1’s rank is minimal
ϕ′ = (4, 2, 2, 4).
Suppose Ω ⊆ 2N is permutational. A game v ∈ GΩ can be thought of as a vector
in RΩ. For each T ∈ Ω\{∅} consider the following generalization of the standard
unanimity game:
uT,Ω(S) =

1 if T ⊆ S, S ∈ Ω;
0 if T * S, S ∈ Ω;
∅ if S /∈ Ω.
(1.4)
For any α ∈ R the game αuT,Ω is given by:
αuT,Ω(S) =

α if T ⊆ S, S ∈ Ω;
0 if T * S, S ∈ Ω;
∅ if S /∈ Ω.
(1.5)
The result below follows from the well-known properties of the unanimity game,
with addition defined as in equation 1.1.
Proposition 1.3.4 Suppose Ω ⊆ 2N and v ∈ GΩ. There exist unique real num-
bers {αT : T ∈ Ω \ {∅}} such that
v(S) =
∑
T∈Ω\{∅}
αTuT,Ω(S) for every S ∈ Ω.
Using the unanimity game basis, the final results of this section demonstrate that,
on two interesting subsets of the permutational domain, the axioms characterize
the value in equation 1.2. In the statement of the next result we stick with the
convention that when the empty set, ∅, is an explicit subset of another set, it has
cardinality one.
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Proposition 1.3.5 Suppose Ω ⊆ 2N is permutational and |Ω| = n + 1. Then
there is a unique value on GΩ satisfying efficiency, additivity and null player.
Proof. The value ϕ∗ in equation 1.2 satisfies the axioms. All that remains to
be demonstrated is that the value is uniquely determined by the axioms.
Suppose ϕ satisfies the axioms. Fix a v ∈ GΩ. From Proposition 1.3.4, v can
be written as
v =
∑
T∈Ω\{∅}
αTuT,Ω.
As ϕ satisfies additivity
ϕ(N, v) =
∑
T∈Ω\{∅}
ϕ(N,αTuT,Ω).
Consider the game αTuT,Ω. As |Ω| = n + 1, there is a player i ∈ T such that
∆j(S, αTuT,Ω) ∈ {∅, 0} for every j ∈ N \ {i} and every S ⊆ N \ {j}. Null
player implies ϕj(N,αTuT,Ω) = 0 for every j ∈ N \ {i}. Efficiency implies
ϕi(N,αTuT,Ω) = αT . 
In the previous result only the axioms of efficiency, additivity and null player
were required to characterize the value in equation 1.2. The reason for this is that,
when Ω ⊆ 2N is permutational and |Ω| = n + 1, no players can be symmetric in
any v ∈ GΩ. The final result of this section considers a richer domain on which
the axiom of symmetry is required.
Proposition 1.3.6 Suppose Ω ⊆ 2N is singleton-defined. Then there is a unique
value on GΩ satisfying efficiency, symmetry, additivity and null player.
Proof. If Ω is singleton-defined then Ω is also permutational, and the value in
equation 1.2 satisfies the four axioms. Let i∗ be the singleton-defining player. It
remains to be demonstrated that the axioms uniquely determine the value.
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Suppose ϕ satisfies the four axioms. Fix a v ∈ GΩ. From Proposition 1.3.4, v
can be written as
v =
∑
T∈Ω\{∅}
αTuT,Ω.
As ϕ satisfies additivity
ϕ(N, v) =
∑
T∈Ω\{∅}
ϕ(N,αTuT,Ω).
Consider the game αTuT,Ω with T = {i∗}. Every j ∈ N \ {i∗} is a null player, so
ϕj(N,αi∗ui∗,Ω) = 0 for every j ∈ N \ {i∗}. Efficiency implies ϕi∗(N,αi∗ui∗,Ω) =
αi∗ .
Consider the game αTuT,Ω with T 6= {i∗}. Every player j ∈ N \ T is a
null player, so ϕj(N,αTuT,Ω) = 0 for every j ∈ N \ T . Player i∗ is also a null
player because αTuT,Ω(i∗) = 0 and ∆i∗(S, αTuT,Ω) = ∅ for every non-empty S ⊆
N \ {i∗}. Hence, ϕi∗(N,αTuT,Ω) = 0.
If |T \ {i∗}| = 1, efficiency implies ϕj(N,αTuT,Ω) = αT for the remaining
player j = T \ {i∗}.
If |T \ {i∗}| > 1, the players remaining in T \ {i∗} are symmetric. To see
this, fix i, j ∈ T \ {i∗}. Consider αTuT,Ω(S ∪ {i}) and αTuT,Ω(S ∪ {j}) with
S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. If S ∩ {i∗} 6= ∅, then αTuT,Ω(S ∪ {i}) = αTuT,Ω(S ∪ {j}) = 0.
If S ∩ {i∗} = ∅, then αTuT,Ω(S ∪ {i}) = αTuT,Ω(S ∪ {j}) = ∅. Efficiency and
symmetry imply that ϕj(N,αTuT,Ω) = αT/(|T | − 1) for every j ∈ T \ {i∗}. 
If the reader reconsiders the two illustrative examples at the beginning of this
section, it should be clear why the proposed payoff vectors are extensions of the
Shapley value. In the first example, suppose the game had been drawn from GΩ
with Ω = {∅, 1, 12, N}. The set Ω is permutational and |Ω| = n+ 1. The domain
satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1.3.5 and the proposed payoff vector is ϕ∗.
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In the second example, the set of known coalitions Ω is singleton-defined (set
i∗ = {1}). Again, the proposed payoff vector is ϕ∗ (the average of the six known
marginal vectors).
1.4 A Two-Stage Solution
In the previous section it was assumed that an impartial observer has taken
the missing information as given. The solution proposed in this section is not
axiomatic, but instead is based upon an interesting thought experiment: suppose
an impartial observer looks at the characteristic function and ‘fills in’ the missing
information before applying the Shapley value to the ‘filled in’ game. Is there
a fair way of assigning worths to the unknown coalitions in a game? The idea
advanced in this section uses the simple principle, widely used in the literature
on economic justice and distribution, that the impartial observer should try to
“maximize the minimum” of the players’ payoffs. To understand the two-stage
solution, we present an example demonstrating how the process is applied to a
game.
Example 1.4.1 The set of players N = {1, 2, 3}. The worth of the grand coali-
tion is v(N) = 20. The worths of the smaller coalitions are
v(13) = 9, v(23) = 8, v(1) = 3, v(2) = 1, v(3) = 4, v(∅) = 0
and
v(S) = ∅ for all other coalitions.
In this game, the worth of coalition 12 is missing from the game. What do the
Shapley value payoffs look like as a function of x = v(12)? By applying the
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Shapley value formula to the game we obtain the following functions.
Sh1(v, x) =
17
3
+
1
6
x
Sh2(v, x) =
25
6
+
1
6
x
Sh3(v, x) =
61
6
− 1
3
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Figure 1.1: Shapley value payoffs and the unknown worth
Now suppose an impartial observer wanted to choose x so that the minimum
payoff of the players is maximized. In this particular example, it is clear from look-
ing at the figure above that there is only one point which maximizes the minimum
payoff of the three players. The figure plots the Shapley value payoffs against the
unknown worth, and the point which maximizes the minimum payoff is x = 12.
Replacing x = 12 in the Shapley value formula yields the following payoffs
Sh(v, x) = (
23
3
,
37
6
,
37
6
).
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1.4.1 Formalizing the Two-Stage Solution
Let the set U(v) = 2N \K(v) contain those coalitions whose worths are unknown
in game v. For each v ∈ G let X(v) ⊆ RU(v) be those vectors from which
an impartial observer could choose to fill in the information missing from the
game. Note that for each game v ∈ G the set X(v) could be chosen to be as
large as required so as to not exclude relevant worths of the unknown coalitions.
Throughout this section we impose the following standard technical assumptions
upon the set X(v).12
Assumption 1.4.1 For each v ∈ G the set X(v) is non-empty, compact and
convex.
The two-stage problem can now be summarized as (v,X(v)). For each v ∈ G and
x ∈ X(v) let Shi(v, x) be the Shapley value payoff which player i receives when
the missing information in the game v is filled in with vector x. The vector of all
the players’ payoffs is
Sh(v, x) = (Sh1(v, x), Sh2(v, x), ..., Shn(v, x)).
For each x ∈ X(v) let
θ(x) = (Shi(v, x), Shj(v, x), ..., Shk(v, x))
with Shi(v, x) ≤ Shj(v, x) ≤, ...,≤ Shk(v, x). The vector θ(x) orders the Shap-
ley value payoffs at x in ascending order. Finally, let & denote the standard
lexicographic vector ordering on the space Rn.
12The assumptions imposed upon the set of vectors from which the impartial observer can
choose are the same assumptions imposed upon the choice set when one applies the nucleolus
solution to a cooperative game. Of course, the two-stage solution, just like the nucleolus, is
sensitive to the set from which the observer can choose.
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With this notation, the two-stage solution can be stated formally as:
(i) Given a game v ∈ G, with U(v) 6= ∅, the impartial observer chooses an
x ∈ X∗(v) with
X∗(v) = {x ∈ X(v) : θ(x) & θ(y) for every y ∈ X(v)}
(ii) Each player receives their Shapley value payoff Shi(v, x) in the filled-in
game.
At the first stage, the impartial observer chooses from the set of vectors which
lexicographically maximize the Shapley value payoff vector in the filled-in game.
At the second stage, after the missing information has been filled in, the Shapley
value payoffs are awarded to each player.
The next lemma demonstrates that if there are multiple vectors in X(v) then
a particular convex combination of them yields a particular Shapley value payoff
vector. This result is used in Proposition 1.4.2 when demonstrating the unique-
ness of the two-stage solution.
Lemma 1.4.1 Fix a v ∈ G, x, y ∈ X(v) and let z = 1
2
(x + y). Then
1
2
[Sh(v, x) + Sh(v, y)] = Sh(v, z).
Proof. If x, y ∈ X(v) then for each i ∈ N
Shi(v, x) = a+
∑
S∈U(v)
bSxS
and
Shi(v, y) = a+
∑
S∈U(v)
bSyS
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with a and {bS}S∈U(v) being constants determined by the Shapley value expres-
sion. Hence
1
2
[Shi(v, x) + Shi(v, y)] = a+
∑
S∈U(v)
bS
1
2
(xS + yS) = Shi(v, z)
with z = 1
2
(x + y). 
The following proposition proves that a solution to the two-stage maximization
problem always exists.
Proposition 1.4.1 For any v ∈ G, if U(v) 6= ∅, then X∗(v) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let
X1(v) = {x ∈ X(v) : θ1(x) & θ1(y) for every y ∈ X(v)}
with θ1(·) being the first element in the θ vector. As the Shapley value expression
is continuous onX(v), θ1(·) is a continuous function onX(v). AsX(v) is compact,
it follows from the Weierstrass theorem that X1(v) 6= ∅.
Let
X2(v) = {x ∈ X1(v) : θ2(x) & θ2(y) for every y ∈ X1(v)}
with θ2(·) being the second element in the θ vector. Again, as the Shapley value
expression is continuous on X1(v), θ2(·) is a continuous function on X1(v). As
X1(v) is compact, it follows that X2(v) 6= ∅.
Repeating these steps another n− 2 times we obtain Xn(v) = X∗(v) 6= ∅. 
Having shown that a vector maximizing the lexicographic order always exists,
it just remains to be shown that the resulting Shapley payoff vector is unique.
The final proposition states that when |X∗(v)| > 1 all vectors in X∗(v) yield the
same Shapley value payoff vector in the filled-in game.
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Proposition 1.4.2 If x, y ∈ X∗(v) then Sh(v, x) = Sh(v, y).
Proof. Suppose x, y ∈ X∗(v) and Sh(v, x) 6= Sh(v, y). Then
θ(x) = (Shx1(v, x), Shx2(v, x), ..., Shxn(v, x))
with x1, x2,..., xn being the ordering of the players at vector x and
θ(y) = (Shy1(v, y), Shy2(v, y), ..., Shyn(v, y))
with y1, y2,..., yn being the ordering of the players at vector y.
Let z = 1
2
(x + y). From Lemma 1.4.1, Sh(v, z) = 1
2
[Sh(v, x) + Sh(v, y)]. At
vector z
θ(z) = (Shz1(v, z), Shz2(v, z), ..., Shzn(v, z))
with z1, z2,..., zn being the ordering of the players at vector z.
As player x1 has the minimal payoff at vector x
Shz1(v, x) ≥ Shx1(v, x). (1.6)
As player y1 has the minimal payoff at vector y
Shz1(v, y) ≥ Shy1(v, y). (1.7)
As x, y ∈ X∗(v), Shx1(v, x) = Shy1(v, y). Equations 1.6 and 1.7 imply
Shz1(v, z) =
1
2
[Shz1(v, x) + Shz1(v, y)] ≥ Shx1(v, x). (1.8)
If the inequality in equation 1.8 is strict, this contradicts x, y ∈ X∗(v). Hence, it
must be that
Shz1(v, x) = Shx1(v, x)
and
Shz1(v, y) = Shy1(v, y).
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This means we can interchange players x1 and z1 in vector θ(x), and we can
interchange players y1 and z1 in vector θ(y). Doing this yields
θ(x) = (Shz1(v, x), Shx2′(v, x), ..., Shxn′(v, x))
and
θ(y) = (Shz1(v, y), Shy2′(v, y), ..., Shyn′(v, y)).
If we repeat these steps for x2′ and y2′ we obtain the following. As player x2′
has the second minimal payoff at vector x
Shz2(v, x) ≥ Shx2′(v, x). (1.9)
As player y2′ has the second minimal payoff at vector y
Shz2(v, y) ≥ Shy2′(v, y). (1.10)
As x, y ∈ X∗(v), Shx2′(v, x) = Shy2′(v, y). Equations 1.9 and 1.10 imply
Shz2(v, z) =
1
2
[Shz2(v, x) + Shz2(v, y)] ≥ Shx2′(v, x). (1.11)
If the inequality in equation 1.11 is strict, this contradicts x, y ∈ X∗(v). Hence,
it must be that
Shz2(v, x) = Shx2′(v, x)
and
Shz2(v, y) = Shy2′(v, y).
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We can now interchange players x2′ and z2 in vector θ(x), and we can inter-
change players y2′ and z2 in vector θ(y). This yields
θ(x) = (Shz1(v, x), Shz2(v, x), Shx3′′(v, x), ..., Shxn′′(v, x))
and
θ(y) = (Shz1(v, y), Shz2(v, y), Shy3′′(v, y), ..., Shyn′′(v, y)).
Repeating this step another n− 2 times we obtain
θ(x) = (Shz1(v, x), Shz2(v, x), ..., Shzn(v, x))
and
θ(y) = (Shz1(v, y), Shz2(v, y), ..., Shzn(v, y))
which implies Sh(v, x) = Sh(v, y) and contradicts Sh(v, x) 6= Sh(v, y).
Hence, if x, y ∈ X∗(v) then Sh(v, x) = Sh(v, y). 
1.5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper has been to take the first steps to understanding how the
Shapley value should be extended to games in which some of the information
may be missing. The authors hope that this work may stimulate further research
on what is an interesting, but difficult problem to address. The results indicate
that, if too much information is missing from the characteristic function, then it
may not be possible to reconcile the axioms of efficiency and null player.
Each of the solutions presented in the paper have particular merits and weak-
nesses. If the set of known coalitions is permutational, and there are as many
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known coalitions as players, or the set of known coalitions is singleton-defined,
there is a value which satisfies the Shapley axioms. Somewhat surprisingly, the
axioms characterize the value. The value ϕ∗ in equation 1.2 is an obvious exten-
sion of the Shapley value on the missing information domain. The value gives
each player the average of their marginal contributions to their predecessors in
each of the known marginal vectors. If the set of known coalitions is not per-
mutational then ϕ∗ cannot be applied to the game. Even if the set of known
coalitions is permutational, when assigning payoffs to the players, ϕ∗ may fail
to use all the information contained in the characteristic function. To remedy
these defects, the two-stage solution draws on ideas in social choice and economic
justice. If an impartial observer were free to fill in the information missing from
the characteristic function then one normative principle which could be used is
“maximize the minimum payoff” once the Shapley value is applied to the filled in
game. This is precisely what the two-stage solution does.
We conclude the paper by presenting two possibilities for additional research
which the authors hope to pursue in the future.
• Throughout the paper it has been assumed that the worths of coalitions,
when known, are independent of the behaviour of players outside the co-
alition. In many cases this is too strong an assumption to make. A more
realistic case is to make the worths of known coalitions dependent upon the
behaviour of players outside the coalition. This generates a game in par-
tition function form. Recently, De Clippel and Serrano (2008), McQuillin
(2009) and Borm et al. (2015) have all suggested different extensions of the
Shapley value to partition function games. These papers assume that all
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the information is contained in the game. It would be interesting to see
whether there is a way of extending the Shapley value to partition function
games with missing information.
• Axiomatic value solutions have been studied in detail for the bankruptcy
problem introduced by O’Neill (1982), and recently surveyed by Thomson
(2015). A bankruptcy problem is summarized by (E, (ci)i∈N) with E > 0
being the money worth of the estate to be divided between the players,
and ci ≥ 0 being the money claim which player i has upon the worth
E. It is assumed that
∑
i∈N ci > E so that all the claims of the players
cannot be realized. Many value solutions have been proposed to this type
of problem. However, all the existing literature assumes that the money
claims of the players are known. In many real world bankruptcy problems
this assumption is not satisfied. Instead, it is known that individuals have
claims upon the estate, but the exact amount of the claim cannot always be
proved. This type of problem could be modelled using the idea of a game
with missing information introduced in this paper. If one sets ci = ∅ for
those players who cannot prove their claims upon the estate, this would
then generate a characteristic function game with missing information.
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Chapter 2
A Model for Quota Allocation
2.1 Introduction
Fish are a relatively scarce biological resource.1 Ensuring the biological and
economic sustainability of the fisheries requires that access to the fisheries is
limited and that allocated quota is within safe biological limits. The allocation
of fishing quota often presents challenges for the fisheries management, and the
design of the catch share program is critically important for a successful fishery.
Traditionally fishing permits have largely been granted based on historical rights
(often referred to as grandfathering) (Anderson et al., 2011; Lynham, 2014). In a
study on allocation of fishing rights worldwide, Lynham (2014) found that in over
91 percent of fisheries surveyed, the access to the fisheries were grandfathered for
some of the catch, whilst grandfathering was used as the only method of allocation
in 54 percent of fisheries. Other methods used, included equal sharing rules, vessel
and gear based rules and least frequently, auctions,2 which were used in 3 percent
1This chapter was co-written with Olga Gorelkina.
2For more information on auctions with regards to the fishing industry, see Anderson et al.
(2011); Bromley (2009); Grafton (1995); Morgan (1995); Marszalec (2018a)
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of the fisheries (Lynham, 2014).3
Governments in a handful of countries have used auctions for allocating fishing
quota for certain parts of their fisheries.4 The Faroe Islands, is the most recent
example of the implementation of auctions for allocating fishing quota. Trial
auctions were run in 2011, 2016 and 2017 and from 2018 onwards auctions became
a part of the new fisheries management system implemented in January 2018.
An important component of fisheries management is limiting the negative
externalities of the fishing activity. Ensuring that the activity does not result in
irreversible damage to the fish stocks and wider ecosystems is essential (Cochrane
et al., 2009). Addressing climate change also requires that carbon emissions from
the fishing fleet are reduced. In this context, investment into newer greener
vessels, as well as fishing equipment, is paramount.
Therefore, fair allocation methods and encouragement of desirable behaviour
of agents are two important policy concerns of managers, both of which this
paper addresses by posing the following research questions: (1) How does the
price and fraction of grandfathered quota affect investment, total welfare and the
auction price? (2) How does the level of investment affect auction prices and
total welfare?
To explore these questions, we introduce a theoretical model that allows the
government to give firms stronger incentives to invest in greener and more envir-
onmentally friendly fishing technologies. In the model, firms have two channels
through which they can obtain quota: grandfathering — which allocates quota
3Auctions for allocating fishing quota are rare and are currently only used in four places:
the Faroe Islands, Chile, Washington DC and New Zealand.
4Estonia and Russia used auctions over a short period to allocate fishing rights, but have
since reverted back to grandfathering the rights based on historical catches (Anferova et al.,
2005; Eero et al., 2005; Vetemaa et al., 2002, 2005).
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based on historical catches — and auctions, which any firm is allowed to particip-
ate in. The management authority has applied an environmental tax to incentivise
environmentally friendly fishing technologies. Therefore, the firm’s level of invest-
ment directly affects its valuation of the quota sold at auction. We interpret this
as an opportunity to make an investment in greener technology which reduces a
firm’s externality and hence decreases their real marginal cost. This will in turn
lead to a higher valuation of the object. Treating bidder valuations endogenously
in the model allows the model to better take into account the complexity related
to agents’ decisions, and little focus has been on this.5 The majority of papers
in the literature on auctions treat bidder valuations as exogenous variables. The
benchmark auction model by McAfee and McMillan (1987) including many other
influential papers (e.g. Riley and Samuelson (1981); Myerson (1981); Vickrey
(1961)) consider values which are independent and identically distributed, drawn
from a common distribution F (v) that is strictly increasing and differentiable
over the interval of valuations
[
v
−
,
−
v
]
and satisfies F (v
−
) = 0 and F (−v) = 1.
Most closely related to our work is Gershkov et al. (2018) who study the
allocation of multiple units among symmetric agents with unit demands and con-
vex preferences over the probability of receiving an object. These non-standard
preferences are a result of agents taking costly actions unobservable to the de-
signer, and that influence their valuations at subsequent auctions. Because of
these ex-ante investments, valuations of the agents become endogenous to the
mechanism.
Using our model, it is therefore possible to explore how the allocation mech-
anism impacts on various parameters, including government revenue from fishing
5See Gershkov et al. (2018) for an exception.
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quota, total welfare, the firms’ level of investment and the equilibrium price at
the auction. It also considers how the level of resource fee on the grandfathered
quota impacts on the level of investment. Surprisingly, we find that the fraction
and the price of grandfathered quota does not affect the equilibrium price, invest-
ment nor the total welfare. We suggest that these results can be attributed to
the design of the model. As expected, we also find that higher investment leads
to increased equilibrium prices at auction and that higher prices of grandfathered
quota result in lower levels of investment. Finally, we consider the applicability
of this model to the fisheries, and suggest how it could be developed in future
work.
2.2 The Model
Let us consider a fish market in which there are n ≥ 2 firms and the firms are
price takers on the fish market (market for final product). The price of the final
product is denoted by f . We assume that all quota is used (i.e. all fish is caught)
and therefore quota is equivalent to production.6 To produce a positive quantity,
firm i incurs a fixed cost. Firms also incur a marginal cost of production which
is denoted mci (q) and satisfies the below assumptions. The fixed cost is the
marginal cost at zero units and is demonstrated by the very high initial marginal
cost in Figure 2.1a.
6The price f is exogenously determined by the world price level, which is a realistic as-
sumption given the size of the fishing industry in the majority of countries.
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Figure 2.1: Marginal cost and value functions for firm i.
Assumption 2.2.1 The marginal cost of firm i, mci (q), satisfies the following
conditions:
1. there exists q¯i ≥ 0 such that ∂∂qmci > 0 for all q > q¯i (marginal cost starts
increasing eventually)
2. ∂
2
∂q2
mci > 0 (marginal cost is convex)
This implies that the marginal cost eventually starts to increase and that the
marginal cost is a convex function of quota.7 Fishing activity also produces an
7In fisheries it is very often the case that marginal costs are decreasing and that firms never
reach full capacity. This is due to limited supply of quota and overcapacity in many fishing
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observed externality of ei > 0 per unit, which can be pollution from fuel usage or
damage to the wider ecosystem e.g. benthic habitats from bottom trawling. The
damage/externality can be reduced if the firm invests into greener technology, and
therefore the externality ei = ei (yi), is a decreasing function of the investment yi
(yi ≥ 0) and the externality satisfies the following.
Assumption 2.2.2 The externality ei (yi) satisfies the following conditions:
1. ∂
∂y
ei ≤ 0 (investment reduces externality)
2. ∂
2
∂y2i
ei ≥ 0 (the effect of investment diminishes)
Given the negative externality, we introduce the social marginal cost of fishing,
denoted by MCi, which is the sum of the production cost and the externality:
MCi (q; yi) = mci (q) + ei (yi) .
To create an incentive for firms to invest in greener vessels or fishing equip-
ment the government applies an environmental tax, which depends on the fuel
consumption of the vessel and the type of equipment used. In doing so, the ex-
ternality of the firm’s activity will be internalised. Here the tax will be calculated
based on the firm’s total quota. An example could be taxation based on the fuel
consumption per kilo of fish.
The marginal value of quota at level qi, vi (qi; yi), equals the price of the final
product less the social marginal cost:
vi (qi; yi) = [f −MCi (qi; yi)]+ .
fleets.
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The properties of the marginal value function vi (qi; yi) are described by inequal-
ities similar to Assumption 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, where signs are reversed. For a fixed
yi, let v˜i (q; yi) = vi (q; yi) be defined in the range where vi is strictly decreasing.
Then the demand at price p per quota (given investment yi) is given by:
qi (p, yi) =

v˜−1i (p; yi) if p ≤ p0i (yi)
0 if p > p0i (yi)
,
where p0i (yi) = vi (q0i ; yi), and q0i solves
∫ q0i
0
vi (q; yi) dq = q
0
i vi (q
0
i ; yi). p0i (yi) is
the price beyond which firm i demands zero quota because he would incur a loss
if he purchased any quota above this price. See Figure 2.2a for an illustration.
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(b) Demand function
Figure 2.2: Value function, demand and maximum price
The demand function qi (p, yi) is thus the inverse marginal value function
‘ironed’ appropriately to become monotone decreasing. The function is concave
in yi, i.e. ∂
2
∂y2i
qi (p, yi) ≤ 0.8 See Figure 2.2b.
Allocation of Quota Let qGi be the grandfathered quota available to firm
i and pG the (uniform) price per unit of grandfathered quota set by the seller.
8Proof: v˜ = p = f − m˜c(q)− e(y), so q = m˜c−1(f − p− e(y)), and ∂q∂y = −
(
m˜c−1
)′
(f − p−
e(y))∗e′(y). Hence, ∂2q∂y2 =
(
m˜c−1
)′′ ∗ (e′)2−(m˜c−1)′ ∗e′′ ≤ 0, since (m˜c−1)′′ ≤ 0, (m˜c−1)′ ≥ 0,
and e′′ ≥ 0. 
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(a) Surplus from grandfathered quota
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(b) Demand at auction
Figure 2.3: Surplus from trade in grandfathered quota and demand at auction
Firm i’s demand for grandfathered quota is capped at qGi and is therefore given by
min
{
qi (p, yi) , q
G
i
}
. Hence, the amount of quota acquired through grandfathering
at price pG is min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
.
The firm’s surplus from trade in grandfathered quota is given by:∫ p0i (yi)
pG
min
{
qi (p, yi) , q
G
i
}
dp.
Note that if p0i (yi) < pG then the term
∫ p0i (yi)
pG
min
{
qi (p, yi) , q
G
i
}
dp is negat-
ive and thus buying grandfathered quota in isolation leads to a loss. For the
remainder of this paper we shall therefore assume that pG < p0i (yi).
Firm i’s demand for quota in the auction is therefore their total demand less
the quota received through grandfathering:
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
= qi (p, yi)−min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
.
Observe that the demand can be negative at high prices implying that the firm
would supply some of its grandfathered quota to the auction.
The price of the grandfathered quota is set by the government and is uniform.
For the auction, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing mechanism is used.
The VCG auction is a type of sealed bid auction for multiple items where firms
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are required to submit bids stating the quantity demanded at what price. Firms
may submit more than one bid since the willingness to pay for quota will depend
on the total quota purchased by the firm. Once all bids are submitted, the firms
with winning bids pay the marginal harm their bid has caused to the other firms
— which is at most as high as their original bid. Consequently, the VCG auction
is an incentive compatible mechanism implying that reporting truthfully is an
equilibrium (see, for example, Milgrom (2004)).
The total amount of the available exogenously determined quota, Q, is split
between grandfathering and the auction, Q = QA +
∑
i min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
,
where QA is the endogenously determined amount of quota sold through the
auction.
Now let y be the vector of investment levels, y = (y1, y2, ..yn), and qG be
the vector of grandfathered quotas, qG =
(
qG1 , q
G
2 , ..q
G
n
)
. The price p∗ (y) solves∑
i q
A
i
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
= QA in p (which is equivalent to
∑
i qi (p, yi) = Q).
9 Note
that p∗ (y) is the highest price paid for one unit of quota sold in the auction and
not the unit price paid by all firms. It follows immediately from the definition of
the equilibrium price that p∗ (y) is not affected by either pG or qG. We therefore
have the following lemma before having solved our model.
Lemma 2.2.1 Changing the price pG or quantity qG of grandfathered quota has
no effect on the equilibrium price p∗(y) at the auction.
Since the equilibrium price is the highest price paid for a unit of quota sold at
the auction, the above result does not imply that the average price for the quota
9Proof:
∑
i q
A
i (p
∗, yi) = QA∑
i(qi (p
∗, yi)−min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
) = QA∑
i qi (p
∗, yi) = QA +
∑
i min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
= Q∑
i qi (p
∗, yi) = Q. 
51
is unaffected. To illustrate how the model works we present a simple example
below demonstrating that although p∗ (y) remains unchanged when changing pG
or qG, the average unit price on the auction does change when changing qG.10
Example 2.2.1 Consider a setting in which there are two firms who both receive
equal fractions of the total allowable catch (TAC) in grandfathered quota. The
total amount of quota Q = 15 and the global price is f = 13. The price of the
grandfathered quota is pG = 3. The firms’ marginal costs are given by:
MC1(q, y1) = 1 +
3
4
q
MC2(q, y2) = 2 +
3
4
q.
Given this, their demand functions can be obtained from the value function,
given by
vi (qi; yi) = [f −MCi (qi; yi)]+ .
The value functions are therefore as follows
v1 (q1; y1) =
[
13− (1 + 3
4
q)
]
+
=
[
12− 3
4
q
]
+
v2 (q2; y2) =
[
13− (2 + 3
4
q)
]
+
=
[
11− 3
4
q
]
+
.
Recalling the assumption of considering only decreasing marginal values and tak-
ing the inverse of the value functions the demand functions become
q1 (p, y1) = 16− 43p
q2 (p, y2) =
44
3
− 4
3
p.
10For simplicity, we use linear marginal cost functions, and assume that the firm is at the
point where marginal costs are strictly decreasing.
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Case 1: Grandfathered quantity is 2 units per firm Now let us assume
that both firms receive 2 units of grandfathered quota, i.e.
qG1 (p, y1) = q
G
2 (p, y2) = 2
The total demand on auction is
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
= qi (p, yi)−min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
.
With the given demand functions and price pG the grandfathered quota constraint
binds, and hence the demands on auction are given by:
qA1
(
p, y1; p
G, qG1
)
= (16− 4
3
p)− 2 = 14− 4
3
p
qA2
(
p, y2; p
G, qG2
)
= (44
3
− 4
3
p)− 2 = 38
3
− 4
3
p.
The next step is to calculate the supply on the auction and the residual supply
facing the firms. Since Q = QA +
∑
i min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
we know that QA =
15− (2 + 2) = 11.
The residual supply can be obtained from
s−i(p, yj 6=i; pG, qGj 6=i) = max
{
QA −
∑
j 6=i
qAj (p, yj; p
G, qGj ), 0
}
and is defined by the following two functions for p ≥ 0:
s−1 =

4
3
p− 5
3
, if p > 5
4
0, if 0 ≤ p ≤ 5
4
, s−2 =

4
3
p− 3, if p > 9
4
0, if 0 ≤ p ≤ 9
4
.
To find the equilibrium we set the auction demand and residual supply of the
firms equal,
s−i(p, yj 6=i; pG, qGj 6=i) = q
A
i
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
.
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(a) Demand of firm i and total supply on auc-
tion
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(b) Residual supply facing firm i
Figure 2.4: How to obtain the residual supply from total supply on auction and
demand functions
Firm 1:
4
3
p− 5
3
= 14− 4
3
p
p = 47
8
.
Firm 2:
4
3
p− 3 = 38
3
− 4
3
p
p = 47
8
.
Note that the equilibrium price p∗(y) = 47
8
for both firms. However, the total
quantity, total payment and price paid per unit are different. The quantities
demanded at the auction by the two firms are
qA1
(
47
8
)
= 14− 4
3
· 47
8
= 37
6
≈ 6.17
qA2
(
47
8
)
= 38
3
− 4
3
· 47
8
= 29
6
≈ 4.83.
In a VCG auction the price paid in the auction is given by the area below the
residual supply curve. In Figure 2.5 we see the total payment of firm 1, where
the payment in the auction is given by the striped area to the right of qG1 . The
payments on the auction (PAi) are therefore given by:
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PA1 =
∫ 47
8
5
4
37
6
− (4
3
p− 5
3
)
dp+ 5
4
· 37
6
= 703
32
≈ 21.97
PA2 =
∫ 47
8
9
4
29
6
− (4
3
p− 3) dp+ 9
4
· 29
6
= 1885
96
≈ 19.64.
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Figure 2.5: Total payment of firm 1
Having calculated the equilibrium quantity and the total payments, we can now
calculate the average price per unit purchased through the auction:
Firm 1:
703/32
37/6
= 57
16
≈ 3.56
Firm 2:
1885/96
29/6
= 65
16
≈ 4.06.
Case 2: Grandfathered quantity is 4 units per firm Now we repeat the
above exercise with
qG1 (p, y1) = q
G
2 (p, y2) = 4.
The quota constraint is still binding and hence auction demands are
qA1
(
p, y1; p
G, qG1
)
= 12− 4
3
p
qA2
(
p, y2; p
G, qG2
)
= 32
3
− 4
3
p,
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and the residual supply of the two firms is given by:
s−1 =

4
3
p− 11
3
, if p > 11
4
0, if 0 ≤ p ≤ 11
4
, s−2 =

4
3
p− 5, if p > 15
4
0, if 0 ≤ p ≤ 15
4
.
Setting demand and residual supply equal for both firms we obtain the following
Firm 1:
4
3
p− 11
3
= 12− 4
3
p
p = 47
8
.
Firm 2:
4
3
p− 5 = 32
3
− 4
3
p
p = 47
8
.
Hence, the quantities demanded at the equilibrium are
qA1
(
47
8
)
= 12− 4
3
· 47
8
= 25
6
≈ 4.17
qA2
(
47
8
)
= 32
3
− 4
3
· 47
8
= 17
6
≈ 2.83.
The total payments for the purchased quota at the auction (PAi) are therefore
PA1 =
∫ 47
8
11
4
25
6
− (4
3
p− 11
3
)
dp+ 11
4
· 25
6
= 575
32
≈ 17.97
PA2 =
∫ 47
8
15
4
17
6
− (4
3
p− 5) dp+ 15
4
· 17
6
= 1309
96
≈ 13.64.
and the prices per unit of quota for firm 1 and 2, respectively, are
575/32
25/6
= 69
16
≈ 4.31
1309/96
17/6
= 77
16
≈ 4.81.
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Comparing the two cases If comparing the two cases we see that p∗(y) = 47
8
in both cases for both players as Lemma 2.2.1 shows. As the quantity allocated
through grandfathering increases, the average price paid on the auction increases
for both players. In this particular example, when pG = 3 the total revenue
also increases. The revenue would have remained unchanged with pG = 2.5. The
positive impact on revenue from an increase in grandfathered quota increases with
the price of grandfathered quota pG, but only to a certain extent because at too high
prices firms would reject the grandfathered quota, and it would be sold on auction
instead, resulting in a new equilibrium. The more quota is sold on auction the
lower is the average unit price for units purchased through the auction.
Table 2.1: Effect of changing qGi on prices
Quantity Average unit price Payment
G A Total G A Total qGi = 2 qGi = 4
Firm 1 qGi = 2 2 6.17 8.17 3 3.56 3.42 27.97
qGi = 4 4 4.17 8.17 3 4.31 3.67 29.97
Firm 2 qGi = 2 2 4.83 6.83 3 4.06 3.75 25.64
qGi = 4 4 2.83 6.83 3 4.81 3.75 25.64
53.60 55.60
2.3 Results
To solve the model, we first need to consider the utility of the firms. The utility
of firm i is the gain from obtaining the grandfathered quota and the quota bought
on auction less the investment made by the firm and is given by:
Ui = −yi +
∫ p0i (yi)
pG
min
{
qi (p, yi) , q
G
i
}
dp
+
∫ +∞
p∗(y)
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
dp+
∫ p∗(y)
0
(
QA −
∑
j 6=i
qAj
(
p, yj; p
G, qGj
))
dp.
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Here, QA −∑j 6=i qAj (p, yj; pG, qGj ) is the residual supply facing firm i in the auc-
tion. Recalling that
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
= qi (p, yi)−min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
the utility becomes
Ui = −yi +
∫ p0i (yi)
pG
min
{
qi (p, yi) , q
G
i
}
dp
+
∫ +∞
p∗(y)
qi (p, yi)−min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
dp
+
∫ p∗(y)
0
(
QA −
∑
j 6=i
qAj
(
p, yj; p
G, qGj
))
dp.
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(a) Utility when the price of grandfathered
quota is higher than the equilibrium price at
the auction
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 2b:
qi (p, yi)
p0i
q0i
p
q
1
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 2a:
p0i
q0i
vi (qi; yi)
p
q
1
Graph 2b:
qi (p, yi)
p0i
q0i
p
q
1
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
q∗1
p∗
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
QA
qA2 (p, y2; p
G, qG2 )
s−1(p, y2; pG, qG2 )
qAi (p, yi; p
G, qGi )
s−i(p, yj =i; pG, qGj =i)
1
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 2a:
p0i
q0i
vi (qi; yi)
p
q
1
Graph 2b:
qi (p, yi)
p0i
q0i
p
q
1
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
q∗1
p∗
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
AT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
QA
qA2 (p, y2; p
G, qG2 )
s−1(p, y2; pG, qG2 )
qAi (p, yi; p
G, qGi )
s−i(p, yj =i; pG, qGj =i)
1
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 2a:
p0i
q0i
vi (qi; yi)
p
q
1
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
q∗1
p∗
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
QA
qA2 (p, 2; p
G, qG2 )
s−1(p, y2; pG, qG2 )
qAi (p, yi; p
G, qGi )
s−i(p, yj =i; pG, qGj =i)
1
Graph 2a:
p0i
q0i
vi (qi; yi)
p
q
1
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
Graph 3a:
pG
qGi
qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
q∗1
p∗
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
(b) Utility when the price of grandfathered
quota is lower than the equilibrium price at
the auction
Figure 2.6: Utility of firm i
This is equivalent to:
Ui = −yi +
∫ p0i (yi)
p∗(y)
qi (p, yi) dp
+
(
p∗ (y)− pG)min{qi (pG, yi) , qGi }
+
∫ p∗(y)
0
(
QA −
∑
j 6=i
qAj
(
p, yj; p
G, qGj
))
dp.
To find the level of investment maximising firm i’s utility we take the derivative
of the utility function with respect to investment. The first order condition then
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becomes:
1 =
∂p0i
∂yi
(yi)q
0
i (yi) +
∫ p0i (yi)
p∗(y)
∂qi
∂yi
(p, yi) dp
+
∂p∗
∂yi
(y) min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
+
(
p∗ (y)− pG) ∂
∂yi
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
+
∂p∗
∂yi
(y)
(
QA −
∑
j 6=i
qAj
(
p∗, yj; pG, qGj
))
.
Since at equilibrium QA =
∑
i q
A
i
(
p∗, yi; pG, qGi
)
, this is equivalent to:
1 =
∂p0i
∂yi
(yi)q
0
i (yi) +
∫ p0i (yi)
p∗(y)
∂qi
∂yi
(p, yi) dp
+
∂p∗
∂yi
(y) min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
+
(
p∗ (y)− pG) ∂
∂yi
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
+
∂p∗
∂yi
(y) qAi
(
p∗, yi; pG, qGi
)
.
Summing up the second and fourth line and recalling that qAi
(
p, yi; p
G, qGi
)
=
qi (p, yi)−min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
we obtain
1 =
∂p0i
∂yi
(yi)q
0
i (yi) +
∫ p0i (yi)
pG
∂qi
∂yi
(p, yi) dp+
∂p∗
∂yi
(y) qi (p
∗, yi)
+
(
p∗ (y)− pG) ∂
∂yi
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
.
On the left-hand side, we have the marginal cost of investment equal to one.
On the right-hand side we have the marginal benefit of investing into greener
technology that comes from the fact that the firm’s valuation for quota increases
as it pays less environmental tax per unit of fish. This increases the firm’s parti-
cipation in the market as it is willing to enter at a higher price p0i (yi) and to bid
more aggressively in the auction.
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We assume that the solution is interior, therefore the second order condition
S (y) = ∂
2Ui
∂y2i
< 0, where S (y) is given by:
S (y) =
∂p0i
∂yi
(yi)
∂q0i
∂yi
(yi) +
∂2p0i
∂y2i
(yi) q
0
i (yi)
+
∂p0i
∂yi
(yi)
∂qi
∂yi
(p0i (yi) , yi) +
∫ p0i (yi)
pG
∂2qi
∂y2i
(p, yi) dp+
∂2p∗
∂y2i
(y) qi (p
∗, yi)
+∂p
∗
∂yi
(y) ∂qi
∂yi
(p∗, yi) +
∂p∗
∂yi
(y) ∂
∂yi
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
+
(
p∗ (y)− pG) ∂2
∂y2i
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
.
As we have established, the firm’s utility is maximized when the marginal
cost of investment equals the marginal benefit from investing. It is also useful to
understand how the level of investment influences the equilibrium price, as this
impacts on government revenue and the payments of the firms for the quota. We
are able to see this from the first order condition. Provided that
∑
i qi (p
∗, yi) ≡ Q
∂p∗
∂yi
(y) = −
∑
j
∂qj
∂yj
(p∗, yj)∑
j
∂qj
∂p
(p∗, yj)
= −
∂qi
∂yi∑
j
∂qj
∂p
(p∗, yj)
> 0.
The numerator is positive since the demand for quota increases as investment
increases. The denominator is negative as demand decreases with price and hence
the derivative is greater than zero. Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3.1 The equilibrium price at the auction increases in the level of
investment.
This seems very plausible, as investment should lead to lower marginal costs.
These in turn increase the demand for quota — as the activity becomes more
profitable — which increases the equilibrium price at the auction.
Equilibrium Stability To study the equilibrium properties we use the implicit
function theorem to show that
dyi
dyj
= −
∂2p∗
∂yi∂yj
(y) qi (p
∗, yi) +
∂p∗
∂yj
(y) ∂
∂yi
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
S (y)
.
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Further, if min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
= qGi (i.e. the grandfathered quota constraint is
binding) then
dyi
dyj
= −
∂2p∗
∂yi∂yj
(y) qi (p
∗, yi)
S (y)
< 0.
This implies that optimal investment levels are substitutes: when another firm
increases its investment yj into the value of quota, the residual supply facing i
shrinks. There is less return on i’s investment and hence their incentive to invest
decreases.
Proposition 2.3.2 If the grandfathered quota constraint is binding, then invest-
ment levels are substitutes. An increase in firm j’s investment leads to a decrease
in firm i’s investment levels.
In reality, this would only be the case where some fraction of the quota was
auctioned, and not in systems, where all the quota is grandfathered as is often the
case. In such cases, firms would receive a fixed proportion of TAC and therefore
potential investments by other firms would not have any implications on the
amount of quota a firm would receive, nor the return on their investment.
Moreover, if the setting is symmetric11 then ∂
2p∗
∂yi∂yj
(y) = ∂
2p∗
∂y2i
(y) and then∣∣∣ dyidyj ∣∣∣ < 1 for all i 6= j. (By continuity this should remain the case in settings close
enough to being symmetric). This implies that the best reply correspondence is
a contraction mapping, and hence the equilibrium is stable.
Proposition 2.3.3 When firms are symmetric (or near symmetric) the interior
equilibrium is stable.
11By symmetric is meant that players have identical marginal costs and grandfathered quota
and hence also the same optimal investment, demand and price.
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An equilibrium is considered stable when it is self adjusting — the economy
will converge back to a stable equilibrium after potential shocks to the market.
In fisheries these could include price shocks, trade wars and resource scarcity.
In fisheries, boom and bust cycles are very common for many species where
abundance fluctuates dramatically (McClatchie et al., 2017).
The Effect of Grandfathered Quota on Investment Now let us take a
look at how the price and quantity of the grandfathered quota affect investments.
By considering the first order condition and using the implicit function theorem
we find that
dyi
dqGi
= −
(p∗(y)− pG) ∂2
∂yi∂qGi
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
S(y)
.
This derivative is always equal to zero. If min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
= qGi , i.e.
the grandfathered quota constraint is binding, then the demand of grandfathered
quota qGi does not depend on yi. If the constraint does not bind then qi
(
pG, yi
)
is independent of qGi . We can therefore conclude that the numerator and hence
the derivative is always zero.
The changes in grandfathered quota offered to another auction participant do
not affect the incentive to invest in environmentally friendly production either
dyi
dqGj
= − 0
S(y)<0
.
Proposition 2.3.4 The increase in grandfathered quota affects neither the in-
vestment level of the firm concerned by the change, nor that of any other firm in
the market.
It is unsurprising that when the firms are allocated more grandfathered quota
than their demand, marginal changes in their allocated grandfathered quota do
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not have any effect on the firms choices, including the choice to invest. However,
when firms demand more quota than what is allocated through grandfathering,
which would be the most usual scenario, the reason for the non-effect is not so
apparent. If the firms are allocated less grandfathered quota, then the amount
on auction will increase by the same quantity. The units that they missed out on
would be acquired at the equilibrium price p∗(y) at auction instead. As a result,
the price itself is unaffected by the changes in grandfathered quotas because
when those are reduced, the auction supply automatically increases by the same
amount. Hence, the marginal benefit from investment does not change.
However, the model does not take into account factors such as risk aversion
and the importance of secure property rights for their decisions (Anderson et al.
(2011); Libecap (2009)). Furthermore, as investments often require a long term
perspective, it would be expected to be easier to make an investment based on
access to a fixed fraction of the TAC, rather than the firms having to compete
for access to the fisheries.
The Effect of the Price of Grandfathered Quota on Investment To find
the effect on investment of changing the price of grandfathered quota we once
more use the first order condition and apply the implicit function theorem to get:
dyi
dpG
= −A+B − C
S(y)
< 0,
with A = − ∂qi
∂yi
(
pG, yi
)
, B =
(
p∗ (y)− pG) ∂2
∂yi∂pG
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
and C =
∂
∂yi
min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
.
In the numerator, the first term is negative as demand is increasing in the level
of investment. The second term is zero, if the grandfathered quota constraint
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binds (which is the much more likely case when overcapacity is common), and
the third term is negative. Therefore, we can conclude that dyi
dpG
< 0 and that
increasing the price of grandfathered quota will decrease the incentive for firms
to invest.
Proposition 2.3.5 If for firm i, the grandfathered quota constraint binds, then
investment is decreasing in the price of grandfathered quota.
This result seems very plausible as facing an increase in grandfathered quota
payment, the firm would likely choose to invest less. In other words, when the
price goes up the firm can afford less quota for the same money, and with lower
quantities the return on investment would decrease. Furthermore, paying higher
prices for the resource would result in having less capital available for investment.
Total Welfare The total welfare, also known as total surplus, is the sum of the
surplus of the firms and the government running the auction. Figure 2.7 shows
the total welfare, from firm i’s operations and therefore the total welfare can be
obtained by summing this up for all the firms in the market. We do not count
the environmental tax towards this surplus since it will go directly into recovering
the damage to the environment, assuming it is correctly computed. In our model,
consumers do not need to be taken into account because the quantity and the
price of final product, fish, remain constant. Consumer surplus is therefore not
affected by the decision how much quota is allocated through the auction given
that the country is a small producer that does not have the market power to
affect the price of fish. The total welfare is therefore equal to the sum of all the
firms’ utilities and the revenue of the government. Looking at Figure 2.7 we can
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Figure 2.7: Total welfare from firm i’s operations
see that the welfare can be expressed by the following equation:
W =
∑
i
Ui +R
=
∫ +∞
p∗(y)
∑
i
qi (p, yi) dp+ p
∗ (y)Q−
∑
i
yi.
To see the effect of changing the price or quantity of grandfathered quota we
can take the derivative of welfare with respect to these variables. It is obvious from
the expression that none of the terms depend on either pG or qiG and therefore
both derivates are zero and the effect absent. Looking at Figure 2.7 it is easy
to see that with an equilibrium price that is unaffected by the grandfathered
quota variables (see Lemma 2.2.1), the total welfare always remains the same,
since investment is not a function of pG or qiG. The following neutrality result
therefore holds.
Proposition 2.3.6 Total welfare is not affected by changes in the price or quant-
ity of the grandfathered quota.
Although total welfare is unaffected, it is worthwhile to explore the impact of
price and quantity of grandfathered quota on the individual total welfare com-
ponents, i.e. revenue and utility. To do so, we return to our example on page
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52. The example demonstrated the effect on the firms’ payments from changing
the quantity of grandfathered quota from two to four units. The total payment
of firm 1 increased by 2 whilst the payment of firm 2 remained unchanged. The
average price paid at the auction increased for both firms.
Let us now calculate the utility of the firms. The utility of the firms from
participating in the auctions is the area between the auction demand and residual
supply functions and utility from grandfathering is given by the area below the
demand function and above the grandfathered quota price (see Figure 2.8 below).
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(a) Utility of firm 1
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(b) Total payment of firm 1
Figure 2.8: Utility and payments of firm 1
Let us first calculate the utility when grandfathered quota qGi = 2 for each
firm. The utility of the firms is given by:
U1 =
∫ 47
8
5
4
(
4
3
p− 5
3
)
dp+
∫ 21
2
47
8
(
14− 4
3
p
)
dp
+
∫ 21
2
3
2dp+
∫ 12
21
2
(
16− 4
3
p
)
dp = 2161
48
≈ 45.02
U2 =
∫ 47
8
9
4
(
4
3
p− 9
3
)
dp+
∫ 19
2
47
8
(
38
3
− 4
3
p
)
dp∫ 19
2
3
2dp+
∫ 11
19
2
(
44
3
− 4
3
p
)
dp = 1537
48
≈ 32.02.
Doing the same calculations for the case when qGi = 4 we get the following
figures:
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U1 =
2065
48
≈ 43.02
U2 =
1537
48
≈ 32.02.
As is evident by the calculations, the utility of firm 2 remains unchanged
whilst that of firm 1 decreases by 2. Therefore the total utility decreases by 2
given the fixed grandfathered quota price of pG = 3. The changes in utility depend
on the relationship between the grandfathered quota price and the equilibrium
price at auction. In this particular case, there would be no effect of changing
the grandfathered quota if the price of grandfathered quota were 2.5. Since the
total welfare (from firm i’s operations) is given by the striped area in figure 2.7
and having demonstrated that the effect of changing the grandfathered quota
variables has no effect on total welfare, any decrease in utility would be offset by
an equivalent increase in revenue.
In our model, the revenue is given by the striped area in Figure 2.9 and it can
be expressed as:
R =
∑
i
∫ p∗(y)
0
qAi (p
∗)−max
{
QA −∑j 6=i qAj (p, yi; pG, qGj ) , 0} dp
+pG
∑
i min
{
qi
(
pG, yi
)
, qGi
}
.
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Figure 2.9: Revenue from firm i’s purchases of quota
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However, since we know that utility decreased by 2, it must be the case that
revenue also increases by the same amount. We have already shown this by
calculation, since revenue is given by the total amount paid by the two firms
through the auction and through the fee on the grandfathered quota. Table 2.2
shows the calculated changes in revenue and utility at the current grandfathered
quota price pG = 3. Note that the total quantities purchased remain unchanged
in the two cases.
Table 2.2: Utility and revenue when changing qGi
Quantity Utility Revenue
G A Total qGi = 2 qGi = 4 qGi = 2 qGi = 4
Firm 1 q
G
i = 2 2 6.17 8.17 45.02 27.97
qGi = 4 4 4.17 8.17 43.02 29.97
Firm 2 q
G
i = 2 2 4.83 6.83 32.02 25.64
qGi = 4 4 2.83 6.83 32.02 25.64
77.04 75.04 53.60 55.60
Finally, let us briefly examine what happens to revenue and utility when the
price of the grandfathered quota changes. When the grandfathered quota con-
straint binds, the price change has no effect on the equilibrium at the auction.
Therefore, the change in revenue is simply the quantity of grandfathered quota
multiplied by the price change. If, on the other hand, the constraint does not
bind, the price change will result in lower or higher quantities purchased through
grandfathering changing the auction supply. As the above example established,
changes in quantities are only affecting the utility and payment of the most effi-
cient firm. Furtermore, changes in utility and revenue only happen, when chan-
ging the grandfathered quota available to the most efficient firm. Whether the
change in grandfathered quota affects revenue negatively or positively depends
68
on the relationsship between pG and p∗(y).
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The work presented in this paper represents the first attempt at creating a model
applicable to fisheries to explore how particular allocation mechanisms impact on
various parameters, including government revenue from the fishing quota, total
welfare, the firms’ level of investment and the price obtained at the auction. It
also considers how the level of resource fee on the grandfathered quota impacts
the level of investment as well as the auction price. The majority of the results
presented in previous sections are plausible, and therefore suggest that the model
has relevance in the fisheries context. However, some of the results are less
intuitive and somewhat surprising.
The model suggests that the amount of quota allocated to firms through
grandfathering has no effect on the equilibrium price on the auction and the
willingness to invest. At first glance, the apparent non-effect on the equilibrium
price seems surprising, but considering that the equilibrium price is the highest
price paid for a unit of quota, this does not imply that there is no effect on average
prices, as demonstrated in Example 2.2.1.
More surprising is the lack of effect on the willingness to invest. However, this
can be explained by the assumption in the model that the total supply remains
unchanged, i.e. if the firms are allocated less grandfathered quota, then the
amount on auction will increase by the same quantity. As a result, the price itself
is unaffected by the changes in grandfathered quotas because when those are
reduced, the auction supply automatically increases by the same amount. Hence,
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the marginal benefit from investment does not change. Another contributor to
this result is the failure of the model to take into account factors, such as risk
aversion and the preference for secure rights, which leads to some unrealistic
model outcomes.
One particular strength of the model is that for the results to hold, the as-
sumption of symmetry is not required. However, there is still considerable room
for improvement if the model is to be applied in a decision-making context. In
such a scenario, the model would need to be further developed, and several com-
ponents need to be incorporated and in some cases revised. One of the areas
where the model is less realistic with respect to fisheries, concerns how it treats
the marginal costs of the firms. The model only considers increasing marginal
costs, whereas in fisheries decreasing marginal costs are much more common with
increasing quantities, as there is often fleet overcapacity (see García-Enríquez
et al. (2016)). In order to get a more realistic picture with respect to the decision
making of firms, future work should focus on including decreasing marginal costs.
This is important as it is widely assumed that firms can bid to the point where
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, but this only holds where fixed costs are
already covered within the existing production. In reality, the firm considers its
entire costs, and not just marginal ones, when deciding on their bidding strategy.
Generally, for marginal units, the firm will demand additional units as long as
these increase the total profit of the operation. It can be economically sound for
the firm to profit at a lower rate for marginal units, than the average rate of profit
per unit for the entire production, which the firm would need to cover its fixed
costs. Incorporating the entire cost curve into the model would therefore be a
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requisite for improving its applicability to the fisheries and would provide a more
realistic picture of the key factors involved in the firm’s decision-making process
with regards to its behaviour at the auctions.
Another area of improvement relates to potential rules at the auction. As
currently set up, the model assumes that any firm can purchase the entire quota
at the auction. In reality, it is likely that anti-trust rules would be applied at such
a quota auction. Therefore anti-trust regulations would need to be incorporated
into the model. One particular strength of the model is that it is a generic model,
and therefore it is informative in a wide range of contexts, for instance electricity
markets. Although, to maximise its potential in the policy arena, it would be
essential to configure the model to the specific context in which it should be
applied. In what follows, the first ideas for a potential way forward are presented
with regards to how the model could be expanded and developed in future work
to improve its applicability and relevance in the fisheries context, before final
conclusions will be drawn.
2.4.1 Future Model Development
As discussed above, it is necessary to revise how marginal costs are treated in the
model to make it more applicable to fisheries. Decreasing marginal costs indicate
that there is overcapacity within the individual firm. In such cases, firms would
require higher quantities than what was supplied on auction. In the model this
would imply that the quota constraint would bind at a point where marginal costs
are decreasing and hence the marginal value increasing. In such a case the firm
could demand the whole supply and the firm would choose its highest price where
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the marginal value over all units is equal to the total cost. See Figure 2.10a. The
firms’ demand would therefore be zero at all prices above the maximum price and
Q at all prices below this point. Figure 2.11a demonstrates what such a demand
function would look like. If we assumed that each individual firm participating
in the auction had enough capacity to fish the total quota auctioned themselves,
then the residual supply would be given by two vertical lines, one at zero and one
at Q. The intersection of demand and supply would be at the maximum price of
the firm with the second highest valuation. See Figure 2.11b for an illustration.
Such a setting would allow one firm to purchase the entire quota available
but in reality it would be more likely that antitrust rules would prevent this from
happening. If this were to be incorporated into the model you would obtain a
new maximum price, which would be lower than without the anti-trust rules. See
Figure 2.10b for the new maximum price.
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(b) Marginal value with antitrust
Figure 2.10: Marginal values and maximum price on auction
72
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 1b:
vi (qi; yi)
v˜i (q; yi)
p
q
1
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 2a:
p0i
q0i
vi (qi; yi)
p
q
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 2a:
p0i
q0i
vi (qi; yi)
p
q
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
(a) Demand function for bidder i
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 1b:
vi (qi; yi)
v˜i (q; yi)
p
q
1
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 1a:
MCi (q; yi)
mci (q)
f
p
q
Graph 2a:
p0i
q0i
vi (qi; yi)
p
q
1
q∗i
Ui
R
QAT
Q
qG1
q1(p, y1)
1
(b) Residual supply facing bidder i
Figure 2.11: Demand and supply on auction
2.4.2 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a model for exploring how various allocation mechanisms
impact on important concerns in management of fisheries. Applying the model in
a theoretical setting, several important results have been obtained, which are very
relevant in the fisheries context, including how auction prices (both equilibrium
and average) and investment are influenced by both the fraction of grandfathered
quota in the system as well as the price (resource fee) paid for this quota. This
provides policy-makers with a tool to explore trade-offs between government rev-
enue and investment into environmentally friendly technologies and thereby un-
derstand how to incentivise investments in the industry. The preceding sections
have also explored how the revenue of the government and utility of the firms is
influenced by changing the parameters. This also relates to an important polit-
ical concern, as this would make evident how particular policy decisions, such
as changing the amount or price of grandfathered quota — and thereby also the
amount that is auctioned — would impact on industry and the revenue of the
government. The majority of the results seem to fit to what one might expect,
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indicating that the model can be applied in the field of fisheries, although as in-
dicated above, the model and its underlying assumptions need to be refined and
developed further to improve its applicability in the policy context. Much work
still remains to be done, but here we have taken the first steps in outlining and
conceptualising what a more realistic and reliable model would look like in the
near future.
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Chapter 3
EPIC Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing
Backfires in Multiunit Auctions
3.1 Introduction
If a seller wishes to sell a single item, many auction theorists would recommend
an ascending auction.1,2 If the values are affiliated (e.g. common), the symmetric
equilibrium in an ascending auction raises greater revenue than the second-price
sealed-bid auction and even greater revenue than the first-price sealed-bid or
descending auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982b). Moreover, when bidders have
independent private values, the ascending auction is the unique strategyproof
and credible mechanism i.e. it cannot be undetectably manipulated by the seller
(Akbarpour and Li, 2018).3
1This is an extended version of a paper cowritten with Daniel Marszalec and Alexander
Teytelboym. See Laksá et al. (2018).
2First-price (second-price) sealed bid and descending (ascending) auctions are strategically
equivalent from the bidders’ point of view (Vickrey, 1961). If bidders’ values are independent
and private and if bidders are risk-neutral, all standard auctions yield the same revenue (Riley
and Samuelson, 1981; Myerson, 1981).
3In fact, ascending auctions for a single item are ex-post incentive compatible (EPIC) and
obviously strategyproof (Li, 2017).
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If a seller wants to sell multiple units of a homogeneous good, many auction
theorists would recommend a uniform-price auction.4 Weber (1981) showed that
in the affiliated values model with unit demands, the uniform-price auction yields
greater revenue than the discriminatory auction. In a general setting with sym-
metric bidders, Pycia and Woodward (2016) proved that the unique equilibrium
in the discriminatory auction for divisible goods is revenue-equivalent to the seller-
optimal uniform-price auction with optimal supply and reserve price.5 However,
Ausubel et al. (2014) pointed out that when bidders are asymmetric uniform-
and discriminatory-price auctions cannot be ranked either in terms of revenue or
efficiency.6 Uniform-price auctions appear appealing both from a theoretical and
practical perspective. In the early 90s, the United States famously switched from
discriminatory- to uniform-price auctions to sell debt (Bikhchandani and Huang,
1993). Today, both auction formats are popular to sell sovereign debt (Bren-
ner et al., 2009). From a structural econometrics perspective, there is a mixed
picture on the performance of discriminatory price auctions. Using a private-
value model, Hortaçsu and McAdams (2010) find that the two auction formats
perform similarly in the Turkish debt market. With a common-value model,
Fevrier et al. (2002) and Castellanos and Oviedo (2008) produce contradictory
4There are many possible formats here: simultaneous vs. sequential and sealed-bid vs.
dynamic, but we will focus on simultaneous, sealed-bid formats. Revenue-equivalence with
independent private values holds (in a weaker form) for multiple object settings (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, 1988). While discriminatory-price auctions and uniform-price auctions are considered
to be the natural generalizations of first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions (Weber,
1981), the appropriate strategyproof generalization of the second-price auction is, of course,
the Vickrey auction. Vickrey payments can also be obtained by running an English auction
i.e. a deferred acceptance algorithm (Gul and Stacchetti, 2000; Ausubel, 2004). Uniform-price
auctions are not strategyproof or even EPIC.
5Wilson (1979) introduced such “auctions for shares” and analysed the common-value set-
ting. See also Klemperer and Meyer (1989); Green and Newbery (1992); Back and Zender
(2001); Wang and Zender (2002). Swinkels (2001) proved revenue-equivalence of uniform- and
discriminatory-price auctions in a large market setting.
6However, if agents are risk-averse in a common-value model then uniform-price auctions
dominate in revenue and efficiency (Wang and Zender, 2002).
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rankings for the French and the Mexican debt markets respectively. Using both
private and common value models, Marszalec (2017) shows that discriminatory
auction revenue-dominates in the Polish sovereign debt market under both sets
of assumptions. Both types of auctions are also popular in many liberalised elec-
tricity markets (Fabra et al., 2002). Finally, in an experimental setting, Abbink
et al. (2006) find that uniform-price auctions outperform discriminatory-price and
Spanish auctions. Ausubel et al. (2014, p. 1393) conclude that:
Uniform pricing has several desirable properties, including: (1) it is
easily understood in both static and dynamic forms; (2) it is fair in
the sense that the same price is paid by everyone; (3) absent market
power it is efficient and strategically simple (“you just bid what you
think it’s worth”); and (4) the exercise of market power under uniform
pricing favours smaller bidders.
But a theorist’s preference for ascending and uniform-price auctions often relies
on two assumptions rarely met in practice: bidder symmetry and competitiveness
of the market.
3.1.1 Consequences of Bidder Asymmetry
It is well-known that when bidders are asymmetric, revenue equivalence of stand-
ard auction formats breaks down even in the singe-item, independent value set-
ting: it is no longer possible to universally rank auctions by revenue, but in
general stronger bidders prefer the ascending auction and weaker bidders prefer
the first-price, sealed-bid auction (Maskin and Riley, 2000).7
7On the other hand, if either the seller or the bidders are risk-averse, the seller would prefer
first-price auction (Maskin and Riley, 1984).
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Milgrom and Weber’s (1982b) beautiful result on the dominance of ascending
auctions depends crucially on the assumption that all bidders are playing a sym-
metric equilibrium: in asymmetric equilibria their revenue ranking breaks down
(Bikhchandani and Riley, 1991). Bulow et al. (1999) analyse such asymmetric
equilibria in an almost-common-value setting of takeover battles in which one
bidder exercises a small advantage by having a slightly larger “toehold” on exist-
ing company shares. They show that in this case there is a unique asymmetric
equilibrium in the ascending auction in which the weaker bidder, in anticipation
of aggression by the stronger bidder (who is interested in bidding more aggress-
ively due to the value advantage), bids a very low amount. With sufficiently
asymmetric value advantage, therefore, the stronger bidder can win the auction
at a much lower price in an ascending (or second-price) auction than in a first-
price auction (Bulow et al., 1999, Proposition 6). One may wonder whether such
effects could be strong in practice, but Kagel and Levin (2002) argue that
it would seem to require very sophisticated bidders for the explos-
ive effect to be realized under these conditions. As such we would
expect that bidders outside the laboratory would employ alternative
strategies available to them in the less structured environment they
operate in to press their private value advantage.
In real-world situations, therefore, bidders with an existing value advantage have
an incentive to make announcements that cement their advantage, make other
bidders bid even more conservatively or drive them out of the auction altogether.
As a result, with strong value advantage asymmetry ascending auctions or second-
price auctions could yield low revenue and be highly inefficient.
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3.1.2 Consequences of Uncompetitive Bidding
In practice, the competitiveness assumption is often inadequate since bidders of-
ten have incentive to collude.8 Auction design can mitigate some collusive prac-
tices (Klemperer, 2002a,b). In general, providing bidders with less information
about each other and their bids and using sealed-bid formats is considered to
make bidding ring formation more difficult (Robinson, 1985; Marshall and Marx,
2007, 2009, 2012).9
Among sealed-bid auction formats, there is little agreement on whether uniform-
price auctions are more prone to collusion than discriminatory-price auctions.
Friedman (1960) argued that the uniform-price auction “in any of its variants,
will make the price the same for all purchasers, reduce the incentive for collusion,
and greatly widen the market.” Chari and Weber (1992) argued that: “Uniform-
price auctions are also likely to be less susceptible to market manipulation.”
However, many auction theorists have pointed out that uniform-price auctions
are susceptible to coordination on low-price equilibria (Wilson, 1979; Back and
Zender, 1993; Noussair, 1995; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998; Kremer and
Nyborg, 2003, 2004; LiCalzi and Pavan, 2005; McAdams, 2007). In equilibrium,
bidders submit high prices for the first few units and very low prices for the final
units. The bids are coordinated such that the bids drop sharply as aggregate
demand approaches supply. If any bidder wishes to grab more than the equilib-
rium share, the equilibrium price will jump sharply so he (and others) will have
to pay a very high price for every unit of the good. Hence, bidders are deterred
8Che and Kim (2009) offer elegant designs of collusion-proof auctions, but they have not
yet been used in practice.
9Milgrom and Weber’s (1982b) “linkage principle” — which states that on average revenues
can be increased by providing bidders with more information — fails in multiunit auctions
(Perry and Reny, 1999).
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from deviating. Indeed, (Milgrom, 2004, p. 264) says that these “extreme price
equilibria [are]... of great practical importance”. Such sophisticated strategies
have been observed experimentally when bidders have been given access to pre-
play communication (Goswami et al., 1996). When these tactics are observed
in procurement or supply-function settings they are referred to as “hockey-stick”
bidding (since the price offered for the first units is low and price for the final
units is very high).10 Hockey-stick bidding is often found in repeated electri-
city auctions (Hurlbut et al., 2004; Holmberg and Newbery, 2010). Figure 3.1
illustrates an empirical example of hockey-stick bidding in the Texas electricity
market. Such bidding strategies have been discussed in the context of supply
function competition (e.g. Bayona et al., 2018; Vives, 2011).11
Figure 3.1: Hockey-stick bidding in an electricity market (data taken from Hurl-
but et al. 2004)
3.1.3 Contribution of this Paper
In this paper, we present three examples of how inexperienced bidders who are
participating in a high-stakes auction are able to exploit bidder asymmetries in
an ascending auction as well as successfully coordinate on strategies that generate
10Cramton (2003) argues that “such bids are entirely reasonable given reasonable assumptions
about demand and supply uncertainty, forward contracts, and marginal cost curves.”
11For more information on supply function competition, see the seminal paper by Klemperer
and Meyer (1989).
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extremely low-price equilibria in uniform-price auctions. We present bidding data
from the first three years of auctions for fishing quota in the Faroe Islands which
involve overlapping sets of bidders. In one set of sequential ascending auctions the
largest quota holder in the relevant fisheries pre-announced that he was willing
to pay whatever necessary to obtain all the quota. An entrant, who was the
only other bidder, attempted to challenge him in the earlier rounds and, having
lost, dropped out in the later rounds leaving the stronger bidder to pick up the
remaining quota at the reserve price. We then present an example of coordinated
bidding in sequential ascending auctions in which all but two bidders appear to
bid as if in a bidding ring. In these auctions, almost all auctions ended at the same
price and the winning bidders rotated. In the final set of auctions, we present a set
of striking examples of what we call crank-handle bidding. We explore how crank-
handle bids were successfully coordinated and whether market entry can prevent
low-price equilibria. We believe that these are the first real-world examples of
exploiting powerful value advantage effects, enforcing nearly perfect bid rotation,
and exploiting subtle low-price equilibria among fairly inexperienced bidders in
high-stakes auctions.12
This paper is organized as follows: First, we briefly introduce the context in
which the auctions took place, before describing the design of the auctions in
Section 3.3. The following section demonstrates how the ascending auctions were
manipulated, before Section 3.5 documents underpricing in the uniform-price
auctions. In Section 3.6 we look into common design features that exacerbated
the failure of the auctions and suggest improvements before concluding in Section
12Our purpose is not to evaluate the suitability of auctions for allocating fishing rights in the
the Faroe Islands; rather we want to analyse the design and performance of previous auctions
and suggest improvements for the future.
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3.7. To protect company identities, we label companies with letters, altering the
labeling between sections.
3.2 Fishing Industry in the Faroes
The Faroe Islands is a small country in the North Atlantic which historically has
been (and still is) heavily dependent on the fishing industry. In 2017, approxim-
ately 13 percent of GDP (Statistics Faroe Islands, 2017b) and 52.5 percent of the
country’s exports came from the fishing industry (Christiansen and Markná, 2018)
and the fisheries sector employed 10.8 percent of the workforce (Statistics Faroe
Islands, 2017a). Although the fisheries contribute substantially to the economy,
the industry is small in the global context and the number of economic operat-
ors is limited. Faroese vessels have traditionally been fishing in many corners of
the world, but currently there are three fisheries that have particular commercial
significance for the industry: (i) demersal fisheries in Faroese waters; (ii) pelagic
fisheries (e.g. mackerel, herring, blue whiting); and (iii) demersal fisheries target-
ing cod in the Barents Sea. Only the latter two are commercially lucrative. The
demersal fisheries in Faroese waters, although currently less commercially signific-
ant, is an important economic and social contributor to local fishing communities
across the islands.
In 2008, the Faroe Islands passed a Competition Act similar to Denmark’s
Competition Act. The law, which includes provisions against anti-competitive
behavior, abuse of market dominance and merger control, is enforced by the
Faroese Competition Authority (Faroese Competition Authority, 2007). Just
three companies operate in the Barents Sea (P/F Enniberg, Sp/f Framherji and
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P/F JFK Trol). The pelagic fisheries industry is also concentrated: four compan-
ies (P/F Christian í Grótinum, Sp/f Framherji, P/F JFK Trol and P/F Varðin)
with ten vessels fish approximately 90 percent of the pelagic catch (Faroese Fish-
eries Inspectorate, 2017). For a complete overview of companies participating in
the auctions, see Appendix A.13 Large fishing companies are fairly homogeneous
in costs and share ownership of fish factories and smaller companies in the in-
dustry. Compared to the rest of the world, the fishing industry in the Faroes is
very small so Faroese firms act as price-takers with respect to global fish prices.
Since the introduction of fishing licenses in 1987, fishing rights in the Faroe
Islands have been exclusively allocated based on historical fishing rights (i.e.
“grandfathered”) with the exception of a number of trial auctions. Meanwhile,
all large companies frequently trade fishing quota through bilateral negotiations.
During the last two decades, the pelagic and demersal fisheries in the Barents
Sea have become increasingly profitable, following a change in legislation allowing
increased transferability of fishing rights as well as increases in the total allowable
catch (TAC) (Fiskivinnunýskipanarbólkurin, 2016). In 2007, the government
cancelled all fishing licenses with a ten-year notice committing its future self to
a complete reform of fishing rights by 2018.
In 2016, as part of the ongoing fisheries reform the new government decided
to run trial auctions of 10 percent of the TAC for demersal fish in the Barents
Sea, blue whiting, herring, and mackerel (Føroya Løgting, 2016b). In 2017, the
government auctioned off between 8 and 42 percent of the TAC for the same spe-
cies (Føroya Løgting, 2016a). In 2018, the Faroe Islands implemented a fisheries
13The other 10 percent are caught by around forty other vessels, many of which are owned
by Framherji, JFK Trol and Varðin either fully or partially.
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reform which introduced auctioning of fishing rights as a permanent feature of the
fisheries legislation. According to the new fisheries law, at least 25 percent of the
TAC of blue whiting and 15 percent of the TAC of the remaining species would
be sold on auction every year, starting in 2018 (Føroya Løgting, 2017).14 We
focus on the design and outcomes of these auctions in this paper. As a fraction
of GDP, these are some of the largest auctions ever held.15
Globally, auctioning of fishing rights is still comparatively rare. Auctions are
currently implemented in some fisheries in New Zealand, Chile and Washington
State in the U.S. (Cerda-D’ Amico and Urbina-Véliz, 2000; Peña-Torres, 2002;
Anderson and Holland, 2006; Lynham, 2014; Washington State Department of
Natural Resources, 2018). Russia and Estonia have used auctions in the past,
but have since moved away from this method of rights allocation (Vetemaa et al.,
2002; Anferova et al., 2005; Eero et al., 2005; Vetemaa et al., 2005). Many eco-
nomists believe that auction-based quota allocation can significantly improve the
efficiency of operations, gives appropriate long-run incentives for innovation in-
vestment, and provides opportunities for revenue-recycling (Kominers et al., 2017;
Marszalec, 2018a; Teytelboym, 2019). We do not consider broader questions of
the desirability of quota auctions in the Faroese context and focus on the per-
formance of the auctions instead.
14When TAC for each of the species is below a certain threshold, 15 percent (or 25 percent)
will be sold on auction, but all quota above these thresholds will be auctioned off. Therefore,
more than 15 or 25 percent of TAC may be sold on auction every year.
15Since the sale of the Roman Empire, the “largest ever” auction is often considered to be the
3G auction in the UK held in 2000 — it raised 2.5 percent of GNP by selling 20-year spectrum
licenses (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002). By contrast, the Faroese one-year quota auctions held
in 2017 raised 0.8 percent of GDP.
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3.3 Auction Design
This section briefly explains the rules of the auctions run in the Faroe Islands
in 2016–2018. It provides an overview of the setting in which these auctions
took place. In following sections we will be using specific examples from these
auctions to demonstrate how auctions with below-bid pricing rules may fail in
such a setting. An overview of quantities and species sold on auction can be
found in Appendix B. Average prices on the auctions and reserve prices can be
found in Appendix C and D, respectively.
3.3.1 Trial Auctions
The trial auctions in 2016 and 2017 were designed and run by the Faroese Ministry
of Fisheries. In 2016 a total of 10 percent of TAC of the four species (demersal fish,
blue whiting, herring and mackerel) was sold on auction in July and September.
Auctions were divided into series and two types of auctions — open and closed.
The open auctions were run as sequential ascending auctions where each series
(i.e. auction of a species in a certain day) was divided into smaller lots and sold
sequentially within minutes.
The closed auctions were run as uniform-price sealed-bid auctions where the
lowest winning bid would set the price for all winners of the auction. Here par-
ticipants had to submit quantity-price bids (i.e. how many kilos they would like
to purchase at what price) for each auction.
Owners of vessels registered in the Faroe Islands and with a fishing license
were allowed to participate in the auction providing they had a letter of credit
prior to the auction. Bidders were allowed to submit one bid per vessel in both
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the open and closed auctions.
The auctions in 2017 were very similar to those in 2016 although signi-
ficantly larger quantities were sold — over three times more quota was sold
(Fiskimálaráðið, 2016, 2017). As percentage of TAC, 8 percent of mackerel, 10
percent of demersal fish, 11 percent of blue whiting and 42 percent of herring
were auctioned in 2017. The main difference in the design was that bidders were
allowed to submit three bids per vessel in the sealed-bid auctions. These bids
counted as separate bids which allowed for several winning bids per bidder. In
addition to this a fishing license was not a pre-requisite for participation. Any
Faroese company was allowed to contract vessels registered in the Faroe Islands
to fish the quota for them as long as this was decided and specified prior to the
auction. Some minor changes were also made regarding the publicly available
information surrounding the auctions. For a complete description of the design
including dates of auctions and quantities sold, see Appendix B.1 and B.2.
3.3.2 Auctions in the New Fisheries Management System
In 2018 between 15 and 29 percent of TAC of the four species was sold on auction.
For the first time rights exceeding one year were sold. There were three types
of maturities — one, three and eight year rights — and different fishing areas
for each species. Companies would no longer submit bids for specific vessels but
instead each company was allowed to submit five bids without specifying which
vessels would use the quota. All registered companies in the Faroe Islands could
participate in the auctions. Furthermore, the owners of the fishing vessel utilizing
the quota had to be Faroese nationals, and the vessel had to be registered in the
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Faroe Islands and possess a fishing license prior to fishing the quota (Føroya Løgt-
ing, 2017). See Appendix B.3 for a complete description of the design, including
dates of the auctions and the quantities sold.
3.4 How Ascending Auctions Fail: Value
Advantage, Signalling, and Coordination
3.4.1 Value Advantage and Signalling
Let us first illustrate how poor auction design can exacerbate one bidder’s value
advantage in an almost-common-value auction setting. Consider the 2016 and
2017 auctions of quota for demersal fish in the Russian part of the Barents Sea.
The auctions were run in sequences of ascending auctions, with similar amounts
of quota being auctioned in each round.16 In 2016, two weeks after the auction
design had been announced — and before the auction was run — the largest
quota holder made an announcement on national Faroese radio claiming that
they were committed to win all the quota at whatever price necessary (Joensen,
2018). Despite several incumbents, all the 24 auctions had the same two bidders:
the aforementioned incumbent and one entrant.17 The outcome of the auctions
was that the incumbent won all 24 lots and the entrant was therefore the price-
setter in each auction round. Figure 3.2a shows the final price in each auction
round. The entrant competed most keenly in rounds 10 to 18, and the last six
auction rounds finished marginally above the reserve price. Overall, the average
16In 2016, 1200 tonnes were sold in 24 lots, and, in 2017, 1106 tonnes were sold in 11 lots.
17There was a third bidder in the 14th out of 24 auctions, but (as per their own explanation)
this bidder entered by accident. He stayed in the auction for a very brief time, and was neither
a winner, nor a price-setter. We therefore don’t read much into this behaviour.
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Figure 3.2: Prices in the auctions for quota for demersal fish in Russian waters
price for rounds 1–18 was approximately 3.4 kr./kg but only 1.5 kr./kg for the
last six rounds. It appears that in the middle rounds, the entrant was testing the
incumbent’s resolve, and perhaps checking whether the incumbent had bought
enough quota to be willing to exit the auction. With only six lots left, the
entrant stopped competing altogether: one plausible reason for such behaviour
is that the remaining amount of quota would not have been sufficient for the
entrant to run a profitable operation. With no serious competition on the last
six lots the incumbent could buy it marginally above the reserve price. As Figure
3.2b illustrates, the same auction ran in 2017 continued from where the previous
year’s auction left off: with the incumbent showing a strong commitment to bid
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whatever necessary to win everything. The entrant only bid in rounds 2 and 3
to test the incumbent’s committment, but dropped out thereafter. Consequently,
all lots other than 2 and 3 were sold at the reserve price to the incumbent.
Let us return to theory. Clearly, the standard symmetric and competitive
bidder assumption does not hold here.18 In the bidder pool there were three
incumbents (one of whom possessed larger quota than the others) and one entrant
(who was definitely value-disadvantaged). In the model of Bulow et al. (1999)
even a small value advantage between bidders can result in extremely asymmetric
bidding strategies in ascending (or second-price) auctions. In particular, the
value-advantaged bidder can credibly commit to “stay in the auction indefinitely
and win at any price”, and in response to this the value-disadvantaged bidder
bids very conservatively. As Klemperer (2002b, p. 174) pointed out:
A strong bidder also has an incentive to create a reputation for ag-
gressiveness that reinforces its advantage. For example, when Glaxo
was bidding for Wellcome, it made it clear that it “would almost cer-
tainly top a rival bid” [...] Predation may be particularly easy in
repeated ascending auctions, such as in a series of spectrum auctions.
A bidder who buys assets that are complementary to assets for sale in
a future auction or who simply bids very aggressively in early auctions
can develop a reputation for aggressiveness (Bikhchandani, 1988). Po-
tential rivals in future auctions will be less willing to participate and
will bid less aggressively if they do participate (Klemperer, 2002a).
18Indeed, if bidders were competitive and symmetric, the price path should be a martingale
and different auction rules should yield revenue equivalence (Milgrom and Weber, 1982b). Fig-
ures 3.2a and 3.2b show that the price path was certainly not a martingale in the 2016 and
2017 auctions for quota for demersal fish in the Russian part of the Barents Sea.
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The above illustration offers two warnings for the auction practitioner who wishes
to implement sequential ascending auctions. First, the main insights of Bulow
et al. (1999) can play out powerfully in asymmetric ascending auctions and appear
to be strengthened if incumbents can build a reputation over time. Second, the
incumbent can block entry by aggressive bidding in earlier rounds and denying
the entrant the chance to win enough quota to operate at a minimum feasible
scale.
3.4.2 Coordination
Let us now examine how poor auction design can facilitate bidding ring formation.
In 2017, the quota for mackerel was sold through two different types of auction:
sequential ascending auctions (analogous to the ones we discussed in the previous
section) and sealed-bid uniform-price (which we discuss later in Section 3.5). Each
type of auction offered 5,447 tonnes of quota.
The sequential ascending auctions took place on 22 August and the 5,447
tonnes were divided into 24 smaller lots ranging from 100 to 467 tonnes each.19
Seven bidders (we label them A–G in this section) participated in the auction and
all bidders except one (Bidder G) won a share of the quota sold. Figure 3.3 shows
the winning bidder and the prices paid by the winning bidders for each of the 25
lots. Each letter denotes a different winner. What is striking is the stability of
the prices. After three rounds, the prices settled at around 3.10 kr./kg. From the
third lot onward, all but two lots were sold at prices between 3.09 or 3.12 kr./kg
(the reserve price was 1.25 kr./kg).
19Lot 13, originally sized at 100 tonnes, was split in two because a bidder only wanted to
buy half, resulting in two lots of 50 tonnes each and 25 lots in total.
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Figure 3.3: Final prices in the 2017 auctions for quota for mackerel (25 lots)
With the exception of lots 13.2 and 21, the prices in all these auctions were set
by the same bidder — Bidder A, who exited roughly at the price of 3.10 kr./kg in
22 out of 25 rounds. The identities of the winning bidders rotated across rounds,
with five bidders taking turns to outbid Bidder A suggesting that there might
have been a bidding ring. In every round, with the exception of rounds 14 and
21, four non-winning ring members either did not participate or dropped out
at prices much below 3.00, leaving one designated ring-member bidding against
Bidder A.20
If the bidding ring were indeed present, then there are at least two explana-
tions for the bidding pattern: Either Bidder A was trying to push up the price
paid by all members of the bidding ring or the bidder served to commit members
of the bidding ring to pay similar prices. Of course, what we present here is not
20In round 14, two non-winning ring bidders dropped out at 3.08 and 3.09 kr./kg respectively,
possibly due to confusion caused by the splitting of lot 13 into two lots — 13.1 and 13.2 —
just before this. In round 21, it appears that one ring-member (who won in round 20) forgot
he was not supposed to win round 21, and stayed in until a price of 3.42 kr./kg. The bidder
subsequently quit the auction, and did not participate in subsequent rounds.
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conclusive evidence of an explicitly agreed bidding ring: repeated auctions, like
any repeated strategic situations, naturally offer opportunities for patient players
to tacitly coordinate on outcomes that are better for participants than static,
one-shot equilibria (Pesendorfer, 2000; Aoyagi, 2003; Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn,
2004).
Why was bidder coordination so simple in this auction setting? As Robinson
(1985) pointed out ascending auctions create ample opportunities for collusion.
Moreover, sequential auction designs mean that more bidder signals can be sent
(Marshall and Marx, 2007, 2009, 2012). Both observations relate to the two cru-
cial pre-requisites for successful collusion that are detection and punishment: the
present auction design easily affords both. Since after each round the winning
price is announced, every member of the bidding ring can detect whether a de-
viation has occurred. If a defection from agreement does occur at any round
before the last, remaining ring members can enforce a higher price in subsequent
rounds. Since each lot in these auctions was small — and the objective of most
ring-members was to win multiple lots — defecting from the agreement to win one
additional lot was probably of limited value, relative to the lower prices sustained
in later rounds.21
21An additional reason why we did not observe deviations even towards the end of the
auction could be bidder concerns for future auctions. Since the same pool of bidders will be
participating in future auctions together, and it is unlikely that the identity of the deviating
bidder could be concealed, deviating even in the final rounds may not be profitable for an
individual bidder.
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3.5 How Uniform-Price Auctions Fail:
Crank-Handle Bidding
Let us finally consider the susceptibility of uniform-price auctions to low-revenue
equilibria. In 2018, for example, quota for demersal fish in Svalbard was sold in
a series of (sealed-bid) uniform-price auctions. In these auctions, bidders were
allowed to bid entire demand curves (at most five price-quantity bids that form
the individual bid schedule) and the price for all units was set at the quantity
where aggregate demand intersected (fixed) aggregate supply. There were three
incumbents — let us refer to them as Bidders A, B, and C.
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate bid schedule of the incumbents and the supply of quota in
the 2018 auction for quota for demersal fish in Svalbard
Figure 3.4 shows the final aggregate bid schedule and the supply in the 2018
auction for quota for demersal fish in Svalbard. A striking feature is the sharply
declining portion of the aggregate bid schedule that takes place at quantities
between 321 and 331 tonnes. The final step decrease occurs less than 1.5 percent
from where aggregate demand and supply (of 336 tonnes) intersect. Even more
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striking are the individual bid schedules presented in Figure 3.5 which are flat
over much of the reasonable support for all three bidders before dropping off
sharply.
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Figure 3.5: Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for demersal fish quota
in Svalbard and market share of grandfathered quota (prior to the auction)
What explains this unusual bidding pattern? We call these bidding patterns
crank-handle bidding (see Figure 3.6 for the visual motivation for our nomen-
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clature).22 While there could be many equilibria in this uniform-price auction,
we believe that this is a natural, profitable, low-price equilibrium that incumbent
bidders can commit to coordinating on. As we explained in Section 3.1, to suc-
cessfully implement coordinated bidding in uniform-price auctions, the drop-off
in the aggregate bid schedule must happen just before the quantity at which it
equals aggregate supply. Suppose that a bidder wants to increase their demand.
This would push the vertical portion of the aggregate demand beyond supply
and increase the price sharply for all inframarginal units. This would make the
deviating bidder worse off and therefore the low-price equilibrium is, in fact, a
Nash equilibrium.23
Figure 3.6: A hockey stick, a crank-handle, and a bidding schedule
Without knowing exactly the bidders’ motivation for submitting the crank-
handle bid schedules, we cannot of course be certain that they are tacitly co-
ordinating on a self-enforcing equilibrium; indeed it might be possible that this
is genuinely what their demand functions look like. To cast doubt that these bid
schedules are purely coincidental, we note that in all six of the 2018 auctions, the
point at which incumbents’ bid schedules drop off sharply reflect precisely the
incumbents’ proportional holdings of the grandfathered quota share held prior
22In the procurement context, the “hockey stick” that describes hockey-stick bidding would
be horizontally reflected (e.g. Hurlbut et al. (2004) and Holmberg and Newbery (2010)). In
our case, the hockey stick presented in Figure 3.6 only describes a portion of the individual and
aggregate bid schedules.
23An analogous argument also applies for coordination in Vickrey auctions.
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to the auction. In Figure 3.5, we illustrate the grandfathered quota share of
the supply by the dotted line. It would be a remarkable coincidence that all
three bidders’ valuations of the quota would change so dramatically at exactly
the grandfathered quota shares, in particular since the industry as a whole has
considerable spare capacity.
There are two other notable instances of crank-handle bidding in 2018. First,
consider the auction for one-year quota for demersal fish in Russian waters. Here,
the incumbents submitted crank-handle bids (Figure 3.7). However, the drop-
offs in individual bid schedules were not in line with grandfathered quota shares
(Figure 3.8). Nevertheless, the aggregate bid schedule still fell off dramatically
just before the total quota supply. This indicates that bidders do not necessarily
require a clear focal point to coordinate on a low-price equilibrium.
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Figure 3.7: Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters
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Figure 3.8: Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for one-year quota of
demersal fish in Russian waters and grandfathered quota share of supply (prior
to the auction)
Second, consider the auction for eight-year quota for demersal fish in the
Norwegian part of Barents Sea. Once again, all the incumbents submitted crank-
handle bids and for two out of the three bidders the drop-off in the bid schedule
took place at almost exactly their grandfathered quota shares (Figure 3.10). As
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before, the drop-off in incumbents’ aggregate bid schedule happened just before
supply. However, in this case, the bidders did not succeed in coordinating on a
low-price equilibrium because an entrant pushed the aggregate bid schedule out
and therefore set a higher price (Figure 3.9).
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Figure 3.9: Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota for
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea
Crank-handle bidding was also observed in the three other 2018 auctions for
demersal fish (see Appendix E). In each case, we observe attempts at low-price
equilibria by the three incumbent bidders. However, all these other attempts were
frustrated because of entrants setting a higher price by pushing out the aggregate
bid schedule. It is worth noting that the entrants purchased less than one percent
of the total quota auctioned. Had no entrants participated in any of the six 2018
auctions for demersal fish, the incumbents’ winning shares would have reflected
precisely the grandfathered quota shares prior to the auctions.
In 2016 and 2017, bidders in demersal fish uniform-price auctions were only
allowed to submit one or three bids. Nevertheless, we observe a crank-handle
in the aggregate demand schedule for the incumbent bidders which falls off just
98
02
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000
Price
Quantity
Bid schedule
Share of supply
(a) Bidder A
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000
Price
Quantity
Bid schedule
Share of supply
(b) Bidder B
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000
Price
Quantity
Bid schedule
Share of supply
(c) Bidder C
Figure 3.10: Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota of
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and grandfathered quota
share of supply (prior to the auction)
before supply (see Appendix F). As in our latter examples, whenever an entrant
is present, the entrant was the price-setter in the main auction frustrating the
incumbents’ attempt at a low-price equilibrium. However, in each case, after the
auction results were announced, the price-setting entrant declined to purchase any
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quota since their bid was not accepted in full. This meant that, once again, the
incumbents’ attempt at coordination on a low price using crank-handle bidding
ended successfully, at least in part. Even if the price was higher than they had
coordinated on, they still had successfully excluded all entrants.
3.6 Discussion
Let us now review the failures of the three auctions we described and suggest an
alternative design that could have ameliorated the problems.
The sequential ascending auctions for quota for demersal fish in the Russian
part of the Barents Sea held in 2016 and 2017 failed because the only participating
incumbent was able to exercise his value advantage. As Bulow et al. (1999)
show, in such a highly asymmetric setting with a common-value component,
the first-price auction is expected to perform a lot better than the ascending or
second-price auction. Moreover, the sequential nature of the auction allowed the
incumbent to signal his commitment early on and drive the entrant out. Finally,
because the quota was broken up into small lots, the entrant had little incentive
to participate in the latest rounds because he could not achieve minimum viable
scale.
The sequential ascending auctions for quota for mackerel in 2017 failed because
bidders found a straightforward way to rotate winners and coordinate on a single
price. The sequential nature of the auctions meant the bidders had a lot of
information between rounds in order to monitor the outcomes of the possible
bidding ring.
The uniform-price auctions for demersal fish in 2016–2018 failed because bid-
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ders found a low-price equilibrium in which they submitted crank-handle bidding
curves. This equilibrium was only possible because in the uniform-price auction,
only the marginal unit was setting the price for all quota, therefore the bidders
did not need to worry about bids on inframarginal units (except to enforce the
equilibrium). As Klemperer (2002b, p. 171) argued:
Since, with many units, the lowest winning bid in a uniform-price
auction is typically not importantly different from the highest losing
bid, [the uniform-price] auction is analogous to an ascending auction
(in which every winner pays the runner-up’s willingness-to-pay). The
“threats” that support collusion in a uniform-price auction are likewise
analogous to the implicit threats supporting collusion in an ascending
auction.
One auction design that could potentially improve all these auctions is the first-
price sealed-bid package auction. In this design, bidders could submit bids for
packages of quota (divided into sufficiently small lots) in a sealed-bid manner
and the winner would pay the price that he bid for the winning packages. This
design has several advantages. First, package bidding would allow bidders to ex-
press preferences over operational scale which would make it harder to lock out
entrants. Second, sealed-bid auctions transmit little information to bidders, mak-
ing the formation of bidding rings less likely. Third, pay-as-bid auctions reduce
the value advantage of incumbent bidders compared to ascending or second-price
auctions as well as any incentives for crank-handle bidding in uniform-price auc-
tions. Therefore, pay-as-bid auctions are more likely to generate higher revenue
and efficiency compared to ascending or second-price auctions in our setting.
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Fourth, although the first-price sealed-bid package auctions have complex Bayes-
Nash equilibria, it is often easier to explain a first-price auction to bidders than
an auction with more subtle core-selecting pricing rules (for an example, see
Prendergast, 2017, footnote 4 and Marszalec, 2018b).
There are two possible variations on the first-price, sealed-bid package auction.
First, one could run a single auction for all the species at the same time, allowing
bidders to express package bids across different species. However, this is likely
to become complicated for the bidders as the bidding space would increase very
quickly. Second, the government could also run an auction with uncertain supply
of quota, which is most easily achieved by permitting the auctioneer to reduce
supply if the stop-out price is too low for their liking. This design mitigates the
ease with which bidders could coordinate on a crank-handle equilibrium and is
used in practice in many Treasury Bill auctions (Back and Zender, 2001; LiCalzi
and Pavan, 2005; McAdams, 2007).24 However, uncertain supply might not be
feasible in the fishing quota context since the annual TAC is usually publicly
known once it has been set by the authorities.
3.7 Conclusion
Economic theory based on realistic assumptions about the auction setting can be
extremely informative for auction design (Klemperer, 2002b). However, models
that do not take into account bidder asymmetry and possibility of collusion could
offer very misleading predictions of market behaviour and result in disastrous auc-
24Mariño and Marszalec (2018) find that the Department of the Treasury in Philippines uses
active supply restriction frequently, and on occasion cancels the entire tender if prices seem too
low. As a result, the market clearing price — whenever the auction is completed — is never
pathologically low.
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tion outcomes. In this paper, we showed that the underperformance of ascending
and uniform price auctions, which is predicted by various models of auctions
with asymmetric bidders and collusive behaviour, is borne out in practice even
among bidders who have had little experience of bidding in such auctions. While
fishing companies in Faroese auctions did not (as far as we know) hire dozens of
auction consultants, their experience of running profitable businesses in a tightly-
knit industry allowed them to easily implement profitable bidding strategies that
surprised the policymakers.
We believe that we have documented the first example of such a plethora of
interesting bidding strategies occurring simultaneously among a group of over-
lapping bidders. Our examples of crank-handle bidding are probably the most
exciting as we know of no other such clear example from the field (except in elec-
tricity markets). However, it is worth noting that the underpricing equilibrium
in this case was particularly easy to achieve since the supply of quota was fixed
and known. With some uncertainty in supply (as is frequent in electricity and
Treasury Bills auctions), such equilibria may be more difficult to achieve.
We therefore caution any auction designer who considers running (sequen-
tial) ascending or uniform-price auctions without flexible supply wherever there
is serious bidder asymmetry and opportunities for industry coordination. We
suggest that first-price sealed-bid package auctions may be more efficient in such
settings. Meanwhile, the majesty of ascending and uniform-price auctions walks
on theoretical stilts.
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3.8 Appendix A: Companies
Table 3.1: Companies operating in pelagic fisheries and demersal fisheries in the
Barents Sea
Company No of
vessels
Demersal
fish
Blue
whiting
Herring Mackerel
P/F Enniberg DF: 1 23%
Sp/f Framherji DF: 1 32%PF: 2 20% 14% 12%
P/F Christian í
Grótinum PF: 2 16% 18% 18%
P/F JFK Trol DF: 2 45%PF: 4 28% 26% 13%
P/F Varðin PF: 5 32% 33% 27%
P/F Jókin DF: 1 10%PF: 2 12% 13% 15%
P/F Thor Fisheries DF: 1 10%PF: 2 11% 14% 13%
P/F Ocean Group Faroes PF: 1 11% 13% 11%
Note: The percentages are their share of the total catch in 2017 of the respec-
tive species with the number of vessels operating in pelagic and demersal fish-
eries given in the table.
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3.9 Appendix B: Design of Auctions
Table 3.2: Total quantities (tonnes) sold on auction in 2016–2018
2016 2017 2018
Maturity 1 year 1 year 1 year 3 year 8 year Total
Demersal fish 3,000 2,827 3,865 227 677 4,769
Blue whiting 20,000 54,594 68,169 7,000 14,000 89,169
Herring 4,000 53,000 10,150 780 1,560 12,490
Mackerel 9,000 10,894 8,283 873 1,745 10,901
Total 36,000 121,315 117,329
B.1 Design of Auctions 2016
Auctions were designed in accordance with Executive Order No. 78 from 29
June 2016 (Fiskimálaráðið, 2016). 10 percent of the TAC of demersal fish in the
Barents Sea, blue whiting, herring and mackerel were sold. Auctions were divided
into series and two types of auctions — 7 series of “open” and 6 series of “closed”
auctions were run in July and September 2016. See Table 3.3 below for dates
of auctions and quantity sold in each series. The Minister of Fisheries had the
opportunity to set a reserve price and did so in all auctions. All quota bought
on auction expired by the end of 2016 and could not be transferred to the next
fishing year or to other vessels. The price of the quota had to be paid regardless
of usage.
Owners of vessels registered in the Faroe Islands with a fishing license and
owners of boats in Group 5,25 according to the Commercial Fisheries Act from
25Group 5 consists of fishing boats under 15 tonnes which do not need a fishing license for
fisheries.
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1994 (Føroya Løgting, 1994), were allowed to participate in the auctions providing
they had a letter of credit prior to the auction.
Open Auctions The open auctions were run as sequential ascending clock
auctions (often referred to as Japanese auction). Each series would be split into
either 15 or 24 sales lines containing smaller lots of quota. There were 150 lots
in total and the reserve price was announced just before the beginning of each
series. The procedure for selling each lot was as follows:
• An initial price is displayed (often reserve price) and bidders may enter the
auction arena.
• The displayed price increases continuously and bidders may exit the auction
at any point.
• No exiting bidders may re-enter the auction arena.
• When there is only one remaining bidder in the arena the auction (and price
clock) automatically stops.
• The remaining bidder wins the lot and pays the displayed price — the price
is therefore the valuation of the second highest bidder.
During the auctions buyers did not know who or how many bidders they were
up against. Bidders were only shown whether there was one or several buyers
in the auction arena. After the completion of each series of open auction the
following information was publicly available: number of participants, names of
winning participants, amounts bought including average prices for the different
buyers, and total revenue to the government.
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Closed Auctions The closed auctions were in the form of uniform-price sealed-
bid auctions and participants had to submit a closed envelope stating how many
kilos at what unit price they would like to purchase. Bidders were allowed to
submit one bid for each vessel and the lowest winning bid would set the price for
all bidders. The procedure for the closed auctions was as follows:
• Bidders submit one quantity-price bid per vessel in a sealed envelope.
• After the submission and before the opening of the envelopes the reserve
price is announced.
• All envelopes are opened.
• The bidder with the highest bid is served first, then the bidder with the
second highest bid etc. until no quota is left to sell.
• The price of the lowest winning bid sets the price for all winning bidders.
The opening of the envelopes was open to the public so all information regarding
bids was publicly available.
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Table 3.3: Dates and types of auctions including quantities (tonnes) sold in 2016
Date Type DF (NO) DF (RU)* BW* HE MA
11.07.2016 Open 1,200*
14.07.2016 Closed 0,600*
14.07.2016 Open 2,000 3,500
18.07.2016 Closed 600
21.07.2016 Closed 0,600*
21.07.2016 Open 2,000 3,500
22.07.2016 Closed 2,000
05.09.2016 Open 0000-*
06.09.2016 Open 0000-*
08.09.2016 Closed 05,000*
12.09.2016 Open 05,000*
15.09.2016 Closed 05,000*
19.09.2016 Open 05,000*
600 2,400* 20,000* 4,000 9,000
*Note that the auctions of blue whiting quota on the the 5th and 6th of September
were both unsuccessful because no buyers entered the auction. The reason for
no interest to bid was because of the reserve price which was perceived as too
high by the industry. On the 5th the reserve price was 0.30 kr./kg. It was then
lowered to 0.18 kr./kg the following day but this proved to be an insufficient drop
in reserve price to attract bidders. On the third attempt the reserve price was
lowered to 0.12 kr./kg and this time all 5,000 tonnes were sold at an average price
of 0.13 kr./kg.
B.2 Design of Auctions 2017
Auctions were designed in accordance with Executive Order No. 101 from 12
July 2017 (Fiskimálaráðið, 2017). As percentage of TAC, 8 percent of mackerel,
10 percent of demersal fish, 11 percent of blue whiting and 42 percent of herring
were auctioned on open and closed auctions in August and September 2017. In
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2017 there were a total of 17 series — 9 closed auctions and 8 open auctions. As
in 2016, all quota bought on auction expired by the end of 2017. It could not be
transferred to the next fishing year or between vessels and the price of the quota
had to be paid regardless of usage. The Minister of Fisheries also set a reserve
price in all auctions in 2017. See Table 3.4 for dates of the two types of auctions
and the quantity sold in each series.
In 2017 some significant changes were made to the participation rules. This
year a fishing license was not a prerequisite to be able to participate in the auction.
It was not necessary for participants to own a vessel either. Any Faroese company
was allowed to contract any vessel registered in the Faroe Islands to fish the quota
for them. All contracts had to be made three weeks prior to the auctions taking
place and only the vessel specified in the contract could fish the quota bought
on auction. The main idea behind this change was to attract new bidders and
to make it easier for new players to enter the auctions since the auctions in 2016
did not result in any new entrants to the market.
The open auctions were identical to the ones in 2016 apart from the division
of the series into smaller lots. In 2017 each series was divided into 11 or 24 lots
totalling 263 lots for the year. The exact same information (see appendix B.1)
regarding the open auctions was publicly available after each auction.
The closed auctions were similar to those in 2016. Auctions were still run
as sealed-bid uniform-price auctions where the lowest winning bid would set the
price. The main difference was that bidders were allowed to submit three bids
per vessel. The publicly available information after the sealed-bid auctions also
changed — in 2017 the only information available to the public were names of
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winning participants, amounts bought and prices paid.
Table 3.4: Dates and types of auctions including quantities (tonnes) sold in 2017
Date Type DF (NO) DF (RU) BW HE MA
22.08.2017 Open 1,106 15,477
24.08.2017 Closed 614 1,107 15,477
29.08.2017 Open 59,000 59,000
31.08.2017 Closed 59,000 59,000
12.09.2017 Open 59,000 59,000
14.09.2017 Closed 59,000 59,000
19.09.2017 Open 59,297 58,500
21.09.2017 Closed 59,297 58,500
614 2,213 54,594 53,000 10,894
B.3 Design of Auctions 2018
The auctions in 2018 were the first auctions after the new fisheries legislation
passed in the government in December 2017. 15 series of auctions were designed
in accordance with Executive Order No. 32 from 17 April 2018 (Fiskimálaráðið,
2018) and between 15 and 29 percent of TAC of the same four species were
sold on open and closed auctions. The major difference in the auctions this
year was that bids belonged to companies rather than vessels and that quota of
different maturities was sold. All registered companies in the Faroe Islands could
participate in the auctions. Furthermore, the owners of the fishing vessel utilizing
the quota had to be Faroese nationals, and the vessel had to be registered in the
Faroe Islands and possess a fishing licence prior to fishing the quota (Føroya
Løgting, 2017).
The open and closed auctions were identical to the ones in 2017 with respect
to publicly available information after each auction. There were only 3 series of
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open auctions — 1 series (16 lots) of herring quota and 2 series (25 lots each) of
blue whiting quota — which were run identically to the ones in 2016 and 2017.
There were 16 series of closed auctions, which also were similar to those in 2017
with the only difference being that bidders could submit 5 bids each. See Table
3.5 for an overview of all the auctions run in 2018. For quota lasting for more
than one year the price of the quota in subsequent years would be calculated
using the average landing value of the relevant years (Fiskimálaráðið, 2018).
Table 3.5: Dates and types of auctions including quantity, maturity and area of
quota sold in 2018
Date Type Species Maturity
(years)
Area Tonnes
24.04.2018 Open Blue whiting 1 FO/IS/NEAFC 25,000
02.05.2018 Open Blue whiting 1 FO/IS/NEAFC 25,000
06.06.2018 Closed Blue whiting 1 FO/IS/NEAFC 18,169
06.06.2018 Closed Blue whiting 3 FO/IS/NEAFC 7,000
06.06.2018 Closed Blue whiting 8 FO/IS/NEAFC 14,000
13.06.2018 Closed Demersal fish 1 NO 874
13.06.2018 Closed Demersal fish 1 RU 2,655
13.06.2018 Closed Demersal fish 1 SV 336
13.06.2018 Closed Demersal fish 3 RU 227
13.06.2018 Closed Demersal fish 8 NO 224
13.06.2018 Closed Demersal fish 8 RU 453
18.06.2018 Open Herring 1 FO/IS/NEAFC 5,000
21.08.2018 Closed Mackerel 1 FO/EU/NEAFC 4,226
21.08.2018 Closed Mackerel 1 FO/NO/NEAFC 4,057
21.08.2018 Closed Mackerel 3 FO/NO/NEAFC 873
21.08.2018 Closed Mackerel 8 FO/NEAFC 1,745
23.08.2018 Closed Herring 1 FO/IS/NEAFC 5,150
23.08.2018 Closed Herring 3 FO/IS/NEAFC 780
23.08.2018 Closed Herring 8 FO/IS/NEAFC 1,560
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3.10 Appendix C: Average Prices
Table 3.6: Weighted average prices in 2016
DF (NO) DF (RU) BW HE MA
Open - 2.98 0.13 3.57 3.63- 1,200 10,000 4,000 7,000
Closed 4.50 3.33 0.10 - 3.60600 1,200 10,000 - 2,000
Combined 4.50 3.15 0.11 3.57 3.66600 2,400 20,000 4,000 9,000
Table 3.7: Weighted average prices in 2017
DF (NO) DF (RU) BW HE MA
Open - 1.93 0.24 1.55 3.12- 1,106 27,297 26,500 5,477
Closed 4.50 3.01 0.24 1.47 3.25614 1,107 27,297 26,500 5,447
Combined 4.50 2.47 0.24 1.51 3.19614 2,213 54,594 53,000 10,894
Table 3.8: Weighted average prices in 2018
Maturity
(years)
DF-
(NO)
DF-
(RU)
DF-
(SV)
BWl HEl MAl
1 - - - 0.46 1.96 -
- - - 50,000 5,000 -
Open 3 - - - - - -- - - - - -
8 - - - - - -
- - - - - -
1 3.10 1.82 1.83 0.40 2.50 5.26
874 2,655 336 18,169 5,150 8,283
Closed 3 - 3.20 - 0.60 2.75 5.11- 227 - 7,000 780 873
8 3.20 3.20 - 0.66 2.95 6.10
224 453 - 14,000 1,560 1,745
Combined 3.12 2.10 1.83 0.49 2.36 5.381,098 3,335 336 89,169 12,490 10,901
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3.11 Appendix D: Reserve Prices
Table 3.9: Reserve prices in 2016
DF (NO)* DF (RU) BW* HE MA
Open - ** 1.50 0.12* 1.00 1.25
Closed 1.75** 1.75 0.10* 1.00 1.25
*Reserve price was initially set at 0.30kr./kg, then at 0.18 kr./kg, but no bidd-
*ers entered at those prices.
Table 3.10: Reserve prices in 2017
DF (NO)* DF (RU) BW HE MA
Open - ** 1.75 0.10 1.00 1.25
Closed 1.75** 1.75 0.10 1.00 1.25
Table 3.11: Reserve prices in 2018
Maturity
(years)
DF-
(NO)
DF-
(RU)
DF-
(SV)
BWl HEl MAl
1 - - - 0.10 1.00 -
Open 3 - - - - - -
8 - - - - - -
1 1.75 1.75 1.75 0.10 1.00 1.25
Closed 1.75** 1.75 0.10 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.25
8 1.75 1.75 - 0.10 1.00 1.25
113
3.12 Appendix E: Other Demersal Fish Quota
Auctions in 2018
E.1 Three-Year Quota for Demersal Fish in the Russian
Part of the Barents Sea
In this auction nine bids were submitted by three incumbents (Bidders A, B and
C) and one entrant (Bidder D). If looking at the bids of the incumbents only, the
sharply declining portion of the aggregate bid schedule takes place at quantities
between 212 to 224 tonnes, with an aggregate supply of 227 tonnes. The final
step occurs 1.3 percent from where aggregate demand and supply would have
intersected with only the incumbents’ bids. The price without the entrant would
have been 1.82 kr./kg. However, with the entrant’s bid the price was pushed up
to 3.20 kr./kg. The entrant bought the remaining 7 tonnes even though it was
significantly less than the 227 tonnes demanded. The individual bid schedules for
all incumbents drop off sharply very close to the intersection of the bid schedule
and the share of supply — for Bidder A and C the drop off happens just before,
and for bidder B just after.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Price
Quantity (tonnes)
Supply
Incumbents
All bids
Figure 3.11: Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for three-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters
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Figure 3.12: Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for three-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters and grandfathered quota share of supply (prior
to the auction)
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E.2 Eight-Year Quota for Demersal Fish in the Russian
Part of the Barents Sea
In this auction there was a total of ten bids submitted by the three incumbents
(Bidders A, B and C) and one entrant (Bidder D). If looking at the bids of
the incumbents only, the sharply declining portion of the aggregate bid schedule
takes place at quantities between 433 to 448 tonnes, with an aggregate supply of
453 tonnes. The final step occurs at 1.1 percent from where aggregate demand
and supply would have intersected with only the incumbents’ bids. The price
without the participation of the entrant would have been 1.85 kr./kg. However,
with the entrant’s bid the price for the quota settled at 3.20 kr./kg. Once more,
Bidder D bought the remaining 10 tonnes, although significantly less than the
453 tonnes demanded. Like in the previous example, the individual bid schedules
for all three incumbents drop off sharply very close to the intersection of their
individual demands and their share of the supply — the drop off for bidders B
and C is just before the intersection of the bid schedule and share of supply whilst
for bidder A the drop off happens 150 kg after this intersection.
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Figure 3.13: Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters
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Figure 3.14: Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for eight-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters and grandfathered quota share of supply (prior
to the auction)
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E.3 One-Year Quota for Demersal Fish in the Norwegian
Part of the Barents Sea
In this auction there was a total of nine bids submitted by the same three in-
cumbents (A, B and C) and one entrant (Bidder E). If looking at the bids of the
incumbents only, the sharply declining portion of the aggregate bid schedule takes
place at quantities between 844 to 869 tonnes, with an aggregate supply of 874
tonnes. The final step occurs less than 0.6 percent from where aggregate demand
and supply would have intersected with only the incumbents’ bids. The price
without the participation of the entrant would have been 1.85 kr./kg. However,
with the entrant’s bid the price ended up being 3.10 kr./kg. The entrant did not
buy the remaining 20 tonnes as this was short of the 437 tonnes demanded. The
striking feature about this auction is that the individual bid schedules for all three
incumbents drop off sharply right before the intersection with the grandfathered
quota share of the supply.
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Figure 3.15: Aggregate bid schedule in the 2018 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea
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Figure 3.16: Individual bid schedules in the 2018 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and grandfathered quota
share of supply (prior to the auction)
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3.13 Appendix F: Auctions for Demersal Fish
Quota in the Russian Part of the Barents
Sea in 2016 and 2017
F.1 Quota for Demersal Fish in the Russian Part of the
Barents Sea 2016
The first evidence of crank-handle bidding was in the auction for one-year quota
for demersal fish in the Russian part of the Barents Sea. The uniform-price sealed
bid auction took place on 21 July 2016 and bidders were allowed to submit one bid
per vessel. Five bids were submitted by four companies — three incumbents and
one entrant. If looking at the bids of the incumbents only, the sharply declining
portion of the aggregate bid schedule takes place at quantities between 550 to 575
tonnes, with an aggregate supply of 600 tonnes. The final step occurs less than
4.2 percent from where aggregate demand and supply would have intersected with
only the incumbents’ bids. The price in this case would have been 2.03 kr./kg.
However, with the entrant’s bid the price was pushed up to 3.06 kr./kg. The
entrant did not end up buying the remaining 50 tonnes as this was short of the
385 tonnes demanded.
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Table 3.12: All bids in the 2016 auction for one-year quota for demersal fish in
Russian waters
Vessel Company Price kr./kg Kg Agg. demand Leftover
Enniberg Enniberg 8.31 300,000 300,000
Gadus JFK Trol 8.12 250,000 550,000
Sjagaklettur Jókin 3.25 385,000 935,000 50,000
Sjúrðarberg JFK Trol 3.06 025,000
Akraberg Framherji 2.03 300,000
Table 3.13: Incumbents’ bids in the 2016 auction for one-year quota for demersal
fish in Russian waters
Vessel Company Price kr./kg Kg Agg. demand Leftover
Enniberg Enniberg 8.31 300,000 300,000
Gadus JFK Trol 8.12 250,000 550,000
Sjúrðarberg JFK Trol 3.06 25,000 575,000
Akraberg Framherji 2.03 300,000 875,000 275,000
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Figure 3.17: Aggregate bid schedule in the 2016 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters
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F.2 Quota for Demersal Fish in the Russian Part of the
Barents Sea 2017
Crank-handle bidding was also observed in the auction of one-year quota for de-
mersal fish in the Russian part of the Barents Sea on 24 August 2017. Companies
were allowed to submit three bids per vessel in 2017 following a change in the ex-
ecutive order concerning the auctions of fishing quota. A total of eight bids were
submitted by four companies — the same three incumbents and one entrant. The
sharply declining portion of the incumbents’ aggregate bid schedule takes place
at quantities between 1,055 and 1,095 tonnes, with the aggregate supply being
1,107 tonnes. The final step occurs at less than 1.1 percent from the intersection
of aggregate demand (of incumbents) and supply. In the absence of the entrant
the price would have been 1.75 kr./kg which was the reserve price set by the gov-
ernment. However, with the entrants bid the price was pushed up to 3.01 kr./kg.
The entrant did not buy the 52 tonnes offered as this was significantly less than
the demanded quantity of 450 tonnes.
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Figure 3.18: Aggregate bid schedule in the 2017 auction for one-year quota for
demersal fish in Russian waters
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Chapter 4
Declining Price Trends: Evidence
from a Faroese Fish Market
4.1 Introduction
The declining price anomaly (or the afternoon-effect) has imposed an intriguing
puzzle in the literature of sequential auctions. The term was popularised by
Ashenfelter (1989) who showed that the price of identical bottles of wine sold on
auction was more than twice as likely to decrease than to increase throughout
the day. Since the discovery of this phenomena many economists have attempted
to test for this feature in different markets and auction settings.1,2 Others have
made attempts to explain the phenomena theoretically (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Kahn, 1999; Black and de Meza, 1992; McAfee and Vincent, 1993; Milgrom and
1Ashenfelter (1989); McAfee and Vincent (1993); Ginsburgh (1998) found the declining
price anomaly in wine auctions, Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2004) and Kells (2001) in rare book
auctions. Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) and Lusht (1994) identified it in real estate auctions
and Buccola (1982) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1999) in livestock auctions.
2The declining price anomaly has also been supported by a number of controlled experi-
ments. For some examples, see Burns (1985), Pitchik and Schotter (1988), Estenson (1995) and
Keser and Olson (1996).
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Weber, 1982a; Jeitschko, 1999, 1998; Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994).
The declining price anomaly has also been tested in a handful of fish markets
(e.g. Gallegati et al., 2011; Pezanis-Christou, 2000; Salladarré et al., 2017; Fluvià
et al., 2012) with contradictory results. The aim of this paper is to test for this
anomaly in fish market auctions in the Faroe Islands. The Faroese fish market has
several particular features which make it an interesting case for analysis. Firstly,
the Faroese fish market has significantly fewer bidders compared to sellers than
any other fish market studies on the topic. Secondly, it is a small market where
sellers and bidders are quite well informed about each other. Thirdly, in contrast
to most other fish markets studied, these auctions are run as pooled auctions (or
right-to-choose auctions) where winning bidders can choose the desired units at
every round.
This paper tests for the declining price anomaly in the Faroese fish markets
using several methods. It applies the original ratio method conducted by Ashen-
felter (1989). To add to the analysis, reduced form analysis is conducted by
running various regressions on the whole dataset and on subsets corresponding
to certain species. This way we can determine whether the findings also hold on
the species level where goods are homogenous. The paper finds that declining
prices are a strong feature of the Faroese fish market both overall and for major
species.
The paper starts by reviewing the relevant literature related to the declining
price anomaly, before introducing the fish market, the design of the auctions and
the dataset. The following sections contain a description of the methodology,
followed by a presentation of the results. Finally, the findings of the paper will be
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discussed in relation to existing theories on this anomaly before the final section
concludes and proposes some avenues for further research.
4.1.1 Price Trends in Sequential Auctions
Sequential auctions of multiple items have been studied substantially since the
theoretical work of Weber (1983). He showed that in the indepent private value
(IPV) model, with risk-neutral bidders having unit demands, the price sequence
in a first (or second) price auction of identical objects is a martingale — i.e. on
average prices should not drift upwards nor downwards over time, but remain
constant. Milgrom and Weber (1982b) extended the model of multiple identical
units sold sequentially to include the case where bidders’ valuations are affiliated.
Milgrom and Weber (1982a) showed that in the first-price sequential auction
with affiliation and price announcements the price sequence is a submartingale.
Without price announcements they proved that the price sequence in first (and
second) price auctions at equilibrium is upward-drifting, i.e. given the price in
any stage, the expected price in the next stage would be at least as great. The
upward-drifting prices are driven by the affiliation assumption that results in a
lower risk of the winner’s curse, as information about the bidders’ valuations is
revealed in earlier rounds. These famous results have been challenged empirically,
originally by Ashenfelter (1989), who showed that prices in sequential auctions
of identical bottles of wine sold in the mid 1980s were more than twice as likely
to decrease as to increase. This result is often referred to as the declining price
anomaly (or the afternoon-effect as better known among wine traders). McAfee
and Vincent (1993) confirmed the existence of the declining price anomaly by
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using data from sequential wine auctions at Christie’s auction house in Chicago
in 1987.
Declining price trends are not limited to wine auctions and have been observed
in many other markets.3 Early evidence of such price trends was detected by
Buccola (1982) who showed downward trending prices in livestock (fall yearling
steer) auctions taking place at Winchester market, Virginia, from 1958–1979.
Milgrom and Weber (1982a) reported strictly declining prices in transponder
lease auctions at Sotheby’s in 1981 contradicting the theoretical results of price
sequences in the same paper. Kells (2001) studied Australian rare book sales in
three different decades (1970–1990s) and found that prices in sequential auctions
of identical books decreased more often than they increased or remained constant
in all three decades.
Declining prices have been identified in studies focusing on auctions of real-
estate (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992; Lusht, 1994),4 Dutch flowers (van den
Berg et al., 2001), jewellery (Chanel et al., 1996), cattle (Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Kahn, 1999; Buccola, 1982) and art (Beggs and Graddy, 1997; Pesando and
Shum, 1996).5
Although the majority of empirical studies on price trends in sequential auc-
tions point toward declining prices, there is some evidence of markets exhibiting
increasing price trends.6
3Most of these markets do not sell completely identical objects like in the case of wine
bottles. Exceptions include some book auctions. See Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2004) and
Kells (2001).
4Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) studied prices in sequential auctions for almost identical
condominium units and Lusht (1994) analysed commercial real-estate auctions with unidentical
units.
5Beggs and Graddy (1997) looked at auctions of impressionist and modern paintings and
Pesando and Shum (1996) studied sales of modern Picasso prints.
6Examples include Chanel et al. (1996) for watches, Raviv (2006) for used cars, Gandal
(1997) for television licenses, Jones et al. (2004) for wool.
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The declining price anomaly has been attributed to many different factors.
Many auction theorists have attempted to account for the phenomenon by con-
sidering e.g. risk aversion, supply uncertainty, heterogeneity of objects and par-
ticipation costs. Ashenfelter (1989) and McAfee and Vincent (1993) suggested
risk averse buyers were the cause of the anomaly, although McAfee and Vincent
(1993) highlighted that this is only a sufficient explanation for bidders with non-
decrasing absolute risk aversion — which is unlikely to be satisfied in practice —
they (McAfee and Vincent, 1993) therefore argue that risk-aversion alone is not
a sufficient explanation for the anomaly. Mezzetti (2011) attributed declining
prices more specifically to bidders being averse to price risk, although he found a
countervailing effect when there were informational externalities.
Pezanis-Christou’s (2000) study of sequential descending fish market auctions
with buyers with asymmetric preferences found that prices were not significantly
affected by the asymmetries. He also used risk aversion to explain the reasons be-
hind the declining prices, but concluded — like Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou
(2007) — that uncertain supply is another important factor in determining price
trends, as price trends were positive when supply was high, whilst the opposite
was true in low supply conditions. Similarly, Jeitschko (1999) considers settings
in which supply was uncertain and found that the price formation depends on the
information regarding supply and that an uncertain supply will lead to declining
prices.
Aspects relating to competition have also been connected to the declining price
anomaly. Von der Fehr (1994) argued that predatory bidding in earlier rounds
reduces competition due to participation costs, whilst Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
127
Kahn (1999) highlighted a limited capacity for purchases by buyers, which leads
to decreasing competition in later rounds and thereby, lower prices.
The work on the declining price anomaly has often assumed that goods are
identical but there is often some heterogeneity in objects despite their shared char-
acteristics. As an example, consider two lots of cod of the same size, fished at the
same location, on the same day, using the same fishing gear, but by different ves-
sels. These lots would be ‘identical’, although the experienced and well-informed
buyer would know that the lot fished by one vessel would be of superior quality
and therefore this heterogeneity would influence his behaviour at the auction.
Several studies (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994; Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994; Gale
and Hausch, 1994) have related ‘heterogeneity’ to the declining price anomaly.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) showed that as long as there is a large enough num-
ber of stochastically equivalent objects with bounded values, this will on average
lead to a downward trend in prices, whereas Gale and Hausch (1994) found that
right-to-choose auctions, where the winner can choose the preferred items first,
guarantee declining prices and efficiency.
Finally, Black and de Meza (1992) have questioned the existence of the de-
clining price anomaly, highlighting that the explanation for the observed price
decreases by Ashenfelter (1989) was the buyer’s option, where buyers could pur-
chase additional units at the same price. They highlighted that this feature of
wine auctions would automatically lead to declining prices. Having reviewed the
key literature related to the declining price anomaly, the context and relevant
auction market on which this chapter focuses will be described, before we go
fishing for the anomaly at the Faroese fish market.
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4.2 Faroe Fish Market
Fish prices in the Faroe Islands were originally set individually by fish factories
across the islands. This led to huge dissatisfaction among fishermen, due to
the different prices fishermen received depending on where they landed their
fish. Several attempts were made to deal with this problem, first in 1965, when
representatives from fish factories and the fishermen in common would agree on
the fish prices. This system was further developed in 1975 — following a collapse
of the fish prices in connection with the global oil crisis in 1973 — with the
establishment of ‘Ráfiskagrunnurin’ (wet fish fund). The aim of the fund was to
ensure that fishermen received more stable prices for their fish. This eventually
led to a plan economy that did not serve the Faroese fishing industry very well
(Gørtz et al., 1994; Astrup Hansen, 2007). After the ‘failed’ plan economy, calls
were made for a more market oriented approach, and this represented the start of
the Faroese fish auctions. The first auctions of wholesale fish in the Faroe Islands
were run in 1991 where public auctions were organised through telephones. These
auctions were well received, and soon proved to be a better solution than the price
setting mechanisms used up until then. However, one big disadvantage with these
auctions was that buyers could only buy fish in bulk rather than choose exactly
what was needed. This sparked the idea of a ‘floor’ auction, where buyers could
see and choose their preferred lots. In September 1992, the Faroe Fish Market was
founded and in March 1993, it held the first auction of this kind. The Faroe Fish
Market, which has been running auctions continuously since its establishment,
remains the only fish market in the Faroe Islands.
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4.2.1 Design of the Auctions
The auctions of wholesale fish in the Faroe Islands are organised as clock auctions.
Faroe Fish Market runs both Dutch (descending) and Japanese (ascending) auc-
tions and sometimes a mix of the two. The price is set by the highest or second
highest bidder depending on the type of auction. The seller can set a reserve price
and the auctioneer chooses the starting price. If any bidders enter the auction
arena at the starting price, the price clock will increase until only one bidder is
left in the auction arena – and the price is set by the second highest bidder.
If no bidders enter the auction at the chosen starting price, the price decreases
until a bidder enters the auction. If there is only one bidder he will win at the
price at which he entered and pay the first price. If more than one bidder enters
as the price clock decreases, the clock will reverse, and the price will increase
again, until only one bidder is left in the auction arena. The winner will pay the
price equal to the second highest bid.
Participants can see which other bidders are active in the auction arena, and
the winners of each lot are announced following each auction round. Buyers have
detailed information about the fish on supply prior to the auction. This includes:
• Estimated quantity and size of each fish species
• Where and when the fish was caught
• Fishing method — trawl or line
• Method of storage
• Date, time and place of landing
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There are two types of auctions: ‘floor’ auctions and ‘telephone’ auctions. In
the floor auctions the fish is present at the fish market and buyers can see the
fish before buying. The telephone auctions may only be based on approximate
quantities and size of fish. In some cases, the fish has not yet been landed.7
All fish of the same species and size is sold in one pool. Buyers have the
right to choose from that pool and the remaining fish will be sold in the following
round. This process goes on until all the fish is sold — then the auctioneer moves
on to the next size of the same fish (if there is more than one size) or the next
species.
Fish factories located around the islands constitute the majority of buyers.
Private (smaller) buyers along with foreign buyers occasionally participate. All
Faroese vessels can sell their fish on the fish market. Since 2018 Faroe fisheries
legislation (Føroya Løgting, 2017) has required that 25 percent of landed fish is
sold through the fish market.8
4.2.2 Presentation of Data
The dataset used in this paper contains every transaction of fish sold at the fish
market in the Faroe Islands from 2011 to 2017. The transactions are registered
daily in the fish market’s databases. The analysis in this paper will focus on
data from January 2017 to December 2017. This represents a sufficiently big
sample (5398 transactions) to test for the declining price anomaly. The database
consists of data taken from two separate databases of the Faroe Fish Market —
one containing all the auction data and the other one a record of all purchases.
7For further information on regulations of the auctioneer please see Faroe Fish Market
(2007)
8Fish caught using purchased quota on auction is exempt from this requirement.
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To obtain the final dataset, the two databases had to be merged in order to
obtain quantities sold at each auction round. In a few instances, where there
were inconsistencies between the two databases, auction rounds have been deleted
from the dataset.9
The auctions analysed in this paper took place at the Faroe Fish Market, in
Toftir, Faroe Islands. Auctions at the fish market are organised through an online
system and buyers can decide to be present at the fish market or to participate
remotely. Auctions take place every morning at 10 from Monday to Friday. On
some days auctions are also run in the afternoon if there is additional fish to sell.
It has been highlighted before that one of the weaknesses of many of the
studies on the declining price anomaly is that they focus on unidentical goods.
Kells (2001, p. 12) argues that “differences between the assets in the sequences
expose auction outcomes to the influence of sellers’ quality ordering strategies
and bidders’ idiosyncratic preferences over asset characteristics”. Due to this, we
try to ensure the largest degree of homogeneity as possible by excluding rounds
where lots contain mixed sizes of a specific fish. In other words, we only analyse
transactions where lots contain fish of the same species and size.
Once inconsistencies between the databases and heterogeneous lots have been
removed from the sample, 5398 transactions of a total of 25 fish species remain
in the dataset. These species are further split into different sizes so there are a
total of 63 different products sold on these auctions. The dataset included 2243
transactions from round 2 or higher. See Table 4.1 for total transactions in each
9A total of 4 percent of the transactions have been removed from the dataset for various
reasons. Mismatches in price and buyers were the most common reason for inconsistencies.
In order to keep the analysis as accurate as possible, inconsistent data was excluded from the
analysis.
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round. The auctions took place on 226 days in 2017. The fish sold in the sample
were landed by 314 vessels at 19 different ports and the total number of bidders
participating in these auctions was 25. See Appendix A for a summary of the
data and the fish sold in 2017.
Table 4.1: Number of transactions in each round
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Trans. 3155 1051 538 287 151 86 55 34 17 10 7 3 2 1 1
4.3 The Declining Price Anomaly
The aim of this paper is to look at the price dynamics in these auctions and
to see whether the declining price anomaly is a feature of Faroese fish auctions.
Several methods will be employed to test for declining prices in these auctions.
In addition to applying these methods to all the data simultaneously, we also
restrict our attention to certain species to identify price trends on the species
level. Firstly, we start by employing the method used by Ashenfelter (1989) in
his influential paper on the declining price anomaly, where he calculated price
ratios to identify price patterns in sequential auctions of wine.
Secondly, we run regressions to establish how the auction round affects ab-
solute and relative price changes — both with respect to the first price of the
day and to the price in the previous round. We also explore the impacts of the
number of bids, quantity sold and the price of the first round of each species on
price trends.
Finally, we employ the method used by Gallegati et al. (2011) by looking at
average prices of a particular fish species in the whole period and measure the
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strength of auction round as a predictor for average prices.
4.3.1 Ratios of Prices
We start by applying the method of Ashenfelter (1989) where we calculate price
ratios to establish whether prices increase, decrease or remain constant most
frequently. First we look at the ratio of the prices in round 2 or higher to the
price in the previous round. We calculate the ratio (k+1)
th price
kth price
for all k ≥ 1 where
k represents the round in the sequence of auctions of a particular species and size
in a day.
By calculating these ratios we get a price comparison of all consecutive auc-
tions of the same type (species and size) sold sequentially each day. These ratios
are then set equal to unity to establish whether prices are increasing, decreasing
or constant. Once these ratios have been calculated the proportion of decreas-
ing (increasing and constant) prices can be found to establish whether there is
a tendency of prices decreasing more often and hence possible evidence of the
declining price anomaly.
Since comparisons are only made of the same type of fish in a day, there are
some days where only one auction is of a specific fish type, because the first winner
purchases all the fish on supply in the first round. When these auctions have been
subtracted, there are 2243 auction rounds left to analyse. Table 4.2 shows the
number of auction rounds where prices are increasing, decreasing and constant.
The table also contains the mean, standard error and standard deviation of the
price ratios. The table shows very strong evidence of declining prices as decreases
in prices occur in approximately 81 percent of the cases. In 12 percent of the
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cases, prices increase and in 7 percent of the cases prices remain unchanged. The
mean of ratios is 0.94 (standard error = 0.0022), meaning that prices decrease
by an average of 6 percent per round. By looking at the price ratios on the
aggregate level, we have found a strong tendency for prices to decrease. However,
it is worthwhile examining whether this tendency also applies on the species
level. When restricting attention to the species most frequently sold on auction
(and with the highest quantities overall), the results are similar. Cod is the
most common species sold on auction followed by haddock, and a total of 90
percent of comparisons are from auctions of cod or haddock. The percentages of
transactions with decreasing prices are 78 and 87 percent, respectively. The mean
of ratios are 0.95 and 0.94 for the two species and the standard errors remain low
(0.0025 and 0.0033). The results found here are significantly stronger than those
of Ashenfelter (1989) who showed that prices were more than twice as likely to
decrease as to increase, and in approximately half of the cases prices remained
constant.
Table 4.2: Distribution of price patterns on the aggregate and species level
All auctions Cod Haddock
Later price higher 267 11.9% 205 14.0% 40 7.7%
Later price lower 1813 80.8% 1148 78.1% 452 87.3%
Later price identical 163 7.3% 116 7.9% 26 5.0%
Mean of ratios 0.9422 0.9534 0.9396
Standard deviation 0.1034 0.0963 0.0743
Standard error of mean 0.0022 0.0025 0.0033
Number of comparisons 2243 1469 518
Note: Prices compared to the price in the previous round.
The number of cases where the ratios are less than or greater than unity
does not necessarily constitute evidence of the declining price anomaly as prices
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may increase by more than they decrease even though decreases occur more often.
Therefore it is worth examining the magnitude of the price changes in more detail.
Table 4.3 shows the average ratios of increasing and decreasing prices seperately.
The table shows that price decreases are more substantial than price increases,
with an average decrease of 8 percent and an average increase of 4 percent. For
cod and haddock the respective figures are nearly 5 and 2 percent for increases
and around 7 percent for decreases for both species.10
Table 4.3: Average increases and decreases in price
All auctions Cod Haddock
Increasing
Average ratio 1.0437 1.0467 1.0202
Standard deviation 0.1090 0.1144 0.0225
Standard error of mean 0.0067 0.0080 0.0036
Decreasing
Average ratio 0.9221 0.9321 0.9290
Standard deviation 0.0962 0.0854 0.0733
Standard error of mean 0.0023 0.0025 0.0034
Note: Prices compared to the price in the previous round.
4.3.2 Regression Analysis
Thus far, we have established that prices from one round to another are substan-
tially more likely to decrease than increase, and that the prices decrease by a
greater magnitude than they increase. To explore price trends in the data and
their significance, we do some regression analysis on the data. First we regress
prices on the rounds in each day and take account for the different species by
absorbing the fish type variable. To ensure that species and prices do not confuse
the overall picture, we also control for the starting price of each fish type everyday.
It is important to control for the first price of the day due to two reasons: Firstly,
10We have conducted the same analysis comparing prices to the price in the first round. For
an overview, see Appendix B.
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the prices can vary depending on the day of the week,11 and secondly, buyers’
valuations are affiliated meaning that the signals sent through the price have an
impact on later prices. In the first regression, we have price as the dependent
variable, round as the independent variable, whilst our control variable is the
first price. Figure 4.1 below shows a binned scatterplot nicely demonstrating a
clear decreasing price trend throughout the day with a fairly precise and highly
significant coeffient of −0.5529 (standard error = 0.0173, p = 0). For the plot,
the data has been grouped into 20 equally sized bins, where each dot represents
the mean of the bin. As can be seen from the figure below, the data points are
a tight fit to the regression line and this indicates a significant downwards trend.
Table 4.4 shows the estimation coefficients and their significance from running
this regression.
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Figure 4.1: Binned scatterplot of price on round
11We do not analyse prices on different weekdays, but Salladarré et al. (2017) demonstrated
that weekday is a predictor of price in a French fish market.
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Table 4.4: Estimation result of price on round
Round -0.5529 *** (0.0173)
First price 0.8906 *** (0.0052)
Constant 2.2351 *** (0.0976)
Number of observations: 5398
F(2, 5333) = 14521.73 ***, R2 = 0.9765
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001.
Given that our data consists of many different fish types it is worthwhile
checking that the negative trend observed in the data is not specific to some
species only and that the trend holds across species. To model the variability of
the trend across clusters, we run a linear mixed regression model with a random
intercept and slope. By doing so we are able to test whether the effect of round
on prices varies depending on the type of fish. In our regression the data is
grouped into 63 fish types; we use price as the dependent variable and round
as our independent variable. We measure both random and fixed effects with
respect to our round variable. We also control for the first price of the day and
the number of bids, since this usually has an impact on prices in auctions. The
results clearly demonstrate a negative relationship between round and price, as
the round coefficient of -1.3209 is highly significant. As expected, the first price
and the number of bids both have positive and highly significant coefficients.
The random effect estimates show that there is considerable variation across fish
types, but the overall effect of round on prices is negative. Checking the individual
fixed effect coefficients for the round, we find that 62 out of 63 have a negative
coefficient, the minor exception being halibut of size 1 with only six transactions.
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Table 4.5: Mixed regression model for estimating prices
Fixed effects
Round -1.3209 (0.2299) ***
First price 0.8825 (0.0049) ***
Bids 0.4231 (0.0203) ***
Constant 2.6610 (0.4105) ***
Random effects
SD(Round) 1.3186 (0.1870)
SD(Constant) 2.8754 (0.3106)
SD(Residual) 1.6296 (0.0159)
Number of observations: 5398
Number of groups: 63
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
The previous regressions assume that the relationship between the price and
the round is linear. However, this may not be the case and therefore it is worth-
while running similar regressions where each round is treated as a separate vari-
able. Our dependent and control variables remain the same whilst the independ-
ent variables now become the individual rounds. Due the small samples in later
rounds, we have merged the data from the last eight rounds (see Table 4.1 for the
number of transations in each round). Figure 4.2 shows the coefficients of running
a regression of prices on the rounds and the first price of each type every day (the
constant and first price coefficients have been dropped from this plot). Table 4.6
shows the estimated coefficients and significance levels and the plot shows the
estimated absolute decrease in prices at each round relative to the price in the
first round of the day. It also shows the 95% confidence interval of all the round
coefficients. Although all the coefficients are significant, the standard errors are
lowest for round 2, and then gradually increasing for each round — this is to
be expected with the number of observations in each round. As well as showing
that prices decrease throughout the day, the coefficients also demonstrate that
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the price decreases are largest early in the day.12
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Figure 4.2: Regression coefficients for estimating price
Table 4.6: Estimation results of prices on rounds and the first price
Round 2 -1.2252 *** (0.0657)
Round 3 -1.8686 *** (0.0859)
Round 4 -2.1905 *** (0.1119)
Round 5 -2.4775 *** (0.1496)
Round 6 -2.9477 *** (0.1941)
Round 7 -3.3304 *** (0.2408)
Round 8-15 -3.4765 *** (0.2083)
First price 0.8979 *** (0.0052)
Constant 1.7822 *** (0.0941)
Number of observations: 5398
F (8, 5327) = 3789.71***, R2 = 0.9774
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001.
By running the same two regressions as above, on separate fish types, we
observe a similar trend. In Figure 4.3a we see a binned scatterplot showing
the relationship between the price of cod 5 on the round whilst controlling for
12For a similar regression, where all individual rounds are included separately in the regres-
sion model (instead of merging the last eight rounds) see Table 4.15 in Appendix C.
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Figure 4.3: Binned scatterplot and coefficient plot for price of cod 5
the first price of the day. The figure nicely demonstrates that the previously
observed negative relationship between price and round is even greater for cod
5 than overall. The round coeffient is −0.9457 and significant at the 1 percent
level (p < 0.001). Figure 4.3b shows a plot of the round coefficients and their
confidence intervals, from running the regression of prices on indivual rounds
whilst controlling for the first price. The plot demonstrates a strong statistical
significance at each round. See Table 4.17 in Appendix D, for the coefficients
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and their individual significance. We find similar results for all sizes of cod and
haddock, see Appendix D, for binned scatterplots and estimation results.
To explore further when the greatest price changes occur, we look at relative
price changes from round to round. To do this, we calculate the difference between
current and previous price and divide it by the previous price. Here we regress
the price change on the rounds without controlling for the first price but still
absorbing the fish types. As demonstrated in Figure 4.4, prices decrease at every
round, but they decrease by the greatest magnitude in the earlier rounds, with
the largest absolute change of 7.25 percentage points occuring between the first
and the second round. All of the price changes are significantly different from
zero (see Table 4.7). For a similar regression comparing prices to the price in the
first round, see Table 4.20 and Figure 4.8 in Appendix E.13
Round 2
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Figure 4.4: Regression coefficients for estimating price changes relative to the
previous price
13For estimation results of relative price change compared to the first and previous round
using all fifteen rounds separately, see Table 4.16 in Appendix C.
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Table 4.7: Estimation results of price change relative to previous price
Round 2 -0.0725 *** (0.0024)
Round 3 -0.0687 *** (0.0032)
Round 4 -0.0591 *** (0.0042)
Round 5 -0.0397 *** (0.0056)
Round 6 -0.0482 *** (0.0072)
Round 7 -0.0226 * (0.0090)
Round 8-15 -0.0248 ** (0.0077)
Number of observations: 5398
F(7, 5328) = 162.19***, R2 = 0.2086
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
4.3.3 Average Price Trends Between Rounds
To see how our results compare to that of other fish markets, we apply the
method used by Gallegati et al. (2011) in their study of price trends in the Ancona
fish market. This method calculates the average price of each round of all the
auctions in the sample, comparing the average prices between rounds. This is an
alternative method to see if there is a tendency for prices to decrease throughout
the day.
Here, we have applied the method to the auctions of cod (size 4), which is
the most frequently sold fish. Like Gallegati et al. (2011), we find that the prices
are decreasing throughout the day, although they found that prices increased for
the last transactions of the day due to limited supply. As can be seen in Figure
4.5, the average price is higher for the first round of the day and lowest for the
last auction round of the day. The price varies from 18.1 kr./kg to 16 kr./kg,
meaning there is a reduction of nearly 12 percent in price from the first to the last
round. When regressing prices on the rounds, it is clear that there is a negative
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Figure 4.5: Average price of cod 4 in each round and regression line
relationship between the two variables meaning that later in the sequence a lot
is sold, the lower the price.
To see the correlation between average prices and the rounds of the auctions, a
linear regression was run to predict the price from the auction round. The results
show that the negative relationship (coefficient is −0.1395) between round and
average prices of cod is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (p < 0.001),
implying that our independent variable, round, is a significant predictor of average
prices for cod 4. See Table 4.8 for estimation results.
Table 4.8: Estimation results for average price of cod 4
Round -0.1395 *** (0.0240)
Constant 17.928 *** (0.1765)
Number of observations: 12
F(1, 10) = 33.83***, R2 = 0.7719
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001.
144
4.4 Discussion
After employing several different methods to test for the declining price anomaly
in the Faroe Fish Market, we can conclude that declining prices are a strong
feature of this particular market. We have established that the round is a signi-
ficant predictor of price in later auctions, even when controlling for the first price
and number of bids. Using Ashenfelter’s (1989) measure of the declining price
anomaly, we can conclude that the declining price anomaly is also present at the
fish market studied here. However, there are two important differences between
Ashenfelter’s paper and the present study. Firstly, the goods considered here are
not as homogeneous as the bottles of wine studied by Ashenfelter (1989), and
secondly, the auctions at the Faroe Fish Market are right-to-choose auctions, al-
lowing bidders to pick their preferred goods. Decreasing prices could be expected
in right-to-choose auctions as this would imply that the ‘best’ goods would be
picked first. This has also been highlighted by Gale and Hausch (1994) who ar-
gued that the format of right-to-choose auctions itself guarantees declining prices
and efficiency. This could be one potential explanation for the decreasing prices.
In some cases, a potential explanation for declining prices could be reducing
quality throughout the day, i.e. fish sold in the afternoon is not as fresh as the
first lot sold in the morning, provided it was caught at the same time. However,
in this particular market setting, auctions start at 10 in the morning, and all the
fish is typically sold within 30 minutes. Since all lots of one fish type are normally
sold in the space of 1 to 3 minutes, we can rule out decreasing quality due to time
as a potential explanation for the declining price trends in our context.
Several papers have suggested that uncertainty in supply leads to decreas-
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ing prices (Jeitschko, 1999; Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou, 2007; Pezanis-
Christou, 2000). The context in which the Faroese fish auctions take place does
involve uncertain supply, especially due to the buyer’s option, where winning
bidders can choose to purchase the whole lot immediately. This means that po-
tential buyers are not guaranteed the chance to purchase the relevant items in
later rounds. This is also likely to be a contributing factor to the declining prices
observed here. There are several reasons why it is not possible to analyse the
exact impact of uncertain supply within this context. Firstly, the auction format
means that the overall demand is unknown. Secondly, there is no available data
on buyer expectations, which would need to be collected in a qualitative manner.
Thirdly, all the data in our current dataset is from the same auction format.
Data from another auction format in a similar setting would allow for a deeper
exploration of the exact contribution of uncertain supply to declining price trends.
Our findings support those of Salladarré et al. (2017) who found that prices
decrease more dramatically in periods with low supply, suggesting that the sup-
ply at the auction is a significant predictor of price trends. We briefly examined
whether the supply of cod (which is the most frequently sold species) was correl-
ated with the changes in price. We found that low supply is negatively correlated
with relative price change to previous round, at a significant level. Therefore, in
line with Salladarré et al. (2017), we can conclude that if supply of cod is low,
the decreases in price from round to round are greater than under other sup-
ply conditions. When using the round and low supply variables to predict price
change, low supply has a much greater negative impact on prices than the round,
both negative and significant at the 1 percent level (see Model 1 in Table 4.10 for
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this estimation result). We also estimated relative price changes using quantity
purchased in each round as one of the independent variables. The results showed
that the effect of quantity purchased in each round is negligible. Furthermore, we
found that including quantity as a control variable in the regression model has a
minute effect on the round coefficient (see Table 4.9 and Table 4.21 in Appendix
E for the coefficients and their significance).
Table 4.9: Predicting relative price changes (first round)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Round -0.027802 *** -0.026483 *** -0.028356 ***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Bids 0.015089 *** 0.013852 ***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Quantity 0.000006 ***
(0.0000)
Constant 0.015702 *** -0.021694 *** -0.020047 ***
(0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0029)
Observations 5398 5398 5398
F-test 1283.03 *** 799.25 *** 615.56 ***
R2 0.2497 0.2839 0.3087
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Here quantity refers to the amount sold in each round.
As discussed in Section 4.1.1 many economists attribute the declining price
anomaly to risk aversion in buyers. Risk aversion also seems to be one plausible
explanation for the price dynamics at the fish market studied here. Most buyers
are fish factories located in different parts of the islands. These factories only
have one means of getting fresh fish for their production, and therefore it is
crucial that they manage to secure their resources at the fish market for their
production. The combination of uncertain supply — exacerbated by the right-
to-choose and buyer’s option format of the auctions — and risk averse buyers
would likely be a contributor to decreasing prices. Testing such an hypothesis is
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out of the scope of this paper, as this would require collection of qualitative data
in relation to risk aversion, and additional data from several auction formats to
allow for comparisons.
In this context, it is worth considering another relevant explanation for the
decreasing price anomaly. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1999) attribute de-
clining prices to decreased competition in later rounds because buyers have lim-
ited capacity for purchases and therefore may purchase the necessary quantities
in earlier rounds. This leads to an overall decrease in buyers and hence decreased
competition in later rounds.
We tested this by running a regression of the number of bids on the round.
The results show that the number of bidders is decreasing by almost 10 percent
per round. The round coefficient of −0.0874 was highly significant (p < 0.001)
with a standard error of 0.01. Since this is the case, it is interesting to further
explore whether the number of bids can predict price patterns. We find that
Table 4.10: Estimating price change relative to previous price of cod
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Round -0.00322) *** -0.00281) ** 0.00004)
(0.00087) (0.00088) (0.00086)
Low supply -0.01365) ** -0.01124) ** -0.00501)
(0.00403) (0.00421) (0.00404)
Bids 0.01015) *** 0.01431) ***
(0.00108) (0.00106)
First price -0.00645) ***
(0.00041)
Constant -0.00936) * -0.04164) *** 0.05959) ***
(0.00465) (0.00644) (0.00894)
Observations 2439) 2439) 2439)
F-test 9.45) ** 42.3) *** 95.73) ***
R2 0.0077) 0.0794) 0.1632)
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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the number of bids is positively correlated with price. When trying to estimate
relative price change to the first round, and using the number of bids and round
as our independent variables, the bid coefficient of 0.0151 is significant at the
1 percent level. The round coefficient is still negative, −0.0265 (p < 0.001),
implying that the number of bids alone, is not sufficient to explain the declining
prices. See Table 4.9 for these results. We obtain similar results by regressing
the relative price change to the previous round on the same two variables.14
Therefore we can support Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1999) by saying
decreasing competition seems like a plausible contributing factor to the declining
prices. In this context, it is also relevant to highlight that the ratio between buyers
and sellers at the Faroe Fish Market differs significantly from that of other fish
markets studied thus far (Gallegati et al., 2011; Fluvià et al., 2012; Salladarré
et al., 2017; Pezanis-Christou, 2000), with very few buyers compared to sellers.
It is likely that this feature, with few buyers, will mean that they get what they
need early on, causing reduced competition later on, resulting in a price decrease,
an observation already made by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1999).
To get an indication of whether the above reasons can adequately explain
the anomaly, we can run a regression for cod controlling for all the measureable
contributors (first price, bids, low supply). Here we find that the effect of round
on price change compared to the previous round is minute (0.00004) and insigni-
ficant. Table 4.10 demonstrates these results and also shows that including more
of these control variables makes the round coefficient less negative (and finally
positive and insignificant). This suggests that the reasons above are sufficient in
14See Table 4.21 in Appendix E for these estimation results. The round coefficient is −0.0071
and the bid coefficient 0.0120, both significant at the 1 percent level.
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explaining the anomaly for cod. Future work should test whether the contributors
also can account for the declining prices for the entire dataset.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has tested for the declining price anomaly, which was first identified
by Ashenfelter (1989). It has since been the subject of many studies. We have
employed several different methods to test for the declining price anomaly in
the Faroe Fish Market. First, the original ratio method conducted by Ashen-
felter (1989) was employed. To add to the analysis, various regressions on the
whole dataset and on subsets corresponding to major species were run in order
to determine whether the findings also were relevant on the species level where
goods are more homogenous. Our conclusions from employing all of the methods
demonstrate that declining prices are a strong feature of the Faroese fish market
both overall and for major species. We found that the round was a significant
predictor of price trends.
From considering the context studied here and comparing to conclusions in
the literature, declining prices should perhaps not come as a surprise as indicated
in the discussion above. One could expect declining prices in connection with the
right-to-choose (Gale and Hausch, 1994) and buyers option (Black and de Meza,
1992) format of this market.
In line with (Salladarré et al., 2017; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1999;
Jeitschko, 1999), our analysis also found that both competition and supply con-
ditions had an impact on price patterns. Like Salladarré et al. (2017), we found
that low supply exacerbated the declining prices with steeper price drops in such
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contexts.
We also found that the number of bidders was positively correlated with price,
and as the number of bidders reduced throughout the day, this likely contributed
to the declining prices. As the number of bidders tends to be quite low at the
Faroe Fish Market, moments with low competition can happen quite frequently.
However, there are many avenues that should be explored further. We ana-
lysed data from one year. As the quantities sold through the auction vary signi-
ficantly from year to year, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to the
whole dataset to explore whether declining prices are a feature throughout the
period, and examine how different supply conditions and seasonal variation affect
price trends.
Faroe Fish Market is a small market, where sellers and bidders are quite well
informed about each other. It would be worthwhile to explore the behavioural
patterns of bidders, such as which buyers purchase from which sellers, when
particular buyers tend to enter the auctions, and the prices they pay relative to
others. This would allow us to test whether the declining prices can be attributed
to this particular pattern. As the dataset already contains this information, this
should be relatively easily achieved. Finally, efforts should focus on extending
the analysis to other fish markets to gauge which of the findings are specific to
the Faroese context, and which can be generalised to a wider setting. This would
enable us to make more general conclusions with regards to which particular
factors are most influential in determining prices.
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4.6 Appendix A: Summary Statistics
Auctions Analysed in the Paper
• 5398 auctions
• 63 different fish types (grouped in species and sizes)
• Up to 15 lines for every fish type
• 2243 auctions in round 2 or later
• 226 days from January to December 2017
• Fish landed by 314 vessels at 19 different ports
• 25 bidders in total (all winning at least 1 auction)
Table 4.11: Fish types, number of transactions, quantities and average prices in
2017
ID Fish Trans. Quantity (kg) Average price (kr./kg)
1 Cod 1 369 258,254 22.29
2 Cod 2 457 435,105 20.87
3 Cod 3 565 1,044,138 18.93
4 Cod 4 649 802,592 17.54
5 Cod 5 399 57,550 11.93
6 Cod 29 7,702 13.48
7 Cod 1-2 2 75 19.55
8 Haddock 1 299 52,781 18.00
9 Haddock 2 366 325,695 17.47
10 Haddock 3 337 237,454 14.89
11 Haddock 4 82 8,960 2.87
12 Haddock 79 10,578 11.19
13 Haddock 1-2 18 957 15.91
14 Whiting 105 20,204 7.55
15 Whiting 1 2 239 9.25
16 Coalfish 1 39 6,469 7.78
17 Coalfish 2 10 1,947 8.41
18 Coalfish 3 12 741 7.53
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ID Fish Trans. Quantity (kg) Average price (kr./kg)
19 Coalfish 4 6 213 5.52
20 Coalfish 5 4 791 4.18
21 Coalfish 33 7,189 7.16
22 Coalfish 1-2 8 968 7.73
23 Cusk 1 49 17,303 7.36
24 Cusk 2 37 32,139 7.31
25 Cusk 3 25 25,604 7.18
26 Cusk 4 16 6,330 5.68
27 Cusk 43 9,168 4.32
28 Cusk 1-2 5 3,295 7.80
29 Cusk 2-3 3 229 6.13
30 Ling 1 94 75,012 14.95
31 Ling 2 62 156,005 15.60
32 Ling 3 49 51,508 14.71
33 Ling 4 36 13,512 11.75
34 Ling 5 13 417 3.92
35 Ling 35 10,768 10.50
36 Ling 1-2 3 408 14.30
37 Ling roe 1 120 12.00
38 Greenland halibut 9 24,770 30.58
39 Norwegian haddock 1 1 128 8.00
40 Norwegian haddock 2 2 44 7.10
41 Norwegian haddock 3 - - -
42 Norwegian haddock 94 14,833 8.00
43 Blue ling 85 78,557 12.78
44 Wolf fish 129 14,993 6.77
45 Spotted wolf fish 64 29,029 10.88
46 Monkfish 1 1 18 24.00
47 Monkfish 194 36,683 23.20
48 Halibut 1 36 5,251 54.49
49 Halibut 2 42 2,358 81.80
50 Halibut 3 29 685 94.72
51 Halibut 4 6 28 104.00
52 Halibut 1 391 55.00
53 Plaice 46 3,630 5.99
54 Pollack 95 5,377 7.45
55 Smear dab 29 4,438 24.21
56 Ray (Skate) 53 17,569 7.67
57 Ray sides 42 9,681 20.44
58 Dab 14 428 3.99
59 Cod roe 4 67 9.58
60 Turbot 3 10 41.00
61 Porbeagle 1 25 7.80
62 Opak 1 40 11.50
63 Mackerel 1 7 4.80
64 Greenland halibut (sek) 75 131,401 19.05
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Table 4.12: Summary statistics of price and quantity per fish type
ID Fish Price Quantity
Mean S.D Mean S.D
1 Cod 1 22.29 3.69 699.88 2,397.34
2 Cod 2 20.87 3.18 952.09 2,137.45
3 Cod 3 18.93 2.60 1,848.03 3,354.01
4 Cod 4 17.54 3.62 1,236.66 5,262.24
5 Cod 5 11.93 3.17 144.24 228.18
6 Cod 13.48 3.98 265.59 482.36
7 Cod 1-2 19.55 0.78 37.50 17.68
8 Haddock 1 18.00 3.55 176.53 252.99
9 Haddock 2 17.47 3.50 889.88 1,568.21
10 Haddock 3 14.89 2.97 704.61 1,227.53
11 Haddock 4 2.87 0.75 109.27 118.35
12 Haddock 11.19 3.56 133.90 183.44
13 Haddock 1-2 15.91 3.87 53.17 47.29
14 Whiting 7.55 2.98 192.42 200.14
15 Whiting 1 9.25 1.63 119.50 92.63
16 Coalfish 1 7.78 0.98 165.87 284.33
17 Coalfish 2 8.41 0.54 194.70 271.90
18 Coalfish 3 7.53 0.62 61.75 96.38
19 Coalfish 4 5.52 1.36 35.50 23.05
20 Coalfish 5 4.18 0.62 197.75 118.53
21 Coalfish 7.16 1.32 217.85 155.31
22 Coalfish 1-2 7.73 0.78 121.00 189.94
23 Cusk 1 7.36 0.82 353.12 489.31
24 Cusk 2 7.31 0.94 868.62 1,015.85
25 Cusk 3 7.18 0.82 1,024.16 901.12
26 Cusk 4 5.68 0.83 395.63 226.92
27 Cusk 4.32 0.98 213.21 353.25
28 Cusk 1-2 7.80 0.45 659.00 598.58
29 Cusk 2-3 6.13 0.23 76.33 96.10
30 Ling 1 14.95 1.92 798.00 1,084.12
31 Ling 2 15.60 1.63 2,516.21 3,465.52
32 Ling 3 14.71 2.25 1,051.18 1,278.77
33 Ling 4 11.75 2.41 375.33 637.14
34 Ling 5 3.92 0.29 32.08 29.03
35 Ling 10.50 2.62 307.66 317.89
36 Ling 1-2 14.30 1.95 136.00 140.39
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ID Fish Price Quantity
Mean S.D Mean S.D
37 Ling roe 12.00 . 120.00 .
38 Greenland halibut 30.58 0.71 2,752.22 4,056.12
39 Norwegian haddock 1 8.00 . 128.00 .
40 Norwegian haddock 2 7.10 0.14 22.00 21.21
41 Norwegian haddock 3 - - - -
42 Norwegian haddock 8.00 3.02 157.80 150.58
43 Blue ling 12.78 4.80 924.20 646.72
44 Wolf fish 6.77 1.87 116.22 200.96
45 Spotted wolf fish 10.88 5.98 453.58 458.45
46 Monkfish 1 24.00 . 18.00 .
47 Monkfish 23.20 3.20 189.09 220.54
48 Halibut 1 54.49 8.54 145.86 134.19
49 Halibut 2 81.80 24.99 56.14 69.03
50 Halibut 3 94.72 25.10 23.62 49.92
51 Halibut 4 104.00 36.44 4.67 2.58
52 Halibut 55.00 . 391.00 .
53 Plaice 5.99 2.89 78.91 105.58
54 Pollack 7.45 1.74 56.60 82.80
55 Smear dab 24.21 12.65 153.03 125.30
56 Ray (Skate) 7.67 2.00 331.49 519.12
57 Ray sides 20.44 3.67 230.50 277.68
58 Dab 3.99 1.73 30.57 24.86
59 Cod roe 9.58 2.19 16.75 6.18
60 Turbot 41.00 18.62 3.33 2.31
61 Porbeagle 7.80 . 25.00 .
62 Opak 11.50 . 40.00 .
63 Mackerel 4.80 . 7.00 .
64 Greenland halibut (sek) 19.05 2.22 1,752.01 1,058.78
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4.7 Appendix B: Price Ratios
Here we analyse price changes in comparison to the first round of each species.
The price ratio is now given by k
th price
1st price
for all k ≥ 2. As can be seen from
Table 4.13 below, over 84 percent of all auctions in round 2 or later have a lower
price than that of the first round. These figures are 83 percent for cod and 89
percent for haddock. When looking at the average magnitude of the increases and
decreases in price (see Table 4.14) we can conclude that when prices are higher
than the first price, they are an average of 5 percent above, whilst lower prices
are an average of nearly 12 percent below the first price.
Table 4.13: Distribution of price patterns (first price)
All auctions Cod Haddock
Later price higher 242 10.8% 184 12.5% 37 7.1%
Later price lower 1897 84.6% 1219 83.0% 460 88.8%
Later price identical 104 4.6% 66 4.5% 21 4.1%
Mean of ratios 0.9093 0.9108 0.9244
Standard deviation 0.1251 0.1271 0.0837
Standard error of mean 0.0026 0.0033 0.0037
Number of comparisons 2243 1469 518
Note: Prices compared to the price in the first round each day.
Table 4.14: Average increases and decreases in price (first price)
All auctions Cod Haddock
Increasing
Average ratio 1.0484 1.0517 1.0247
Standard deviation 0.0766 0.0711 0.0247
Standard error 0.0049 0.0052 0.0041
Decreasing
Average ratio 0.8866 0.8847 0.9128
Standard deviation 0.1196 0.1209 0.0814
Standard error 0.0027 0.0035 0.0038
Note: Prices compared to the price in the first round each day.
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4.8 Appendix C: All Rounds
Table 4.15: Estimation results of price on all rounds
Round 2 -1.2247 *** (0.0656)
Round 3 -1.8680 *** (0.0857)
Round 4 -2.1891 *** (0.1116)
Round 5 -2.4757 *** (0.1493)
Round 6 -2.9454 *** (0.1936)
Round 7 -3.3267 *** (0.2403)
Round 8 -3.4757 *** (0.3031)
Round 9 -2.7102 *** (0.4251)
Round 10 -3.4791 *** (0.5526)
Round 11 -3.3270 *** (0.6594)
Round 12 -5.2606 *** (1.0048)
Round 13 -7.3004 *** (1.2305)
Round 14 -8.5211 *** (1.7403)
Round 15 0.6789 (1.7403)
First price 0.8978 *** (0.0052)
Constant 1.7848 *** (0.0939)
Number of observations: 5398
F(15, 5320) = 2032.04***, R2 = 0.9775
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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Table 4.16: Estimation results of price changes on all rounds
Relative to first price Relative to previous price
Round 2 -0.0725 *** (0.0029) -0.0725 *** (0.0024)
Round 3 -0.1032 *** (0.0038) -0.0688 *** (0.0031)
Round 4 -0.1162 *** (0.0049) -0.0592 *** (0.0041)
Round 5 -0.1259 *** (0.0066) -0.0398 *** (0.0055)
Round 6 -0.1473 *** (0.0086) -0.0484 *** (0.0071)
Round 7 -0.1613 *** (0.0106) -0.0228 * (0.0089)
Round 8 -0.1583 *** (0.0134) -0.0478 *** (0.0112)
Round 9 -0.1195 *** (0.0189) -0.0419 ** (0.0157)
Round 10 -0.1719 *** (0.0245) -0.0290 (0.0204)
Round 11 -0.1679 *** (0.0293) 0.0471 (0.0243)
Round 12 -0.2596 *** (0.0446) -0.0515 (0.0371)
Round 13 -0.3517 *** (0.0546) -0.0214 (0.0454)
Round 14 -0.3858 *** (0.0772) -0.0187 (0.0643)
Round 15 0.0195 (0.0772) 0.6408 *** (0.0643)
Observations 5398 5398
F-test 132.53 *** 91.58 ***
R2 0.3098 0.2264
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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4.9 Appendix D: Cod and Haddock
Table 4.17: Estimation results for price of cod 5
Round 2 -1.0882 *** (0.2387)
Round 3 -2.0947 *** (0.3015)
Round 4 -3.3104 *** (0.4182)
Round 5 -4.2737 *** (0.5726)
Round 6 -3.3533 *** (0.8050)
Round 7 -4.6492 *** (1.1246)
Round 8-15 -5.7705 ** (1.9335)
First price 0.7402 *** (0.0285)
Constant 3.1123 *** (0.3697)
Number of observations: 399
F(8, 390) = 85.88***, R2= 0.6379
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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Table 4.18: Estimation results for price of cod
Cod 1
Number of observations: 369, R2 = 0.7614
Round -0.6665 *** (0.0484)
First price 0.8556 *** (0.0271)
Constant 3.7634 *** (0.6477)
Cod 2
Number of observations: 457, R2 = 0.6616
Round -0.4247 *** (0.0519)
First price 0.7434 *** (0.0252)
Constant 5.6200 *** (0.5535)
Cod 3
Number of observations: 565, R2 = 0.6966
Round -0.2846 *** (0.0312)
First price 0.7579 *** (0.0211)
Constant 4.8422 *** (0.4000)
Cod 4
Number of observations: 649, R2 = 0.5151
Round -0.3607 *** (0.0450)
First price 0.5866 *** (0.0227)
Constant 7.3959 *** (0.4453)
Cod 5
Number of observations: 399, R2 = 0.6316
Round -0.9357 *** (0.0700)
First price 0.7286 *** (0.0281)
Constant 4.1075 *** (0.3628)
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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Table 4.19: Estimation results for price of haddock
Haddock 1
Number of observations: 299, R2 = 0.8790
Round -0.8610 *** 0.0793
First price 0.9551 *** 0.0206
Constant 1.5837 *** 0.3782
Haddock 2
Number of observations: 366, R2 = 0.8805
Round -0.5206 *** 0.0518
First price 0.8966 *** 0.0173
Constant 2.2352 *** 0.3218
Haddock 3
Number of observations: 337, R2 = 0.8765
Round -0.5269 *** 0.0455
First price 0.8740 *** 0.0180
Constant 2.3192 *** 0.2859
Haddock 4
Number of observations: 82, R2 = 0.9213
Round -0.7387 *** 0.0744
First price 0.9529 *** 0.0314
Constant 0.8746 *** 0.1088
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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Figure 4.6: Binned scatterplots for price of cod
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Figure 4.7: Binned scatterplots for price of haddock
163
4.10 Appendix E: Estimation Results
Table 4.20: Estimation results of price change relative to first price
Round 2 -0.0725 *** (0.0029)
Round 3 -0.1032 *** (0.0038)
Round 4 -0.1163 *** (0.0050)
Round 5 -0.1259 *** (0.0066)
Round 6 -0.1474 *** (0.0086)
Round 7 -0.1615 *** (0.0107)
Round 8-15 -0.1622 *** (0.0092)
Number of observations: 5398
F(7, 5328) = 258.47***, R2 = 0.3051
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6
Round 7
Round 8-15
-.2 -.15 -.1 -.05
Figure 4.8: Regression coefficients for estimating price change relative to first
price
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Table 4.21: Predicting relative price changes (previous round)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Round -0.008141 *** -0.007088 *** -0.008687 ***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Bids 0.012043 *** 0.010928 ***
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Quantity 0.000006 ***
(0.000)
Constant -0.008361 *** -0.038209 *** -0.036725 ***
(0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Observations 5398 5398 5398
F-test 142.92 *** 178.72 *** 190.49 ***
R2 0.0651 0.1004 0.133
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Here quantity refers to the amount sold in each round.
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Conclusion
This thesis has addressed the topic of resource allocation within the broad field
of game theory, covering both cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretical
approaches. In the four chapters, largely focusing on allocation methods within
fisheries, both theoretical and empirical methods have been employed. Three
different allocation mechanisms have been considered within the thesis: auctions,
grandfathering and the Shapley value, which is discussed in a more general setting.
Efforts have been made to take into account the contextual setting to the extent
possible and real life examples have been analysed to add to our understanding
of the behaviour of players and their interactions.
In the first chapter on the Shapley value, we introduced a cooperative game in
which some of the information may be missing from the characteristic function.
A universal assumption of game theory is that the money worths of the coalitions
are known. In reality, this is often not the case, since it might be in the interest
of players to withhold information or coalitions might not have formed. In the
chapter, two different methods for extending the Shapley value to the missing
information domain were proposed. First, intuitive generalizations of the clas-
sical axioms of Shapley (1953) were suggested. Following this, the paper looked
for domain restrictions on the set of known coalitions upon which the Shapley
167
axioms characterize a unique solution. The chapter found that when the set of
known coalitions is permutational, and there are as many known coalitions as
players, or the set of known coalitions is singleton-defined, there is a value which
satisfies the Shapley axioms. Somewhat surprisingly, the axioms characterize the
value. The value proposed (ϕ∗) is an obvious extension of the Shapley value on
the missing information domain. The value gives each player the average of their
marginal contributions to their predecessors in each of the known marginal vec-
tors. However, when the set of known coalitions is not permutational, then the
value (ϕ∗) cannot be applied to the game. Even if the set of known coalitions is
permutational, when assigning payoffs to the players, the value (ϕ∗) may fail to
use all the information contained in the characteristic function.
The second solution, which draws on ideas in social choice and economic
justice, largely succeeds in remedying these shortcomings. The solution consists of
two stages in which (i) an impartial observer could use the information contained
in the characteristic function to fill in the missing information, using an agreed
upon normative principle, in our case to “maximize the minimum payoff” (ii)
the Shapley value would then be applied to the ‘filled in’ game. Therefore, the
paper concluded that there are ways to extend the Shapley value to the missing
information domain and thereby find a ‘fair and efficient solution’ in potential
situations where coalitions have not formed or information is withheld. Finally,
we highlighted that both of the proposals put forward rest on the assumption
that the worths of coalitions are independent of the behaviour of players outside
the coalition and that there are many situations where this might not be the
case. Therefore developing ways of extending the Shapley value to partition
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function games — where worths are dependent on behaviour of players outside
the coalition — with missing information would make our methods relevant in a
wider range of settings.
In the second chapter, the first steps were taken towards developing a theoret-
ical model for exploring how different combinations of two allocation mechanisms
— grandfathering which allocates quota based on historical catches and auctions,
which any firm is allowed to participe in — perform in relation to key para-
meters. Since an important component of fisheries management is to limit the
negative externalities of the activity, the developed model allows the government
to incentivize investment into greener and more environmentally friendly fishing
technologies. In our model, the government did this by applying an environmental
tax, which could be reduced through investment, to achieve these environmental
objectives. Therefore, the firms’ level of investment directly affects its valuation
of quota sold at auction. This reduces the firms’ externalities and decreases their
marginal costs, leading to a higher valuation of the fishing quota sold at the auc-
tion. This meant that bidder valuations were endogenous within the model, which
we argued, better captures the complexity related to agents’ decisions. By apply-
ing the model in a theoretical setting, several important results were obtained,
which are very relevant in the fisheries context. This included how changing dif-
ferent government controlled variables (how much is auctioned or the resource fee
of grandfathered quota), affects the government revenue, total welfare, the firms’
level of investment as well as the equilibrium price at auction. We concluded that
the model needs to be further developed to improve its applicability in real-life
settings. In particular, we highlighted that the model must include decreasing
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marginal costs as well as potential anti-trust rules to improve its relevance in
the fisheries context. However, as currently developed, the model still provides
policy-makers with a tool to explore trade-offs between government revenue and
investment into environmentally friendly technologies and thereby understand
how to incentivise investments in the industry. The model also captures another
important policy concern by making evident how particular policy decisions and
changing the amount or price of grandfathered quota — and thereby also the
amount that is auctioned — would impact on the industry and the revenue of the
government. We found that the majority of the results seemed to fit to what one
might expect indicating that the model could be applied in the field of fisheries,
although as indicated above, the model and its underlying assumptions need to
be refined and developed further to improve its applicability and relevance in the
fisheries context
The third chapter focused on the auctioning of fishing rights that took place in
the Faroe Islands from 2016 to 2018. In terms of fraction of GDP, these auctions
were some of the largest ever held. Two different types of auctions took place:
the ascending (or second-price) and uniform-price multiunit auctions. The per-
formance of the auctions with respect to collusion, entrants, and price equilibria
was evaluated. The chapter found that signalling, bidding rings and low-price
equilibria all featured at the auctions, indicating that there were severe problems
with the auction design. Several examples of crank handle bidding, leading to
low-price equilibria as well as evidence of a bidding ring and signalling by a dom-
inant player were all observed. After having identified what we believe to be the
first case of all three of the above-mentioned phenomena happening in the same
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bidding environment, we argued that the underperformance of ascending and
uniform-price auctions are not just theoretical curiosities, but rather a pervasive
phenomenon in practical auction design.
Finally, straightforward improvements to the auction design, which could have
mitigated the problems identified in the Faroese auctions, were suggested. More
specifically, we argued that the first-price sealed-bid package auction would allow
bidders to express preferences over operational scale which would make it harder
to lock out entrants. Furthermore as sealed bid auctions transmit little inform-
ation, the formation of bidding rings would be less likely. Moreover, pay-as-bid
auctions reduce the value advantage of incumbent bidders compared to ascending
or second price auctions, as well as any incentives for crank handle bidding in
uniform price auctions. In view of this, such a format would probably be more
suitable in the Faroese context. The chapter demonstrated that the underper-
formance of ascending and uniform price auctions, which is predicted by various
models of auctions with asymmetric bidders and collusive behaviour, was borne
out in practice, even among bidders who had little experience of bidding in such
auctions. As a result, we ended by cautioning against the use of (sequential)
ascending or uniform-price auctions without flexible supply in cases where there
is serious bidder asymmetry and opportunities for industry coordination.
The fourth chapter analysed the auctions at the Faroe Fish Market. Using
auction data from 2017, the paper focused on identifying price trends at the
market. Since Ashenfelter’s (1989) discovery of the declining price anomaly in
sequential wine auctions, there has been a steadily growing body of literature on
the topic with contradictory findings, although the majority of empirical studies
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have found declining prices. Several methods were employed to test for declining
prices at the Faroe Fish Market. First, the method used by Ashenfelter (1989)
in his influential paper on the declining price anomaly was employed. Second,
regressions to establish how the auction round affected absolute and relative price
changes — both with respect to the first price of the day and to the price in
the previous round — were run. Furthermore, we explored the impact that the
number of bids, quantity sold and the price of the first round of each species had
on price trends. Finally, we applied the method used by Gallegati et al. (2011) by
analysing the average price of cod in each round across the whole period. Here we
also measured the strength of auction round as a predictor for average prices. The
paper found that declining prices were a strong feature of the auctions at the Faroe
Fish Market, both overall and for major species. This result was independent of
the method employed. In 81 percent of all cases, the prices were declining from
one lot to another, with the highest percentage for the second largest species in
terms of quantity and transactions — haddock — where the corresponding figure
was 87 percent. We also established that the auction round was a significant
predictor of price trends, even when controlling for number of bids, quantities
and the first price. Once declining prices had been identified, the paper went on
to discuss potential reasons for the price patterns. It highlighted that there were
two important differences with regards to the auctions studied by Ashenfelter
(1989). Firstly, the goods considered in our chapter were not as homogenous
as the bottles of wine studied by Ashenfelter and secondly, the auction format
differed as the auctions at the Faroe Fish Market were right-to-choose auctions,
allowing bidders to pick their preferred goods.
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After considering the context of the auctions and comparing to findings from
the literature, our paper argued that the declining prices were perhaps not so
surprising. We highlighted that one could expect declining prices in connection
with the format of the market. In addition to the right-to-choose, the auctions
also involve a buyers option — where winning bidders can choose to purchase the
whole lot immediately. We argued that these two features would expectably lead
to lower prices. Our analysis demonstrated that both competition and supply
conditions had an impact on price patterns. We found that low supply exacer-
bated the declining prices with steeper price drops in such settings. The paper
also found that the number of bidders was positively correlated with price, and
that it reduced throughout the day, which likely also contributed to the declining
prices. Therefore, we concluded that there were many contributing factors to the
declining price anomaly identified, which perhaps is not such an anomaly after
all.
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